BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons >> Ahmed v. Her Majesty's Advocate [2008] ScotHC HCJAC_64 (12 November 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2008/HCJAC_64.html Cite as: 2009 SCL 183, [2008] HCJAC 64, [2008] ScotHC HCJAC_64, 2008 GWD 39-584 |
[New search] [Help]
APPEAL
COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
|
Lord Osborne
Lady Paton
Lord Mackay of Drumadoon
|
[2008] HCJAC 64
Appeal No: XC737/07
OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LADY PATON in APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION by SHABAN AHMED Appellant; against HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent: _______ |
Appellant: G. McClure, Solicitor
Advocate; McClure Collins
Respondent: Prentice, Q.C.,
Advocate Depute; Crown Agent
" ... A statement made by an injured
party de recenti, unless it can be
brought within the rule of res gestae, is
ordinarily inadmissible as being hearsay only, but an exception is allowed in
the case of sexual assaults upon women and children, including sexual offences
against young boys. In cases of that
kind the court will allow the evidence of complaints or statements de recenti made by the injured party,
for the limited purpose of showing that the conduct of the injured party has
been consistent and that the story is not an afterthought, and, in the case of
assaults upon women, to negative consent.
A complaint de recenti increases
the probability that the complaint is true and not concocted, and the absence
of complaint where sexual offences are alleged is always a material point for
the defence. But it must be clearly
affirmed that the evidence is admissible as bearing upon credibility only, and
the statements of an injured party, although made de recenti of the commission of a crime, do not in law amount to
corroboration ..."
[3] On
"On
[4] On
"(1) The
trial judge misdirected [the] jury on a material issue in regard to the use to
which it could put the statement by the complainer, AB. At pages 22-24 of the charge to the jury the
learned trial judge directed the jury that it could take account of evidence of
a de recenti claim of rape by the
complainer, AB, although the complainer in her evidence denied making the
statement. Reference is made to MacDonald against Her Majesty's Advocate 2004 S C C R page 100 ...
(3) [That
misdirection amounts] to a miscarriage of justice ..."
[5] The report of
the trial judge narrates that on
[7] The group got
out of the car and went into
"... The complainer, according to her
evidence, separated from the others in order to relieve herself. She went down a hill and towards a stand of
trees or bushes. It was when she had
just finished relieving herself that, according to the complainer, the
appellant came up behind her, grabbed her arm, pulled her down, got on top of
her and raped her. Thereafter he said
'Let's go' and they then walked together up the hill, re-entered the car and
the two girls were driven back to the centre of
[9] Transcripts
of parts of the evidence were available at the appeal hearing.
Pages 44 to 45
Q When
you get back up to the car, did you say anything to CD?
A No.
Q About
what happened to you?
A No.
Pages 47 to 53
Q And
did anything happen when you were in the toilet at the Holiday Inn or did you
realise anything at that point?
A Naw,
I went into the toilet to clean, to clean myself up.
Q You
went in to clean yourself up. And was it
at that point you could see something on your underwear?
A Yes.
Q What
was it you could see?
A Semen.
Q Semen. And were you able to clean yourself up?
A (Inaudible).
Q And
what did you do after you cleaned yourself up, did you stay at the Holiday Inn
or did you leave it?
A Naw,
we stayed in it for about half an hour.
Q You
and CD?
A (Inaudible).
Q At
that point did you tell CD what had happened?
A Naw.
Q Or
did you discuss it?
A ...
she asked me.
Q She
asked you?
A Uh
huh.
Q If
I could cast your mind back, when you were walking out of the ... after this had
happened, when did you become aware of CD?
A When
I got to the top of the hill.
Q When
you got to the top of the hill?
A Aye,
CD and that other man was standing at the top of the hill.
Q So
CD asked you about what had happened, did you tell CD what had happened?
A I
never told her exactly what happened, I just ... she said, "Where were you?" and
I says I ... I didnae say, ken, exactly.
Q Right. So she asked you what had happened, but you
didn't say, or did she ask where you were, which was it? Did she say what happened or did she say
where were you?
A Aye,
she was asking me where I was because she was shouting me.
Q She
was asking you where you were, but you didn't tell her what had happened to
you?
