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United Kingdom Competition Appeals Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Competition Appeals Tribunal >> Brannigan v Office of Fair Trading [2007] CAT 23 (26 July 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/CAT/2007/23.html Cite as: [2007] CAT 23 |
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B e f o r e :
GRAHAM MATHER
VINDELYN SMITH-HILLMAN
Sitting as a Tribunal in England and Wales
____________________
TERRY BRANNIGAN | Applicant | |
-v- | ||
OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING | Respondent |
____________________
Mr Daniel Beard and Miss Anneli Howard (instructed by the Solicitor, Office of Fair Trading) appeared for the respondent.
Heard at Victoria House on 14 May 2007
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
I INTRODUCTION
"Whether, in the Complaint by Brannigan Publishing against Newsquest and also Johnston Press Case (CE/3651-03), there were reasonable grounds to suspect an infringement of competition law under section 25 of the Competition Act 1998 (The 'Act')."
II FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Market overview
"… there are 1,300 regional and local newspapers in the UK today, including 25 mornings (19 paid-for and 6 free), 75 evenings, 21 Sundays, 529 paid-for weeklies, and 650 free weekly newspapers."
The background to Brannigan Publishing
The launch of the Uckfield Life and Lewes Life newspapers
Conduct in Uckfield
"The whole ethos of my company was to be an integral part of local life and to add a sense of community. We employed local people; we ran community interest stories and campaigns and were making a real difference to people's lives. This strategy could work on a nationwide basis with the cost effective nature of desktop publishing nowadays. Unfortunately the newspaper market seems to be a closed market nowadays with the majority of publications being owned by just a few large companies."
III STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
"2 Agreements … preventing, restricting or distorting competition
(1) … agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which –
(a) may affect trade within the United Kingdom, and
(b) have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the United Kingdom,
are prohibited unless they are exempt in accordance with the provisions of this Part.
(2) Subsection (1) applies, in particular, to agreements, decisions or practices which –
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts …"
"18 Abuse of dominant position
(1) … any conduct on the part of one or more undertakings which amounts to the abuse of a dominant position in a market is prohibited if it may affect trade within the United Kingdom.
(2) Conduct may, in particular, constitute such an abuse if it consists in –
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the contracts.
(3) In this section –
"dominant position" means a dominant position within the United Kingdom; and "the United Kingdom" means the United Kingdom or any part of it."
"Decisions of the Tribunal
3.– (1) The tribunal must determine the appeal on the merits by reference to the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal.
(2) The tribunal may confirm or set aside the decision which is the subject of the appeal, or any part of it, and may –
(a) remit the matter to the OFT,
(b) impose or revoke, or vary the amount of, a penalty,
(c) …
(d) give such directions, or take such other steps, as the OFT could itself have given or taken, or
(e) make any other decision which the OFT could itself have made.
(3) Any decision of the tribunal on an appeal has the same effect, and may be enforced in the same manner, as a decision of the OFT.
(4) If the tribunal confirms the decision which is the subject of the appeal it may nevertheless set aside any finding of fact on which the decision was based."
IV THE REVISED NOTICE OF APPEAL
(1) The OFT failed to comply with its own procedural rules by not providing Mr Brannigan with a draft of the decision of 9 June 2006 so that he could submit comments before they adopted the Decision.
(2) In relation to its finding that there had been no infringement of the Chapter II Prohibition, the OFT erred:
(a) in its definition of the relevant geographic market. Mr Brannigan alleges that the OFT wrongly failed to consider the relevant local markets of Lewes and Uckfield, and that, in Lewes, Johnston held a dominant position;
(b) in finding that neither Newsquest nor Johnston was individually dominant in East Sussex;
(c) in finding that Newsquest and Johnston did not hold a collective dominant position; and
(d) in concluding that the practices set forth in the revised complaint were not abuses of a dominant position, contrary to the Chapter II prohibition.
(3) In relation to its finding that there had been no infringement of the Chapter I prohibition, the OFT wrongly concluded that there were no agreements entered into by Newsquest and Johnston in breach of the Chapter I prohibition.
V THE TEST WHICH THE TRIBUNAL MUST APPLY
"9. My understanding of the position now reached is that the OFT has concluded that there are no reasonable ground[s] for suspecting a breach of the competition rules. They say in their letter of 9 June that
"… we have assessed whether, on the information available to us, there are reasonable grounds to suspect an infringement of competition law under section 25 of the Act. … I regret to say that, on the basis of the evidence that you provided to us, we consider that the grounds for suspecting an infringement are weak"
10. This is the essence of this appeal. Did the OFT have reasonable grounds to suspect that there had been an infringement of the prohibitions in the Act. If the Tribunal concludes that they did have reasonable grounds for suspicion then I must succeed in this appeal.
