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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Reid v. Sundolitt Ltd [2007] ScotCS CSIH_64 (27 July 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2007/CSIH_64.html Cite as: [2007] CSIH 64, [2007] ScotCS CSIH_64 |
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EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
|
Lord JohnstonLord EassieLord Wheatley |
[2007] CSIH 64XA142/06 OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD JOHNSTON in APPEAL from the Sheriffdom of
Tayside, Central and in the cause TONY REID Pursuer and Appellant; against SUNDOLITT LIMITED Defenders and Respondents: _______ |
Act: McDonald; Lefevre Litigation (Pursuer and Appellant)
Alt: McPherson, Solicitor
Advocate; Simpson & Marwick
(Defenders and Respondents)
[2] The circumstances
of the accident itself as found by the
sheriff in her findings
in fact are not in dispute.
"17. The
defenders had three methods of dealing with waste material. These were the use of empty octobins, the use
of plastic bags, and the use of pallets.
There were no empty octobins available to the pursuer on the day of the
said accident. The waste material from
the TFT machine was too sharp to make the use of plastic bags advisable. The material was too bulky and unstable to
attach it to the top of an empty pallet.
18. When
there were insufficient octobins available for the amount of waste material
which had to be cleared away it was not unusual for someone to climb into the
top of an octobin in order to try to tramp down the waste and thereby free some
space at the top of the octobin. The
said practice was known to the senior management of the defenders' factory in
Montrose."
[6] The sheriff
herself paraphrased or summarised the evidence of each witness
and at the end of the day the important evidence focused on
by counsel for the appellant, apart from that of the pursuer himself, was that
of George Nicol, Mrs. Cowley and Mark Simpson. He also made references to the defenders' witnesses
Mrs. Hartup, Chris Dennis and Kenneth Smith.
[8] In his pleading,
the pursuer's cases were as follows:
"Cond. 3 The said accident was caused by the fault and negligence of
the defenders. It was their duty to take
reasonable care for the safety of their employees including the pursuer. It was their duty to take reasonable care to
devise, implement and maintain a safe system of work for all tasks which their
employees required to carry out. In
particular, it was their duty to take reasonable care for devise, implement and
maintain a safe system of work for the disposal of waste materials. It was their duty to take reasonable care to
devise, implement and maintain a system of work for the disposal of waste
materials which did not require employees, such as the pursuer, to step into
octobins. It was their duty to take
reasonable care to devise, implement and maintain a safe system of work for the
disposal of waste materials which did not require employees, such as the
pursuer, to step into unsupported octobins.
In their performance of each and all of the said duties the defenders
failed. But for their said failures the
said accident would not have happened. A
safe system of work for the disposal of waste materials would not have required
employees to step into unsupported octobins.
The defenders knew or ought reasonably to have known that a failure by
them in the performance of all or any of the said duties could give rise to an
accident of the sort which did, in fact, happen. In particular they knew or ought reasonably
to have known that a failure by them to take reasonable care for the safety of
all of their employees, including the pursuer could result in him being the
victim of an accident whilst at work.
They knew or ought reasonably to have known that a failure by them to
take reasonable care to devise, implement and maintain a safe system of work
for all tasks which their employees required to carry out could result in
injury to one or more of their employees.
They knew or ought reasonably to have known that a failure by them to
take reasonable care to devise, implement and maintain a safe system of work
for the disposal of waste materials could result in an accident in the course
of disposing of waste materials. They
knew or ought to reasonably have known that a failure by them to take
reasonable care to devise, implement and maintain a system of work for the
disposal of waste materials which did not require employees, such as the
pursuer, to step into octobins could result in an accident of the sort which
did, in fact happen. They knew or ought
reasonably to have known that a failure by them to take reasonable care to
devise, implement and maintain a safe system of work for the disposal of waste
materials which did not require employees, such as the pursuer, to step into
unsupported octobins could result in an accident of the sort which did in fact
happen. With reference to the defenders'
averments in answer, it is admitted that the pursuer was subject to certain
duties of reasonable care for his own safety under explanation that he duly
fulfilled all such duties incumbent upon him.
Quoad ultra the defenders'
averments in answer are denied except
in so far as coinciding herewith.
Cond. 4 Separatim, the
said accident was caused by the breach of statutory duty of the defenders. The said octobin was work equipment within
the meaning of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998. Regulation 2 thereof provides:-
'(1) In
these Regulations, unless the context otherwise requires - "use" in relation to
work equipment means any activity involving work equipment and includes
starting, stopping, programming, setting, transporting, repairing, modifying,
maintaining, servicing and cleaning;
"work equipment" means any machinery,
appliance, apparatus, tool or installation for use at work (whether exclusively
or not).'
When the pursuer was tramping down
the contents of the octobin he was using the work equipment within the terms of
the said Regulations. Regulation 4 of
the said Regulations provides:-
"(2) In
selecting work equipment, every employer shall have regard
to the working conditions and to the
risks to the health and safety of persons which exist in the premises or
undertaking in which that work equipment is to be used and any additional risk
posed by the use of that equipment.
(3) Every
employer shall ensure that work equipment is used only
for operations for which, and under
conditions for which, it is suitable.
(4) In
this Regulation 'suitable' means suitable in any respect
which it is reasonably foreseeable
will affect the health or safety of any person."