A (Inaudible).
Q Was
there a reason why you didn't tell her what had happened to you?
A Because
I was embarrassed.
...
Q Did
you say anything to the police about what had happened, what Shaban had done to
you?
A No.
Q And,
again, was there any reason why you wouldn't tell the police?
A Because
I just ... I don't know, I was too embarrassed.
Q Again
you were too embarrassed.
A And
they'd think it was my own fault for running away, ken what I mean.
Q Sorry,
did you say you thought the police would think it was your fault as well,
because you'd run away?
A Mm
hmm.
...
Q When
you initially went back to the school did you tell the people in the school
what Shaban had done to you?
A No.
Q And
I'm afraid I'm going to ask you the same question, was there a reason why you
didn't tell the school at that point?
A I
was too embarrassed.
Q Just
the same reason?
A (Inaudible).
Q And
once you'd had your shower, did anything happen, did you go to bed or what
happened then?
A Naw,
I came out the shower and the staff says, ehm, "CD's told us what happened".
Q Right. You were told that CD had told them what
happened?
A (Inaudible).
Q But,
forgive me, I thought you hadn't told CD what had happened?
A Naw,
but she must have seen something, I don't know.
Q So
the ladies and gentlemen understand it, you didn't tell CD what had happened,
but you're then told that CD's given information about what had happened?
A Mm
hmm.
[11] In
cross-examination, the complainer confirmed her position:
Pages 129 to 130
Q Did
you say anything to CD about what happened?
A Naw.
Q Did
she say anything to you?
A Naw.
...
Q Now,
you remember you were asked this morning if you told CD what happened and you
said that you hadn't told her, and you went on to say she asked you where were
you because she was shouting on you; is
that right?
A Mm
hmm.
Q And
you didn't want to tell her what happened at that stage?
A No.
Q But
you were with her in a safe place, alone, without these men being there, do you
agree with that?
A Mm
hmm.
Q If
this had happened to you you would have been very distressed; is that right?
A Mm
hmm.
Q Upset.
A Mm
hmm.
Q This
is a girl that you spent some time with at the school; is that right?
A Sometimes,
I didnae spend a lot of time with her.
Q But
in any event you didn't feel that you wanted to tell her how this terrible
thing happened to you?
A No.
Q When
she asked you where were you, what did you say to her?
A Nothing,
I didn't answer her.
Q You
didn't answer her?
A Naw.
[12] CD gave
evidence from a witness room by means of CCTV.
In evidence-in-chief, having described being separated from the
complainer in
Pages 24 to 25
A She
never started crying until they went away, and then she telt me what happened
to her.
Q Right. And what did she tell you had happened to
her?
A She
said to me she had been raped.
Q By
who?
A By
Shaban.
Q She
told she had been raped by him?
A Yes.
Q Are
you sure about that?
A Yes.
Q And
whereabouts did she tell you that?
A Just
at the corner as we were walking down.
When they'd went away and we couldn't see them, she telt me.
Q And
after that, after you got into town, what did you do?
A We
walked about for a wee while and then she was just telling ... explaining to me,
basically what happened. And I said to
her, "We need to go to the police station", so we went to the polis station.
Q Right. Was anything said to the police at that time?
A No.
Q No? And...
A She
didn't want me to tell anybody
Q She
didn't want you to tell anybody?
A Yes,
she was ...
Q And
at that time, you didn't tell anyone?
A No.
[13] In
cross-examination, CD did not accept that there had been no de recenti statement:
Page 162
Q Well,
is it not really the case that what this boils down to is that AB did not tell
you that she was raped ...
A Yes,
she did.
[14] In
re-examination, CD confirmed her position:
Pages 168 to 169
Q When
you say that AB told you she'd been raped;
that was the truth?
A Yes.
Q And
you said earlier, as well, that you saw AB, she was upset from when she came
back from ...
A She
was ... she was ... she wasn't ... she was not her normal self, like, she was usually
happy and cheery and all that, but she wasnae when she came back.
Q And
you said earlier that you saw her crying?
A Yeah,
that was just ... I dinnae know if it was actually cry ... I think it was maybe
anger.
Q Anger?
