MICHAEL GERARD CAMERON AGAINST THE SCOTTISH MINISTERS [2020] ScotCS CSIH_6 (30 January 2020)


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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> MICHAEL GERARD CAMERON AGAINST THE SCOTTISH MINISTERS [2020] ScotCS CSIH_6 (30 January 2020)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2020/2020_CSIH_6.html
Cite as: 2020 GWD 7-111, [2020] CSIH 6, [2020] ScotCS CSIH_6

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EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2020] CSIH 6
XA60/19
Lord Brodie
Lord Drummond Young
Lord Malcolm
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD MALCOLM
in the appeal
by
MICHAEL GERARD CAMERON
Appellant
against
THE SCOTTISH MINISTERS
Respondents
in respect of a decision of a reporter appointed by the Scottish Ministers dated 25 April 2019
Appellant: O’Carroll; Anderson Strathern
Respondents: McLean (sol adv); Scottish Government
30 January 2020
[1]       This is an appeal against the decision of a reporter appointed by the Scottish
Ministers dated 25 April 2019 which upheld an enforcement notice issued by Scottish
Borders Council. The notice concerned a breach of planning control in respect of a property
“Greenloaning” (sometimes known as Linton Lodge) in West Linton; the basis being a
material change of use from a residential dwelling to “short-stay commercial visitor
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accommodation”, and this in the absence of the necessary planning permission. The
proprietor, Mr Michael Cameron (the appellant), appealed against the notice on various
grounds, but none were successful. The only one insisted upon before this court is that any
breach of planning control occurred more than 10 years before the date of the notice, namely
9 November 2018, and thus enforcement action could not be taken, all in terms of
section 124(3) of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997. It is contended that
the reporter erred in law in that, in the whole circumstances, he was bound to uphold this
challenge to the notice.
[2]       In his decision the reporter noted that the property can accommodate up to 30 people
in 8 bedrooms. It is being used for the provision of short- stay accommodation, which is a
sui generis use not covered by any of the use classes - see Town and Country Planning (Use
Classes) (Scotland) Order 1997. This amounted to a material change of use, having regard to
the subjects previous role as a dwellinghouse under class 9. In terms of section 26 of the
1997 Act, this was development which should have been the subject of an appropriate
planning consent.
[3]       With regard to the proposition that any breach of planning control occurred before
9 November 2008, and thus enforcement action was no longer available, the reporter
examined the evidence before him as to the use of the property in 2008. He concluded that,
as at 9 November 2008, it remained the appellant’s main residence. There was conflicting
evidence as to the extent to which up to 6 bedrooms had been let in the course of that year.
In response to a procedure notice the appellant spoke of 2 weeks hire in April, 4 weeks in
July, 4 weeks in August, and 2 weeks in October. In another response reference was made to
lettings totalling 9 weeks.
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3
[4]       The reporter’s key finding was “that the use of the property for letting between
April 2008 and 9 November 2008 was ordinarily incidental to its use as a house”
(paragraph 10). As at 9 November 2008 the lawful use was as a house, and thus the material
change of use occurred less than 10 years before the date of the enforcement notice. The
reporter discussed the evidence as to when the subjects stopped being the appellant’s main
residence - see paragraph 11. He had told Scottish Borders Council, the planning authority,
that this occurred in 2009, though he suggested 2010 to the reporter. His evidence was that
as from October 2010 the whole subjects were available “year-round” for letting for
self-catering purposes.
[5]       Paragraph 15 of the reporter’s decision is in the following terms:
“In conclusion, before 9 November 2008 the availability of ‘Greenloaning’ for holiday
letting, and its limited use for 12 weeks, was ordinarily incidental to its main use as a
house. Some 2 or 3 years after 9 November 2008 it ceased to be the appellant’s main
residence. From 2010 ‘Greenloaning’ was continually promoted and used as
self-catering accommodation for short-stay lets. On the balance of probability and on
the basis of the evidence before me I find that the unauthorised change of use of the
house occurred between 9 November 2008 and 9 November 2018. The council is not
time-barred from taking enforcement action under section 124(3) of the 1997 Act and
the appellant’s appeal under ground (d) fails.”
[6]       Before this court, and as per the note of argument, the appeal was presented on the
following basis. The reporter was obliged to follow the terms of the Use Class Order.
Class 9 is in the following terms:
Houses
Use-
(a) as a house, other than a flat, whether or not as a sole or main residence, by-
(i) a single person or by people living together as a family, or
(ii) not more than five residents living together including a household where
care is provided for residents;
(b) as a bed and breakfast establishment or guesthouse (not in either case being
carried out in a flat), where at any one time not more than two bedrooms are,
or in the case of premises having less than four bedrooms one bedroom is,
used for that purpose.”
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It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that if a new use of land falls outwith a class as
defined, it is to be taken as development requiring planning permission. Ordinarily a