The defenders breached the duties
which the said Regulation placed upon them.
The said octobin was not suitable for use by someone standing inside it
whilst it was sitting on a pallet. The
defenders did not have regard to the risk to the pursuer of the octobin falling
over whilst the pursuer was standing in it.
Regulation 20 of the said Regulations provides:-
"Every employer shall ensure that
work equipment ... is stabilised by clamping or otherwise where necessary for the
purposes of health and safety."
The defenders breached the said
Regulation and so caused the said accident.
But for the breach of the said Regulation the said accident would not
have occurred. The defenders did not
ensure that the octobin was stabilised by clamping or otherwise. The defenders' averments in answer are denied
except insofar as coinciding herewith."
"In my opinion the pursuer fails to
prove his case. It seems to me that
there was a safe system of work (a) for all tasks which the employees of the
defenders required to carry out; (b) for
the disposal of waste materials; (c) that
did not require employees such as the pursuer to step into the octobins and (d)
which did not require employees such as the pursuer to step into unsupported
octobins. To say that the fact that
there had been what, at most, can be described as a handful of incidents in the
past meant that there was not a safe system of work does not stand up to
scrutiny. More than one witness stated
that in his or her opinion it was common sense not to climb into the octobin
and, indeed, to do so was inherently dangerous.
The terms of the internal memo by Mr. Dennis refer to a verbal
instruction relating to this practice being given some eighteen months prior to
the pursuer's accident. That memo makes
it quite clear that instructions had been given to supervisors and team leaders
in all departments. Again, more than one
witness stated that it was a Health and Safety issue. Indeed, the fact that there has been only the
occasional incident of this nature seems to me to indicate that a mixture of
plain common sense and an awareness that this was a practice which was not
allowed, existed.
As
far as the breach of duty of care owed in terms of the Provision & Use of
Work Equipment Regulations 1998, Regulations 2, 4 and 20 is concerned, it is
eminently obvious that the octobin was not suitable for use by the pursuer
standing inside it. As far as the terms
of Regulation 4 are concerned, it seems to me that the defenders did their best
to ensure that the work equipment, namely the octobins, were used only for
operations for which or under conditions for which they were suitable, that
suitability being any respect which it is reasonably foreseeable will affect
the health or safety of any person. In
my opinion this is precisely the reason why Mr. Dennis had, some 18 months
earlier, instructed the supervisors and team leaders to make it clear to all
employees that climbing in and out of the octobins had to cease
immediately. As far as the alleged
breach of Regulation 20 is concerned, the said Regulation provides, the pursuer
did not lead any evidence to prove that stabilising the octobin by clamping it
or otherwise would have prevented the accident."
leaders to make it clear to all employees that the practice
had to cease.
More
importantly, there is in our view no support at all in the evidence for the
respondents' having known of or condoned those instances. With the possible exception of the pursuer,
all of the relevant employees who gave evidence stated - naturally in different
formulations - that they regarded climbing into an octobin to be obviously
dangerous; and they were equally clear
that if a worker were to be found indulging in that practice, their expectation
- again naturally expressed in words of differing colourfulness - was that the
individual concerned would be reprimanded or disciplined. This negatives any case based on want of instruction,
since there is no duty to instruct somebody in respect of some danger of which
he is or should be aware and when the practice which gives rise to the danger is
forbidden. In essence, therefore, we
would conclude that the pursuer's case at common law fails on fact, contrary to
the submissions of counsel for the appellant.
[18] However, the
case made under the Regulations reflects different considerations.
[21] Mr. McPherson
referred us to the Work Equipment Directive 89/655 which is in the following
terms:
"1. The
employer shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the work equipment
made available to workers in the undertaking and/or establishment is suitable
for the work to be carried out or properly adapted for that purpose and may be
used by workers without impairment to their safety or health. In selecting the work equipment which he proposes
to use, the employer shall pay attention to the specific working conditions and
characteristics and to the hazards which exist in the undertaking and/or
establishment, in particular at the workplace, for the safety and health of the
workers, and/or any additional hazards posed by the use of work equipment in
question.
2. Where
it is not possible fully so to ensure that work equipment can be used by
workers without risk to their safety or health, the employer shall take
appropriate measures to minimise the risks."
[23] More
importantly Mr. McPherson referred us to Robb
v
"The quantum aspect having been
agreed, it seemed to me that the Proof was not of such complexity that required
Counsel and could have been conducted by a Solicitor".
Counsel for the appellant informed us that he had been
employed at an earlier stage at which there were some difficult issues
respecting quantum of damages. He had
been very participant in their resolution, shortly before the proof. In these circumstances we consider that the
sheriff has misdirected herself in law in as much as she applied the question
of propriety and necessity of employing counsel as to the circumstances
obtaining at the start of the proof.
This is not the appropriate time to consider the matter, which has to be
assessed when counsel is first instructed.
In this case this was some time before the proof when, quite apart from
issues of liability, difficult questions of damages appeared to exist. Given those facts and the fact that the sum
of money involved was substantial we consider that the instruction of counsel
in this case was entirely appropriate.
We therefore allow the appeal in this
respect and hold that the cause should have been certified as suitable for the
employment of counsel.
[28] In these
circumstances and for these reasons we shall allow the appeal to the extent of
certifying the cause as suitable for the instruction of counsel and recall the
sheriff's interlocutor of