A Aye,
like something in her. I'm not too sure,
because she was a bit crabbit as well, and moody.
Q But
you thought she was upset?
A Yes.
Q And
she told you that Shaban had raped her?
A Yeah. Well, at that time I didnae really, really
know his name, so she just said, "He raped me".
Q But
when she told you that ... the gentleman who was asking you questions before me ...
A Yeah.
Q ...
and he asked you about when she's said that ...
A Mm
hmm.
Q ...
to you, and you'd said to him that it was when you were walking back to the
car?
A Yeah.
Q So,
it was very shortly after it happened that she told you?
A Yeah.
"Now, I've given you, as I said, a
general rule which is that hearsay cannot be [had] regard to [by a] jury. I have identified one relevant
exception. There is, perhaps, another
exception which I should draw your attention to. Now, the Advocate Depute [led] evidence from
CD about what CD said, ehm, that AB had said very shortly after the events in
the park down near the trees. Again it's
(inaudible) what CD says that you've to remember that (inaudible) says, but I
think I'm right in saying that, according to CD, AB said something about having
been raped when they were on their way
back to the car and perhaps in the car.
Now whether I'm right about that, it, it's not for me to decide, but I
think there might have been some evidence (inaudible) AB (inaudible). Now that's what CD says and I think, again if
I'm right about the evidence, AB denied having said anything to CD at that stage. However, maybe what you make of the evidence
is that it may be you come to the view that very ... very shortly after the
events which, whatever it was that occurred in the park, near the trees, AB
said to CD something along the lines of her having been raped. Well you can have regard to that as something
that the alleged victim has said very shortly after the incident in question
and as I say normally that would be inadmissible as hearsay, but in a case like
this, because it is a very recent statement, it is admissible, but only for a
limited purpose and the limited purpose is whether, or as a tool as it were, to
help you decide whether or not AB was telling the truth when she came later to
give evidence in, in the witness box. It
is not, I have to express this, it is not corroboration because, at the [very]
best, assuming that you find that she said anything, at the very best the
source of the evidence is still AB, so you can have regard to that piece of
evidence if you come to the view that AB did say anything very shortly after
the, the events in the park. The
principal thing is that that cannot be [corroborative] of what AB later said in
court, AB can't corroborate herself, corroboration, defined, is a separate
source of evidence".
[17] In his report,
the trial judge made the following observations:
"Ground
1
In this ground the appellant contends
that I misdirected the jury in stating that they could have regard to the evidence
of the witness, CD, to the effect that shortly after the appellant had sexual
intercourse with the complainer, the complainer said to CD that she had been
raped, given that the complainer in her evidence had denied making such a
statement. Reference is made to MacDonald v HMA 2004 SCCR 100 ...
The circumstances in
which I gave the direction at page 22, line 15 to page 24 line 23 are as
follows.
The complainer, AB, gave
evidence from the witness box. The
witness, CD, gave evidence from another part of the court building by way of
CCTV link. Neither AB nor CD spoke very
distinctly. At times they spoke quite
softly, the audibility of CD being affected by the position she adopted in
front of the CCTV camera. Both became
distressed at points in their evidence.
The complainer had to be allowed a break to compose herself on one
occasion and simply ran out of court on another. In the result I was not entirely confident
that I had heard everything that each of these witnesses said. However, my notes are consistent with what
appears in the ground of appeal: that
the complainer denied making any statement to CD following upon what she said
had been rape. According to my note, the
complainer explained that after the appellant had intercourse with her in the
park, she walked up the hill and got back into his car. The advocate depute asked her whether she had
said anything to CD at that time. The
complainer said no. She explained that
after she and CD had been dropped off by the appellant and his companion in
town, she and CD had gone to the Holiday Inn to use the toilet. The advocate depute asked whether at that
time she told CD what had happened. The
complainer answered, 'She asked me'. The
complainer then explained that she had been aware of the presence of CD at the
top of the hill in the park. After that
answer the advocate depute again asked whether she had told CD what had
happened and the complainer answered, 'No', going on to explain that she was
embarrassed. That position was confirmed
to Mr Freeman [solicitor advocate for the appellant] in cross-examination. I have noted him as asking, 'No one said
anything to CD about what happened?'.
