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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> G Hamilton (Tullochgribban Mains) Ltd v The Highland Council & Anor [2011] ScotCS CSIH_1 (07 January 2011) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2011/2011CSIH1.html Cite as: [2011] ScotCS CSIH_1, 2011 SLT 900, 2011 SCLR 365, 2011 SC 361, 2011 GWD 3-116, [2011] CSIH 1 |
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SECOND DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
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Lord Justice ClerkLord CarlowayLady Smith
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[2011] CSIH 1P1531/08 OPINION OF THE LORD JUSTICE CLERK
In the Reclaiming Motion in the Petition of
G HAMILTON (TULLOCHGRIBBAN MAINS) LIMITED Petitioner and Reclaimer;
against
THE HIGHLAND COUNCIL First Respondent;
and
ENNSTONE THISTLE LIMITED Second Respondent: _______
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For first respondent: Smith QC; Biggart Baillie LLP
For second respondent: Martin QC, Davidson; Tods Murray LLP
7 January 2011
Introduction
[1] This is a petition for judicial review. It
relates to a site at Tullochgribban, Carrbridge, Morayshire. The site is at
present in agricultural use. Part of it was formerly worked for minerals. The
petitioner owns the site. The second respondent owns the mineral rights. The
first respondent is the planning authority.
[2] The second respondent has applied to the
first respondent for approval of a schedule of conditions that will govern an
existing planning permission for mineral working at the site. The petition
relates to the validity of a decision that the first respondent proposes to
issue relating to these conditions and, in particular, to its proposal, set out
in a final draft of conditions prepared by it, to impose a first condition in
the following terms.
"For the avoidance of doubt, in the absence of a definitive docquetted site plan, the boundary of the site to which planning permission ICC/1964/798, issued by the County Council of Inverness on 12 February 1965 relates shall be as outlined in red in the approved plans EG320/RMP/F/01 & 2."
I shall call this area the red area. The first respondent proposes to exclude from the red area that part of it that is covered by Loch Mor (the submerged land). It is agreed that this exclusion is immaterial. The petitioner contends that planning permission for mineral extraction exists over only a small area within the red area that is outlined in green on a plan annexed to a letter from the first respondent dated 15 July 1997 (the green area).
[3] The petitioner seeks review of the proposed
decision by way of (1) declarator that no valid and subsisting relevant
planning permission exists over the red area beyond the extent of the green
area; (2) declarator that a determination of conditions that will apply over
the whole of the red area is ultra vires for that reason; (3) reduction
of the first respondent's decision as being ultra vires, and (4)
interdict, and interim interdict, against the first respondent's
determining planning conditions over the red area.
[4] The validity of the proposed decision
depends ultimately on the meaning and effect of the decision of the first
respondent intimated in the letter of 15 July 1997.
[5] By interlocutor dated 10 March 2009, Lady Clark of Calton
dismissed the petition for the reasons set out in her Opinion dated 13 January 2009. That is the
interlocutor reclaimed against.
Reviewing old mineral permissions
The background
[6] In the early years of development control
under the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1947, many permissions for mineral extraction
were granted subject to minimal conditions. By reason of an increasing public
sensitivity to the environmental effects of mineral extraction and developments
in the technology for minimising environmental impact, such conditions became
inadequate. Since 1991, legislation has required planning authorities to keep
a definitive list of extant mineral permissions and periodically to review and
update the conditions on which the permissions were granted. The general
objectives of the legislation with which we are concerned in this case were to have
a definitive public list drawn up of all old mineral permissions in each
planning authority's area, to make such permissions subject to new conditions
that were appropriate to modern environmental standards and in certain circumstances
to extinguish such permissions altogether.
[7] The current legislation relating to the
review of old mineral permissions is set out in Schedule 9 to the Town and
Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997 (the Schedule). The Schedule continues,
with immaterial changes in wording, the provisions of the Environment Act 1995,
which previously applied to Scotland. The scheme of the Schedule is based on a classification of
the relevant sites as Phase I, Phase II or dormant.
Schedule 9 procedure
[8] There are two stages in the Schedule 9
procedure. At stage 1, the planning authority must identify the mineral sites
within its area and draw up two lists. The first list is a list of all the
mineral sites (para 3(1)). The second is a list of the active Phase II sites
(para 4). We are concerned in this case only with the first list. At stage 2
it is for the holder of an interest in a listed site to apply to the planning
authority to determine the conditions that are to govern the relevant planning
permission.