reporter would be entitled to exercise his discretion and planning judgment in determining
whether and when a material change of use occurred. However, in the present case, such a
discretion had been removed by Parliament. Paragraph 9(b) prescribes a limited permissible
deviation from use as a dwellinghouse. The purpose was to allow householders to earn an
income from accommodating guests on a small scale. It follows that anything beyond that
small scale requires planning consent. The reporter’s findings demonstrate that before
9 November 2008 the two bedroom limit was breached. It followed that the property could
no longer be described as being used as a “house”. As no planning permission was sought
or obtained for this, the breach of planning control occurred more than 10 years before the
enforcement notice.
[7]       It was contended that the terms of paragraph 9(b) preclude the conclusion that “as a
matter of fact and degree … the use of the property for letting between April 2008 and
9 November 2008 was ordinarily incidental to its use as a house”. The concept of
intensification of an incidental use leading to a material change of use has no place in the
present circumstances. The material change of use occurred in April 2008 when more than
two bedrooms were given over to short-term commercial gain.
[8]       It was also submitted that the reporter erred in considering it relevant to decide
when the subjects ceased to be used as a house by the appellant, and also in failing to
identify when the material change of use occurred.
[9]       Counsel for the Scottish Ministers objected that the main argument before this court
was not presented to the reporter, and thus it could not be founded upon in criticising his
decision - see Taylor v The Scottish Ministers 2019 SLT 681, per Lord President (Carloway) at
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5
paragraphs 34/35. There is force in this, but nonetheless we will address the merits of the
submission.
[10]       The appellant proceeds upon the basis that if a householder who is absent from his
property for a period chooses to let it on a short-term basis, then, no matter how short that
period is, and unless the bedroom limit in paragraph 9(b) is observed, he has breached the
bed and breakfast establishment/guesthouse provision, and has thereby allowed a material
change of use to occur for which planning permission would be required. In the courts
view this is an erroneous approach to the Use Class Order, and also to the content and
context of the reporter’s decision. Before him, and in our view quite rightly, it was not
contended that at any time the property was being used as a “bed and breakfast
establishment or guesthouse”. The issue was whether there had been a breach of planning
control through its use for short-stay commercial visitor accommodation of a kind which in
recent years has become a relatively frequent phenomenon - though it has been known of for
long enough, for example if a major sporting event is taking place in the local area which
attracts visitors from far and wide. Class 9 distinguishes between properties being used as a
residence (paragraph (a)), and those which are set-up as a bed and breakfast establishment
or as a guesthouse (paragraph (b)). Greenloaning fell into the former category until the
material sui generis change of use occurred. In these circumstances the terms of
paragraph 9(b) were of no relevance to the issues before the reporter.
[11]       The court detects no flaw or legal error in the reporter’s analysis and reasoning as
summarised earlier. It is well established that a use which is incidental to a primary use is
subsumed into that primary use. Furthermore, if such a use intensifies to become the main
or only use of the subjects, in general that will amount to a material change of use requiring
planning permission. These are all issues of fact and degree for the reporter: City of Glasgow
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District Council v Secretary of State for Scotland 1997 SCLR 711; Moore v Secretary of State for
Communities and Local Government [2012] EWCA Civ 1202 at paragraphs 27 and 33; and
Edward v The Scottish Ministers 2001 SCLR 338.
[12]       It was accepted by the appellant that he regarded the house as a residence until after
9 November 2008 - see his email of 13 September 2018 to Scottish Borders Council, where he
said:
“The property stopped being used as a main residence in 2009. Previously it had
been rented out for both the Edinburgh film festival and main festival plus over the
holiday periods from May 2008. The house is strictly on a self-catering basis and
does not do either serviced accommodation or nightly booking. We feel the Airbnb
model is more problematic with the potential of different groups staying every night
of the week. The house can be booked for a minimum of 3 nights at the weekend
and up to 1 or 2 weeks in duration.”
Whether the lettings in 2008 were or were not ordinarily incidental to the use of the property
as a residence was a matter well within the exclusive planning judgment of the reporter.
Furthermore it was not necessary for him to identify exactly when the material change of
use occurred, so long as he was satisfied that it fell within the 10 year period. In addition, in
our view it was relevant and appropriate for the reporter to consider the issue of when the
subjects ceased to be used as the appellant’s residence.
[13]       For completeness it is noted that the appeal document makes reference to use class 7
“Hotels and Hostels”, however, for the reasons given above, we see no relevance in its terms
so far as the issue before the court is concerned. For the above reasons the appeal is refused.



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