…
14. The matter which the Tribunal must decide was whether the OFT was wrong to conclude, on the evidence before it, that the test set out in s 25 of the Act had not been met."
"9. The correct issue for the Tribunal to determine in this appeal is whether the OFT was wrong in its conclusion in the Decision that, based upon the evidence before it, there was insufficient evidence to justify making an infringement decision because, in summary there was no clear evidence of whether:
9.1 Newsquest or Johnston, individually or collectively, occupied a dominant position in a relevant market for advertising space in free and paid for regional and local newspapers in East Sussex and neither had committed any abuse contrary to the Chapter II prohibition; and/or
9.2 [there was] an agreement, whether vertical or horizontal, which could prevent, restrict or distort competition contrary to the Chapter I prohibition.
10. In determining that question, the Tribunal should assess the evidence by reference to the Napp standard of proof…"
"101. In our view, at this early stage in the development of the 1998 Act, it is neither desirable nor possible to lay down hard and fast rules as to the Tribunal's approach in appeals brought by complainants in a case where the Director has declined to find that the conduct in question amounts to an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of the Chapter II prohibition. Apart from anything else, there is an infinite variety of circumstances in which such appeals may arise in future cases. We think, however, it is useful to clarify certain matters, in deference to the submissions that have been made, even though it is not strictly necessary for us to do so in order to reach a decision in this particular case. …
106. It seems to us that the reference to an appeal "on the merits" in paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 8 means, first, that the Tribunal's function is not limited to the judicial review of administrative action according to the principles of judicial review applied in the civil courts of the United Kingdom: contrast, in this respect, sections 120 and 179 of the Enterprise Act 2002. Nor is the Tribunal limited to the heads of review set out in Article 230 of the EC Treaty, which are applicable to the Court of First Instance. Nor do we see, in a case such as the present, more than a distant analogy between the functions of the Court of Appeal under CPR 52.11 and those of the Tribunal under the 1998 Act. In our view, the position of the Tribunal is as follows.
107. In appeals where there has been a finding of infringement, it is clear that the Tribunal has a full jurisdiction to find facts, make its own appraisals of economic issues, apply the law to those facts and appraisals, and determine the amount of any penalty. The Tribunal exercised such a jurisdiction in Napp Pharmaceuticals v Director General of Fair Trading [2002] CAT 1, [2002] CompAR 13. Where, however, the justice of the case so requires, the Tribunal will not determine the matter of infringement itself, but remit to the Director: see Aberdeen Journals v Director General of Fair Trading [2002] CAT 4, [2002] CompAR 167, at [177].
108. The 1998 Act does not distinguish between an "infringement" and a "non-infringement" decision. The Tribunal's powers in Schedule 8, paragraphs 3(1) and 3(2) of the 1998 Act apply equally, whether it is a decision of non-infringement, or a decision of infringement. Similarly, the Tribunal's powers under its Rules, for example to order disclosure of documents or examine witnesses, do not distinguish between "infringement" and "non-infringement" decisions. Indeed, in some cases, a decision by the Director of "non-infringement" may well be as lengthy and detailed, and may have involved as complex an investigation, as a decision of infringement.
109. For these reasons, we do not think that, as a matter of law, the legal scope of the Tribunal's statutory jurisdiction under the 1998 Act differs according to whether the decision in question is one of "infringement" or "non-infringement". To give one example, even where the Director has taken a decision of "non-infringement", it may be open to the Tribunal in an appropriate case to substitute a decision of "infringement", rather than remit the matter to the Director, provided that the Tribunal has all the necessary material before it, and the rights to be heard of all parties have been fully respected: that was the course followed by the Tribunal in IIB and ABTA v Director General of Fair Trading ("the GISC case") [2001] CAT 4, [2001] CompAR 62.
110. It follows, in our view, that whether it is an infringement or a non-infringement decision, the Tribunal has, in principle, jurisdiction to hear an appeal on the merits, that is to say to decide whether the Director has made an error of fact or law, or an error of appraisal or of procedure, or whether the matter has been sufficiently investigated. That conclusion is not, it seems to us affected by section 58 of the Act: see Claymore Dairies Limited v Director General of Fair Trading, [2003] CAT 3, at [176]. …
114. We add that, in our view, in accordance with general principles, in complainants' appeals the onus is on the complainant to persuade the Tribunal that the relevant decision should be set aside. In that respect, we recognise that many complainants will face the difficulty that the Director will normally have much greater access to the facts than they do. That is particularly true of the specialist regulators, such as the Director in this case. In addition, some complainants may be small- and medium-sized enterprises, without access to legal advice and only a rudimentary knowledge of the sometimes complex issues of competition law. What, it seems to us, a complainant needs to do is to persuade the Tribunal that the decision is incorrect or, at the least, insufficient, from the point of view of (i) the reasons given; (ii) the facts and analysis relied on; (iii) the law applied; (iv) the investigation undertaken; or (v) the procedure followed.
