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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Burke v Bayne Services Edinburgh Ltd & Ors [2011] ScotCS CSIH_14 (18 February 2011) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2011/2011CSIH14.html Cite as: [2011] ScotCS CSIH_14, [2011] CSIH 14 |
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SECOND DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
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Lord Justice ClerkLord Osborne Lord Wheatley
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[2011] CSIH 14P283/94 OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by THE LORD JUSTICE CLERK
in the Reclaiming motion by
ALISDAIR DAVID BURKE Petitioner
against
BAYNE SERVICES (EDINBURGH) LTD and OTHERS Respondents
For an Order under and in terms of the Companies Act 1982, section 459 _______
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For the Respondents: Bowen; Tods Murray
4 February 2011
The petition
[1] This petition relates to the conduct of the
affairs of the first respondent. It was raised in November 1994. The
petitioner is a shareholder in the first respondent. He has 24 of the 100
issued ordinary shares in the company. The second, third and fourth
respondents were formerly shareholders with holdings of 24, 25 and 25 shares
respectively. The fifth respondent held the remaining two shares. The sixth
respondent was the company secretary. The fifth respondent was discharged from
the process in February 2000 and the sixth respondent did not enter
appearance. Shortly before the petition was lodged, the shares of the third, fourth
and fifth respondents were transferred to the second respondent who accordingly
then held 76 shares.
[2] The petition is brought under section 459
of the Companies Act 1985. In the operative part of the prayer the petitioner
seeks an order requiring the company and certain of its shareholders to
purchase the shares in the company held by him at a price that represented, at the
valuation date, that proportion of the value of the whole shares in issue which
the nominal value of the petitioner's shares bore to the nominal value of the
whole shares in issue. The petitioner also sought an order requiring the
company to refrain from holding an extraordinary general meeting or from
considering a proposed resolution to sell the company's heritable assets or from
selling those assets. An interlocutor to that effect was granted in December
1994. That is no longer an issue.
[3] The central issue was and remains whether
the affairs of the company were being, or had been, conducted in a manner that
was unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner's interests. That turned on an
allegation by the petitioner that there had been a series of irregular
transactions, the details of which need not concern us at this stage, the
result of which was that the assets of the company, and therefore the value of
shares, were grossly understated.
The 2000 agreement
[4] The
petitioner sought to have the value of the shares assessed as at the date of
the presentation of the petition, that is to say 25 November 1994. However in 2000 the
parties entered into an agreement in the following terms:
"The parties hereby agree that they will co-operate in the appointment of an appropriate expert, for the purposes of remitting to him the undernoted matters. Such agreement will be made within four weeks of the later date of execution of these presents, failing which the President from time to time of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland may be requested by other party to select and appoint an appropriate forensic accountant.
The expert will be instructed to value Bayne Services (Edinburgh) Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the Company' as at 30 November 1998 on the following basis. He will be required to investigate the affairs of the Company, by reference to the process in the present action, including the pleadings and documentary evidence especially the accounts of the Company and working papers, and by such means and with regard to such further evidence as he considers appropriate, taking into account, but not limited to, the following factors, namely:-
(1) the nature and extent of the costs incurred by the Company in connection with the sale and re-purchase of Dalnaglar Castle between 1992 and 1993;
(2) the nature and value of the benefits enjoyed by the directors of the Company from their occupancy, if any, of (i) Dalnaglar Castle or part or parts thereof from 1984 to 1994, and (ii) 10 and 11 Belford Road, Edinburgh from 1984 to 1998;
(3) The source of the funds identified as those sums constituting the directors' and shareholders' loan accounts, verification of payment and receipt and the sums paid to and from such accounts from time to time.
He will be asked to examine and report on the accuracy of the accounting and financial records relating to such entries, if any, and the effects of such entries, or failure to record or misrecording, if any, on the value of the Company and to comment on any ancillary issues of accounting practice or probity. He will be requested to ascertain the effect of such transactions, or benefits, on the value of the Company in order to arrive at a valuation of the Company as at 30 November 1998, and to contrast such figure with the valuation arising from existing accounting records.