Stage 1 (paras 3 - 6)
[9] So far as is relevant to this case, a
"mineral site" is defined as "the land to which a relevant planning permission
relates" (para 1(1), (2)(b)). A relevant planning permission means a planning
permission, other than an old mining permission or a planning permission
granted by a development order, granted after 30 June 1948 for minerals
development (para 1(1)). In broad outline, Schedule 9 requires the
planning authority, in drawing up the first list, to classify each site as an active
Phase I, an active Phase II or a dormant site (para 3(1)-(3)). The
definitions of Phase I and Phase II sites need not concern us in this case. A
dormant site is a Phase I or Phase II site at which mineral development has not
been carried out to any substantial extent between 22 February 1982 and 6 June
1995 otherwise than by virtue of a planning permission that was not a relevant
permission relating to the site (para 1(1)).
[10] When the first list is published (para 5), a
person who is the owner of any land or is entitled to an interest in a mineral site
may, if that land or interest is not a mineral site included in the first list
and does not form part of any mineral site that is in the list, apply to have that
land or interest included in the list (para 6(1)). It is then open to the
authority to grant the application in full (para 6(3)(a)), to grant it in part
(para 6(3)(b)) or to refuse it. Counsel for the petitioner contends that paragraph
6(3)(b) is the critical provision. It is in the following terms
"Where the planning authority consider that ...
(b) part only of the land or interest is, or forms part of, any dormant or active Phase I or II site, they shall accede to the application so far as it relates to that part of the land or interest,
but shall otherwise refuse the application."
[11] If the planning authority accedes to the
application in whole or in part, it must supply the applicant with details of
any amendment made to the list (para 6(10)). There is a right of appeal
against the decision of the authority to grant the application in part only or
to refuse it altogether (para 6(11)-(13)). There is no provision that
expressly requires the planning authority to specify the boundaries of the site
at the listing stage.
[12] The first stage of the procedure is to be
carried out expeditiously. The planning authority is required to publish the
first list by 1
April 1997
(para 5(4)), that is to say within three months. An application to be added to
the list has to be made within three months of its being published. The
planning authority has to make a decision on such an application within two
months.
Stage 2 (para 9)
[13] Once the first list has been compiled, the owner
of any land or a person entitled to an interest in a mineral site may, if it is
or forms part of a dormant site or an active Phase I or Phase II site, apply to
the planning authority to determine the conditions to which the relevant
planning permissions relating to the site are to be subject (para 9(1)). In
the case of a dormant site no relevant planning permission shall have effect
unless an application for approval of conditions is made to the planning
authority and such conditions are finally determined (para 12(3); para 9(1),
(5)).
[14] In an application for approval of
conditions, the applicant has inter alia to identify the mineral site to
which it relates, specify the land or minerals comprised in the site which the
applicant owns or in which he is entitled to an interest, and identify any
relevant planning permissions relating to the site (para 9(2)(a), (b) and (c)).
At this stage the planning authority may call for further details (para 9(9)),
including plans or drawings (para 9(10)(a)). In the case of an active Phase I
or Phase II site, the planning authority is entitled by means of such
conditions to restrict working rights in respect of the site (para 10), in
which case the applicant is entitled to compensation (paras 1(6), 10 and 15).
The history of the dispute
[15] On 12 February 1965, the County Council of
Inverness granted planning permission to George MacWilliam & Son
(Contractors) Ltd (MacWilliam), the second respondent's predecessor in title,
for the working of minerals at the site, which was referred to in the
permission as Tullochgorum. The permission narrates that it is granted "in
accordance with the plan(s) submitted to the Council and docquetted as relative
hereto." The plan docquetted as relative to that permission has been lost.
[16] In 1967 MacWilliam was granted a disposition
of the mineral rights at the site by Viscount Reidhaven, the then heritable
proprietor. The extent of the grant was as delineated and coloured red on a
plan annexed and signed as relative to the disposition. The boundary of this
area coincides with the outline of the red area which the first respondent has
identified in its proposed first condition (supra) as being the boundary
of the site to which the planning permission relates.