115. In order to persuade the Tribunal that the decision is incorrect or insufficient on an issue of fact or appraisal, complainants should normally seek to produce evidence, rather than relying on unsupported assertion. This applies particularly to sophisticated complainants with the resources to present a properly supported case. For a complainant who lacks resources, it should normally be possible at least to explain in plain business terms how a particular course of conduct adversely affects the complainant's own ability to compete in the market, with supporting information about its own business, without necessarily embarking on any complex legal analysis."
This approach was also adopted by the Tribunal in Claymore v Office of Fair Trading [2005] CAT 30, paragraphs 167-170 and in Albion Water Limited v Water Services Regulation Authority (Dwr Cymru/Shotton Paper) [2006] CAT 23, paragraphs 287-291.
"Furthermore, when it comes to the practicality of dealing with cases it is not simply a matter of saying, "We will make one or two phone calls". We have to maintain a case team in order to deal with these matters, we have to think about what the outcome of any phone calls are going to be. Are we going to scrutinise them further? What are we actually going to do in relation to the planning of our process of our going forward? That is why we have the process and the threshold of dealing with investigations formally under section 25, where we look at matters and we decide whether or not we are going to proceed to a full investigation and commit the necessary resources. We recognise there may be meritorious competition cases out there that are not getting full investigation. That must be a possibility. No regulator could possibly suggest otherwise, but that is not the test." (Transcript, 14 May 2007, pp. 18-19)
VI THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL
(1) Failure to consult Mr Brannigan before adopting the Decision
"On our part our client is to collate additional material, put it in an appropriate form and submit it to the Office. As was made clear and recorded in the transcript, we do not foresee that this is going to look radically different from the submission already made".
The parties' submissions
The Tribunal's Analysis
"… (f) however, it is not appropriate for the Tribunal to annul a decision on the basis of omissions in a preparatory document such as a Statement of Objections/Rule 14 Notice which have no repercussions on the defence of the undertaking concerned. The crucial question is whether the defence was affected by the defect;
(g) it is relevant to ascertain in what way the conduct of the administrative procedure and the content of the contested decision might have been different were it not for the defect;
(h) if the arguments put forward before the Court are substantially the same as those appearing in the reply to the Statement of Objections/Rule 14 Notice, the likely conclusion is that the conduct of that administrative procedure would not have been different.
(i) essentially, the question is whether the defect can be cured fairly: the Tribunal's task is to seek to do what is just in all the circumstances."
(2) Infringement of the Chapter II Prohibition
(a) Definition of the relevant market
"9 The narrowest geographic markets would be one centred on Uckfield and the other on Lewes but wider ones such as East Sussex may be appropriate.
10 In Uckfield, the main competition for Brannigan's Uckfield Life appeared to have been from the paid-for titles of Johnston's Sussex Express, Northcliffe's Kent and Sussex Courier, Newsquest's Argus as well as Newsquest's free Uckfield Leader.
11 In Lewes the competition for Brannigan's Lewes Life appeared to have been from the paid-for titles of Johnston's Sussex Express and Newsquest's Argus.
12 It is unclear how much of the advertising content of the newspaper titles in these towns, other than the Uckfield Leader and Uckfield Life and Lewes Life, were specifically geared towards the residents. But, as already mentioned, there must have been sufficient competition for the content for Johnston, which appeared to have had the most readership in both towns prior to the appearance of the free newspapers, to be as concerned as Newsquest about the Uckfield Life and Lewes Life. The ability of advertisers to switch between the regional and the local publications in both towns would suggest that the regional newspapers might have been acting as competitive constraints on local prices for advertising. More generally, regional newspapers also had overlapping readership areas enabling advertisers to switch between them and, because of this, they also acted as price constraints on each other. The net result is that there is likely to have been a chain of substitution covering all regional and local newspapers throughout East Sussex if not further afield making the geographic market at least as wide as East Sussex (if not wider). Brannigan appeared to have supported this definition in his allegation that the main aim of Newsquest (Sussex) was to foreclose the East Sussex market.
13 The possibility of price discrimination against truly local advertisers, which might support the narrower market definitions, is not ruled out. However, it would be difficult to partition publications in this way in any economic analysis. Also, whether or not the geographic market may have been narrow or wide is unlikely to have changed any findings on dominance.