The parties undertake to assist the expert in such manner as he may request. The parties agree to abide by the valuation of the Company arrived at in accordance with the foregoing, and to treat the same as a fair and accurate valuation. The parties agree that the expert shall be entitled to order that all or a part of the legal or other expenses of one party shall be paid by the other party. The expenses of appointment of the expert are the joint and several liability of the parties without prejudice to the rights of the parties thereafter to seek relief inter se in terms of any determination by the expert of a proportion in which each party shall pay his expenses."
This agreement held out the prospect that the true value of the company and therefore its shares could be determined by a skilled valuer thereby saving the time and expense of a prolonged and complex proof in this court.
[5] By letter of engagement dated 29 July
2002 the parties instructed Chiene and Tait, Chartered Accountants, Edinburgh
to value the company as at 30 November 1998 in accordance with the remit
set out in the 2000 agreement. The effect of that agreement was to substitute
a new valuation date for the date specified in the prayer. This point is not
contentious.
The valuation
[6] On 10 October 2006 Chiene and Tait delivered
their valuation. They calculated that each share was worth £1,542. The
petitioner's holding was therefore worth £37,016. That together with his loan
balance of £15,757 brought out a total due to him of £52,773. The petitioner
considered that this value was erroneous and that he was due about £1 million.
He thereupon sought to argue that the valuation was not binding but had brought
out merely a provisional figure. By interlocutor dated 21 August 2007, the Lord Ordinary held
(1) that the valuation was binding on the parties and (2) that since that was
the only live issue remaining in the case, it remained only for the petitioner
to execute a transfer of his shares and to receive in exchange the full
consideration due to him under the valuation.
The submissions for the petitioner
[7] In
this reclaiming motion the petitioner has renewed the submission that the
valuation is not binding. He has submitted that in the context of
section 459 of the 1985 Act the court has the power to grant a remedy that
is equitable and that, in light of certain irregularities brought out by Chiene
and Tait the court should have the company valued of new. In addition, the
petitioner has sought leave to amend his pleadings in order to raise two new
pleas namely (1) that a letter written to him by the third respondent in 1997
was an obligatory document that was binding not only on the third respondent
but also on the company itself; and (2) that the petitioner, qua
shareholder, could competently represent the company's interest and pursue a
claim by the company for recovery of sums of money wrongfully taken from it.
The petitioner proposed that he should be given time to have a suitable minute
of amendment drafted by a lawyer
[8] We have refused leave to amend for three
related reasons. First, the motion comes far too late in a process that has
been in dependence for over sixteen years. Second, the petitioner has failed
to tender a proposed Minute of Amendment setting out the averments that he seeks
to add to his pleadings. Third, we are not prepared to countenance further
delay to enable the petitioner to seek to have a Minute of Amendment drafted
professionally. In any event, it appears to us from the petitioner's
description of the proposed amendment that it would be of doubtful relevancy to
say the least. That being so, as the petitioner recognises, the reclaiming
motion now stands or falls on the single question whether the 2000 Agreement
binds the pursuer to accept the valuation brought out by Chiene and Tait.
Decision
[9] If the valuation exercise carried out by
Chiene and Tait had been fundamentally vitiated; for example, by fraud or
misconduct on the part of the valuer, it would have been open to challenge by
an action of reduction. But there has been no such challenge to the
valuation. On the contrary, the petitioner does not suggest that the valuation
itself is voidable for any such reason. He simply contends that it was only a
provisional draft. His case is that the agreement should be interpreted in
that sense; that the valuation has brought to light material facts that
suggest that the value is greatly understated and that, whatever the effect of
the agreement, the court in exercise of its equitable powers should allow the
valuation to be re-opened.
[10] In our opinion, the valuation must have
effect unless and until is reduced. On a straightforward interpretation of the
agreement, it is final and binding on the parties. We are further of the view
that since the parties have chosen to resolve the central issue of fact by way
of an expert valuation this court has no power in the context of a
section 459 application to disturb that valuation.
[11] We therefore consider that the reclaiming
motion is misconceived and we refuse it.