[17] In March 1997 the first respondent issued its
first list. The list did not include the site.
[18] By an undated letter received by the first
respondent on 7
May 1997 the
then owner of the minerals, Tilcon (Scotland) Ltd (Tilcon), applied to the first respondent to have
the site added to the list as an active Phase I site. With the application Tilcon
submitted a plan showing the site as being the red area. This plan appears to
be an enlarged photocopy of the red area in the plan annexed to the disposition
by Viscount Reidhaven. Tilcon also submitted evidence that the site had
been worked for minerals between December 1989 and December 1991.
[19] By
letter to Tilcon dated 26 June
1997 the first respondent said
inter alia
" ... from the information provided, the Council has been able to trace this old planning permission (reference number ICC/1964/798 approved on 12 February 1965) and has been able to locate a working on the ground as shown by the enclosed map. It would therefore seem appropriate to include Tullochgribban in the first list of sites."
However, in the absence of better information as to the annual output since 1982, the first respondent was minded to list it as a dormant site.
[20] By letter dated 7 July 1997 Tilcon notified the first
respondent that it had no production records available and accepted that the
site should be listed as a dormant site.
[21] By letter dated 15 July 1997 the first respondent notified
Tilcon that the site had been added to the first list as a dormant site. With this
letter the first respondent enclosed a Reference Sheet and a site plan. The
Reference Sheet, so far as relevant to the present dispute, is in the following
terms.
"Site: Tullochgribban, Carrbridge
Area: Badenoch and Strathspey
Grid Reference: NH 960257
Status: Dormant
Date of Permission(s) 12th February 1965
Planning Reference No: IC/1964/798
Operator: Tilcon (Scotland) Ltd ...
Notes: Permission
originally granted to Messrs George
MacWilliam (Contractors) Ltd, Torvean Quarry, Inverness
Site is referred to as 'Tullochgorum' in records of Inverness County Council.
Original definitive site plan not available."
On the site plan annexed to the Reference Sheet there is an outline of the green area to which I have referred. On the amended first list the site was described as "Tullochgribban, Carrbridge, Badenoch and Strathspey."
[22] In 2006, Messrs Johnson Poole and Bloomer, land
consultants, negotiated with the first respondent regarding the new schedule of
conditions that the first respondent was to impose on the 1965 planning
permission. The question then arose as to the extent of the site to which that
permission applied.
[23] On 24 October 2006 the first respondent's
Principal Planner wrote to Johnson Poole and Bloomer inter alia as
follows:
"Thank you for your further letter of 17 October enclosing a copy of the signed plan attached to the Disposition which is held in the Register of Sasines.
On this basis, and given that no more definitive information appears to be available concerning the site boundary for Inverness County Council permission no: 1964/798, it is agreed that an application under Section 74 of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997 should be on the basis of this boundary, with the following exception -
that the south-eastern boundary should be revised to exclude Loch Mor as it presently extends ... "
[24] On 20 April 2007 the second respondent
applied to the first respondent under paragraph 9 of the Schedule for approval
of a schedule of conditions to which the 1965 permission should be subject.
The conditions are framed on the basis that the 1965 permission remains in
force and that the mineral site in the first list is the red area, subject only
to the exclusion of the submerged land.
The first respondent's proposed decision
[25] In answer to the petition, the first
respondent avers that
" ... subject to a formal decision within the application process, the first respondents are minded to treat the red area as the area for which planning permission subsists for the purposes of the application and with reference to the 1965 permission. It has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the first respondents, by means of a comparison between a Register map index kept by the first respondents for the purpose of registering planning applications as they are made (including the 1965 permission), and the plan attached to the said 1967 disposition, that there is a correlation between these documents. It is therefore highly likely that the 1965 permission extends to an area demonstrated by each of said plans. The first respondents are accordingly minded to accept that the 1965 permission extends at least to the red area."