The complainer replied, 'no'. CD,
on the other hand, stated in chief that the complainer 'said that she had been
raped by Shaban'. I cannot tell from my
notes whether that was in response to a specific question from the advocate
depute. It may have been volunteered. The advocate depute's follow-up question was,
'Are you sure about that?'. To that
question CD responded by indicating the point in the park where 'she explained
what happened'. The advocate depute
asked whether anything had been said to the police, to which CD said, 'No, she
didn't want to tell anyone'. No
objection was taken to this line of questioning, although, in fairness, it may
be, as I have already indicated, that the most damaging answer: 'She said she had been raped by Shaban', did
not come as an answer to a specific question directed at eliciting that
information.
Although the advocate
depute may not have intended to elicit an account of a de recenti statement given by the complainer to CD, he did appear
to rely on this passage of evidence when he addressed the jury. He accepted that the Crown had to rely on CD
for corroboration of the complainer's account of a forcible rape. He also accepted that in certain respects the
evidence of CD differed from that which had been given by the complainer. As an example of that, the advocate depute
referred to the evidence of CD that before they had arrived at the park, there
had been mention of money for sex. The
complainer had vehemently denied that.
The advocate depute relied on CD's evidence of having heard a scream, of
the appellant's companion saying that the appellant 'would not hurt her', of
seeing two figures who seemed to be the appellant and the complainer close
together, and of the complainer's distress shortly afterwards. In relation to distress the advocate depute
referred to CD's evidence describing the appearance of the complainer, CD
thinking that 'something was different', and that the complainer appeared
'freaked out'. He then went on to say,
'and before she got back into the car she told CD that Shaban had raped her'.
The point was taken up by
Mr Freeman in his speech to the jury. In
the context of listing a number of things about the complainer's evidence which
'did not square up', Mr Freeman told the jury that there was an issue about
intimation of the allegation of rape.
According to Mr Freeman, the advocate depute had said that the
complainer had made an allegation shortly after she had got into the car,
whereas, Mr Freeman told the jury, she did not in fact say anything. In these circumstances I took the view that I
required to give some direction to the jury about the use they could
legitimately put to any de recenti
statement that may have been made by the complainer. I was concerned, given the context in which
it had been referred to by the advocate depute in the course of his speech,
that the jury did not take it to be a source of corroboration. I therefore checked my notes of the evidence
which confirmed that whereas I had noted CD as saying that the complainer had
told her that she had been raped, the complainer had denied saying anything at
all to CD before getting into the car.
However, having regard to the way in which each of the girls had given
evidence, I was not confident that my note was comprehensive. Moreover, I took the view that it was not for
me to determine what the evidence had been and I did not wish to suggest
otherwise to [the] jury. At pages 8
to 10 I gave conventional directions to the effect that determining what the
evidence has been and what should be made of it are matters for the jury and
not for either counsel or judge. The
point that it was the jury's recollection of the evidence that was important
was reiterated at pages 17, 34 and 37.
My direction on the use of a de
recenti statement is to be found at pages 22 to 24 of my charge. In that passage I explain my understanding of
the evidence which was that while CD had said that AB had told her that she had
been raped, AB denied that. At
page 24, line 15 I directed the jury that they could have regard to
the fact that she gave a de recenti account
"assuming that you find that she said anything". As I would understand the basis of the
criticism of this direction in the Grounds of Appeal it is that I left it to
the jury to decide that AB had made a de
recenti statement, simply on the basis of the evidence of CD, even if in
their view (which would have been consistent with my note) the evidence of AB
had been that she had made no such statement. I can see that I may have been in error by
failing to direct the jury that, at least if the statement was to be used for
the purpose of supporting the credibility of the complainer, they could only
find the statement to have been made if the complainer herself (and not just
another witness) spoke to her making the statement. It is, of course, for your Lordships to
determine whether that was a misdirection on my part."