[26] The reference in these averments to the
Register map index kept by the first respondent is explained by Mr Andrew Brown
in an affidavit dated 22 September 2008. Mr Brown was a planner with the first respondent at
the time of the Tilcon application. From his knowledge of the practice of the
first respondent at that time in dealing with the listing of sites for which no
definitive site plan was available, Mr Brown concludes that the likeliest
explanation is that the map referred to in the first respondent's letter dated
26 June 1997 (supra) was a copy of the register plan covering the area
with the extant workings marked on it. When the first respondent then listed
the site, the site plan that accompanied the Reference Sheet was prepared using
detailed large scale maps held by the first respondent identifying what was
indicated as the approximate extent of the quarry working. It was not intended
that the site plan would seek to restrict the original planning permission to
the area indicated.
The decision of the Lord Ordinary
[27] The Lord Ordinary decided that, in granting Tilcon's
application, the first respondent added to the first list the site specified in
the plan annexed to the 1965 permission, whatever that area was. She reached
that conclusion on the view that the first respondent could not restrict the
scope of the permission as part of the listing process (Opinion,
para [27]). She accepted that what was to be entered in the list was "the
land to which a relevant planning permission relates." She said that "The
listing procedure envisages a listing of something which pre-exists, ie
the planning permission granted at an earlier date in respect of mineral sites"
(ibid). She concluded (para [28]) that the entry of Tullochgribban in
the first list constituted the listing of land to which a relevant planning
permission related, namely the permission of 1965 expressly referred to in the
accompanying reference sheet.
The issues in this case
[28] Counsel for the petitioner has raised two
issues; namely, (1) whether the planning authority was entitled or obliged to
define the extent of the mineral site in the first list; and (2) whether, if the
planning authority had power to define the extent of the site at that stage, it
defined it in this case as being the green area.
Conclusions
Issue (1)
[29] The submission for the petitioner is that by
the letter of 15 July and the accompanying documents the first respondent in
effect granted the application for listing in part only (para 6(3)(b)). Tilcon
had a right to appeal against that decision (para 6(11)-(13)). Tilcon's
failure to appeal had the consequence that any planning permission for mineral
development beyond the green area was extinguished (paras 6(11)(b) and 12). For
the reasons that I shall give, I do not accept that the first respondent granted
Tilcon's application in part only. However, for the purpose of deciding this
issue, I shall assume that that is what the first respondent purported to do.
[30] The proposition of counsel for the
petitioner is that on a true interpretation of Schedule 9, and in
particular paragraphs 1 to 6, the boundaries of a mineral site, as defined in
paragraph 1, fall to be determined by the planning authority, on the
information available to it, at the first list stage and not at any later stage
in the Schedule 9 procedure: that is to say, an entry in the first list is not
merely site-specific but boundary-specific too. It follows, on this
submission, that at stage 2, when it comes to consider the question of
conditions, it is too late for the planning authority to define the boundaries
of the site.
[31] The submission for the petitioner stresses
that "mineral site" is defined by reference to "the land" (Sched 9, para
1(2)(b), 1(4)) and that the process of applying to be added to the first list relates
to "the land or interest" (para 6)(1), (3) and (4)). That, in counsel's
submission, means that the list must define the land that forms the mineral
site in each case. It is implicit in that argument that even if, as the first
respondent is disposed to accept, the 1965 permission extended over the whole
of the red area, the effect of the listing of this site is to restrict the
development rights granted in 1965. On that view, the lost plan annexed to the
1965 permission is now of no significance and would be of no significance if it
were to be found.
[32] Counsel for the petitioner submitted the
Lord Ordinary erred in describing the list as a list of planning permissions
rather than a list of sites. I think that that criticism is unjustified. When
the Lord Ordinary said that the listing procedure envisaged "a listing of
something which pre-exists, ie the planning permission granted at an
earlier date" (para [27]), I think that she meant only that the mineral sites
are to be identified by reference to planning permissions, which is plainly the
case in view of the definition of a "mineral site" (para 1(2)(b)) that I have
quoted.
[33] In my opinion, the Lord Ordinary's decision is
correct. The
power of the planning authority at stage 1 is merely a power to list a mineral
site. Looking at the overall scheme of Schedule 9, I think that the procedure
of listing (paras 3 to 6) is administrative in nature (Dorset CC v Secretary
of State [1999] JPL 633, at pp 642-643). Listing is the qualification that
entitles the interested party to apply to the planning authority to determine
the conditions that should govern the existing planning permission (cf R. v
Oldham MBC and Anr, ex p Foster, supra; and R (Payne) v
Caerphilly CBC,
supra). Listing is about preserving an extant planning permission, not about
restricting or rescinding it. The first list is a census of the mineral sites in
the planning authority's area (para 3(1); R v Oldham MBC and Anr, ex
p Foster, [2002] Env LR 395, at p 402; R (Payne) v Caerphilly CBC (2002) 25 PLCR 496,
[2003] Env LR 679 (Court of Appeal); Lafarge Aggregates v Scottish
Ministers 2004 SC 524, at para [37]). It is not a list of defined areas of
land. It is drawn up to identify where the mineral sites are and to classify
each of them in order to determine the procedures that are to be followed at
stage 2. The existence of a relevant planning permission relating to it is the
condition precedent to the inclusion of a site in the list. Therefore the
planning authority is bound to satisfy itself that a relevant planning
permission exists; but it need not identify the planning permission in the list
itself (R v Oldham MBC, ex p Foster, supra) and a
fortiori, in my view, it need not define its boundaries. Since the site is by
definition land to which a relevant planning permission relates, the extent of
it will be defined by the planning permission itself. If the site is then listed,
the extant planning permission will remain alive in its entirety.
[34] It is only when the site is listed that the
extent of the existing development rights over it becomes important. That
question will be determined at stage 2 by reference to the relevant planning
permission itself. It is at that stage that planning judgments have to be made on the merits
of each case.
[35] If the boundaries of the site had been a
matter to be determined at the listing stage, I would have expected that that
would be expressly provided for in the Schedule. As it is, paragraph 3 refers
to certain specific matters that are to be set out in the list (eg
para 3(3),(4)); but these do not include the boundaries of the site.
There is a preliminary unlikelihood in the idea that at stage 1 the
planning authority should be required or entitled to determine the precise
boundaries of each site that it lists, particularly in view of the tight
timetable that the legislation imposes for compiling the first list and
deciding on applications to be added to it.
[36] On the other hand, the exact boundaries of a
listed mineral site will be a relevant consideration at stage 2 because
the applicant has to identify the land over which he has an interest and
identify any relevant planning permissions relating to the site
(para 9(2)(c)). If that question should be contentious, it will be for
the planning authority to determine the boundaries by reference to the original
planning permission or if, as in this case, the docquetted plan is missing, by
reference to such other evidence as is before it. The extent of the site may then
be a crucial question, because if it is an active Phase I or Phase II site, the
planning authority can decide that, for planning reasons, the working rights
should now be restricted (para 10). That is why the planning authority is
entitled at that stage to call on the applicant to produce plans or drawings
(para 9(9), (10)).
[37] The interpretation proposed for the
petitioner requires us to conclude that as part of the listing process Schedule
9 has, by implication, given the planning authority power to restrict the scope
of an extant permission. Since that would involve the abridgment of existing
land use rights, I regard that as an unlikely interpretation. The power to restrict
working rights at stage 2 is granted expressly, and with a related right
to compensation. That points against there being any implied power to restrict
the area of an extant permission, without right to compensation, at
stage 1.
[38] In this case, all that the first respondent was
asked to do was to accept that there was a mineral site at Tullochgribban. It
could refuse the application only to the extent that the applicant's land or
interest fell outside the boundary of a relevant planning permission. The first
respondent did not know whether or not it did. It was in no position to decide
what the extent of the planning permission was. In those circumstances, in my
opinion, paragraph 6(3)(b) did not authorise it to decide at that stage what
the extent of the permission should be. I agree with the Lord Ordinary on this
point (at para [27]).
[39] In my opinion, the case for the petitioner
is based on a misinterpretation of the provision in paragraph 6(3)(b) (supra)
that entitles the planning authority to grant an application for listing in
part only. The power to grant an application in part only arises where the
planning authority concludes that part of the applicant's "land or interest" does
not enjoy a relevant permission at all. Such a decision could be made where
the evidence was clear: for example, if the applicant were to submit a plan
that was inconsistent with the docquetted plan annexed to the permission; or if
there was clear evidence that the planning permission founded on had expired (eg
R (Payne) v Caerphilly CBC, supra, Dyson LJ at para 27) or been revoked. A
decision of that kind is entirely different from a decision by the planning
authority, in the absence of the docquetted plan, as to what the extent of the
site should be.