[18] For the
appellant, Mr McClure, solicitor-advocate, submitted that there had been a
material misdirection in the charge, causing a miscarriage of justice. Reference was made to MacDonald v HM Advocate, 2004
S.C.C.R. 100 and to Hume vol. 2 Supplemental Notes page 288. Evidence of a de recenti statement formed an exception to the rule against
hearsay, and the parameters of that exception had to be strictly
controlled: cf R v Wallwork (1958) 42
Cr. App. Rep. 153 (where it was held that a de
recenti statement was admissible only if its maker gave evidence).
Parliament had expressly enacted certain further exceptions to the rule
prohibiting hearsay, such as sections 259, 260 and 261 of the Criminal Procedure
(
[19] The present
appeal focused upon the misdirection of the judge, not upon the admissibility
or otherwise of CD's unexpected evidence about an alleged de recenti statement. Thus
the lack of any objection to her evidence on the part of the defence was
irrelevant. The judge should have
directed the jury that they could not rely upon CD's hearsay evidence about an
alleged de recenti statement. In his speech to the jury, the Advocate
Depute suggested that the complainer's credibility could be enhanced or
supported by the evidence about the de
recenti statement, and the judge in his charge had not clearly directed the
jury that they could not rely upon that evidence in support of the complainer's
credibility. Support for the appellant's
contention could be found in White v R [1999] 1 Cr App R 153 (a decision
of the Privy Council, drawn to the court's attention during the course of the
hearing by Lord Mackay of Drumadoon).
Thus there had been a material misdirection about a critical issue,
amounting to a miscarriage of justice.
[20] The Advocate
Depute responded by submitting that there should have been an objection by the
defence to the supporting witness's evidence about a de recenti statement. As no
objection had been taken, section 118(8) of the Criminal Procedure (
[22] The Advocate
Depute contended that there was no rule of law that the complainer must
personally give evidence about having made a de recenti statement. A
complainer might be so traumatised and confused by an incident that she might
subsequently be unable to remember clearly what she had said or done at the
time. By contrast others, such as
passers-by, might have a clear recollection of her condition, words, and
actions. The jury would be entitled to
disbelieve the complainer when she indicated in evidence that she had not made
a de recenti statement, and to prefer
the evidence of others that she had indeed made such a statement: cf the approach
adopted in Muldoon v Herron, 1970 JC 30. Similarly, support for the Crown's position
could be found in section 263(4) of the 1995 Act, which permitted earlier
statements (different from the evidence given by the witness in the witness
box) to be put to the witness, and evidence to be led that the witness had made
a different statement on an earlier occasion.
There was no rule of law that a complainer must confirm in evidence that
she had uttered a de recenti statement,
although it was clear that the complainer must be a witness in the case: Morton v HM Advocate, 1938 J.C. 50; Walker & Walker, The Law of Evidence in
Scotland (2nd ed.) paragraphs 8.3.1 and 8.3.2; Davidson, Evidence, page 571. The situation in White v R [1999] 1 Cr App R 153 was the reverse of the present case. In White,
the complainer gave evidence that she had told five people what had
happened to her, but those five people were not called as witnesses. Thus there had been no independent check upon
the complainer's testimony. The present
case involved a reverse situation. Thus White could be distinguished, as it had
not addressed the particular problem which had arisen in the present case.
[25] On the other
hand, we accept that there is some force in the Advocate Depute's arguments in
relation to (i) the possibility that a traumatised complainer might be unable
to recall having made a complaint after an incident; and (ii) parallels which may be drawn with
section 263(4) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 and authoritative
decisions such as Muldoon v Herron, 1970 JC 30, where it was held
that evidence that two eye-witnesses had identified the accused shortly after
the incident could be preferred to the eye-witnesses' evidence in court (to the
effect that the wrongdoers were not in court).
We also recognise, however, that such considerations may be out-weighed
by the need to maintain strict limits on exceptions to hearsay. Moreover there are authorities tending to
support the appellant's contention, namely MacDonald
v HM Advocate, 2004 S.C.C.R. 100
(a decision of three judges in the criminal appeal court), and White v R [1999] 1 Cr App R 153 (a decision of the Privy Council). In all the circumstances, bearing in mind the
importance of the matter at issue not only in the present case but potentially
in other cases, we have concluded that a remit to a court of five judges is
necessary.
[26] For the
reasons given above, we remit this appeal to a bench of five judges.