[40] Counsel for the petitioner has relied on two
decisions supporting the principle that in identifying the sites for listing,
it may be necessary for the planning authority to construe such planning
permissions as are before it (Stancliffe Stone Company v Peak
District NP Authority [2005] Env LR 434; [2006] Env LR 150 (Court of
Appeal); Lafarge Aggregates Ltd v Scottish Ministers, supra);
but in my view these cases do not assist his argument. They merely demonstrate
that to list a mineral site the planning authority has first to be satisfied
that the site is land to which a relevant planning permission relates. That is
not an issue in this case. It is agreed on all sides that at the time of the
preparation of the first list the land at Tullochgribban was land to which a
relevant planning permission related. The existence and continuing validity of
the 1965 permission was not then in doubt. The only question, if it was then a
question, was what the extent of the site was.
[41] Staffordshire County Council v NGR
Land Developments Ltd ([2002] EWCA Civ 856), on which counsel for the
reclaimer also relies, has no bearing on the present question. That case
simply establishes that the planning authority is entitled not to list a site
where implementation of the relevant planning permission has become physically
impossible (ibid, at paras [57]-[61]). If it is impossible to implement
a planning permission, it cannot meaningfully be said that there are
development rights over the site in terms of that permission.
Issue (2)
[42] Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
true interpretation of the letter of 15 July 1997 and its annexations was
that the first respondent conclusively determined that the mineral site was the
green area and accordingly listed only that area. I do not agree. In my
opinion, the planning authority granted the application simpliciter. In
the letter of 15
July 1997 it
did not invoke paragraph 6(3)(b), as would have been necessary if it had granted
Tilcon's application in part only. On the contrary, the Reference Sheet
identified the site, correctly in my view, by reference to the 1965 planning
permission and, far from defining the area of it, stated that the original definitive
site plan was not available.
[43] On the uncontradicted evidence of the
planning official who dealt with this case at the time, it appears that the green
area was no more than an indication of the area that had been worked by then. That
ties in with the first respondent's letter dated 26 June 1997 (supra) with which
it enclosed a map showing the working on the ground that it had been able to
locate. If that is so, the listing of only that area would have been
pointless.
[44] But whether or not that is the explanation,
it is clear from the Reference Sheet, in my opinion, that the second respondent
was not intending to make a definitive statement about the boundaries.
[45] I conclude therefore that in the absence of
the plan, the extent of the 1965 permission falls to be determined by the
planning authority, on whatever evidence is before it, at the stage 2 procedure
that is now current (Staffordshire Moorlands DC v Cartwright,
[1992] JPL 138). As its pleadings state, the first respondent is minded to
decide that the planning permission extends over the whole of the red area. In
my view, it is entitled on the evidence to come to that conclusion.
Disposal
[46] I propose to your Lordship and your
Ladyship that we should refuse the reclaiming motion.
SECOND DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
|
|
Lord Justice ClerkLord CarlowayLady Smith
|
[2011] CSIH 1P1531/08 OPINION OF LORD CARLOWAY
In the Reclaiming Motion in the Petition of
G HAMILTON (TULLOCHGRIBBAN MAINS) LIMITED Petitioner and Reclaimer;
against
THE HIGHLAND COUNCIL First Respondent;
and
ENNSTONE THISTLE LIMITED Second Respondent: _______
|
For first respondent: Smith QC; Biggart Baillie LLP
For second respondent: Martin QC, Davidson; Tods Murray LLP
7 January 2011
[47] For the reasons given by your Lordship in the Chair, I agree that this reclaiming motion should be refused.
SECOND DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
|
|
Lord Justice ClerkLord CarlowayLady Smith
|
[2011] CSIH 1P1531/08 OPINION OF LADY SMITH
In the Reclaiming Motion in the Petition of
G HAMILTON (TULLOCHGRIBBAN MAINS) LIMITED Petitioner and Reclaimer;
against
THE HIGHLAND COUNCIL First Respondent;
and
ENNSTONE THISTLE LIMITED Second Respondent: _______
|
For first respondent: Smith QC; Biggart Baillie LLP
For second respondent: Martin QC, Davidson; Tods Murray LLP
7 January 2011
[48] For the reasons given by your Lordship in the chair, I agree that we should refuse the reclaiming motion.