5.1.3 Conclusions on Relevant Market
14 The relevant market was advertising space in free and paid-for regional and local newspapers in East Sussex".
(b) Single firm dominance
"a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers" (see Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, paragraph 65)
(i) Readership figures
"18 There were no reliable figures available for advertising revenue which would have provided a more accurate estimate than readership of any market share relating to a product involving advertising space, particularly where free publications are involved. With free publications actual readership may be quite low, despite claims of total coverage in an area, because a significant number of recipients would treat the publication as unwanted junk mail. Nevertheless, readership figures can act as rough proxy for share of advertising revenue, on the basis that publications which have the best distribution attract proportionately higher revenue …"
(a) In East Sussex, Newsquest publishes five papers and readership figures are available for four of those five. If one adds up the readership figures for those four newspapers, one arrives at an overall readership figure for Newsquest's papers of 35.73%. Johnston's readership figure compiled in a similar way is put at 37%.
(b) In Lewes where Newsquest's Argus is the only daily paid-for title available, the daily average readership figure for the paper is 25.01% of adults. Johnston publishes the only other local newspaper, the weekly paid for title Sussex Express. This has a readership of 70%.
(c) In Uckfield, Mr Brannigan states that the average readership of the Newsquest Argus is 7.06% with Johnston's Sussex Express having a readership figure of 30.6% and the other two newspapers, Kent & Sussex Courier and East Grinstead Courier having a readership of 14.03% and 1.12% respectively.
"20 … In Lewes, Johnston had a readership of 70% with only one other competitor, Newsquest, having a readership of 35%. The fact that both newspapers were regional would suggest that, as advertising vehicles, they could only ever have a limited impact in the town and that they might represent poor value for advertisers wishing to target their advertisements solely at the residents of the town. Due to overlapping readership areas of different publications, it is likely that advertisers interested in regional advertising would have prices in the overlapping publications constrained as a result of chains of substitution. However, as mentioned above … prices for truly local advertisers would not be constrained and Johnston would be able to price discriminate against such advertisers because its newspaper would be the main vehicle for advertising unless Newsquest was able to act as a competitive constraint.
21 Readership data suggested that, in Lewes, Newsquest was in a relatively weak position. Nevertheless, Brannigan had not alleged anywhere in his complaint that either Newsquest or Johnston were earning supra-normal profits and that Brannigan entered the market in Lewes to provide advertisers with a more competitive alternative. Indeed, Mr Brannigan the owner indicated that when he worked for Johnston, between 1996 and 2002, he worked hard to become sales person of the year and build up a profitable area for the company. This suggests that Johnston's advertising operations in Lewes and surrounding East Sussex (Mr Brannigan's sales area) were not that profitable when Mr Brannigan joined, that it had to compete with rival publications to win customers and, as a result, was not making supra-normal profits because of its market position.
22 Such a picture does not indicate markets occupied by dominant companies. In contrast it is characteristic of normal competitive markets. As a result, it is doubtful that Johnston was dominant in either town despite its leading market shares for readership."
"23 If a wider geographic market definition is adopted, such as East Sussex, the picture does not become any clearer. Brannigan's estimates of readership figures for Newsquest's publications were 36% and for Johnston's 37% which suggests a more evenly balanced situation than that in the local towns and that neither is likely to have been dominant. The increase in Newsquest's readership as the market is widened, and the corresponding reduction of any local market power that Johnston might have, is to be expected because nationally Newsquest has a slightly larger readership than Johnston. Also, as the geographic market is widened bigger players in the national market, such as Northcliffe (DMGT), come into the frame and would have reduced any market power that either Newsquest or Johnston might have had in more local markets. Brannigan had not provided any readership figures for the DMGT in East Sussex. The only conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the readership figures provided is that as before Johnston, rather than Newsquest, is probably the market leader in the wider geographic market of East Sussex. This suggests that it would be difficult to reach a conclusion that Newsquest was dominant in East Sussex."
(ii) Share of titles
(iii) Estimates of advertising revenue
"… Although I am now thoroughly on the outside of the industry having lost everything I had worked for over several years of experience, I have tried to come to some safe assumptions based on industry figures and my experience to help the OFT and the CAT glean that there could be the basis of presuming market dominance by Newsquest (Sussex) in my case for anti-competitive behaviour under Chapter Two of the act. All figures are based on the lowest assumptions of figures I know were being achieved during my time at Johnston Press up to 2002 and our regular use of market share figures at that time and are used as a safe guideline, though it is highly likely if not probable that the actual figures would be drastically higher on full investigation by the OFT ..."
Conclusion on single firm dominance
(c) Collective dominance
(1) The market must be transparent. This means that each undertaking alleged to be part of the dominant collective entity must be able to know whether or not the other undertakings are adopting and maintaining the common policy which it is alleged that the collective entity pursues.
(2) There must be mechanisms in the market to deter undertakings from departing from the alleged common policy. This means that it must be possible for one undertaking within the collective entity to retaliate against an undertaking which deviates from the common policy in a way which means that the latter undertaking will not benefit from its deviation.
(3) It must be impossible for competitors and consumers to erode the advantages which accrue to the collective entity from the common policy.
"34 Although the newspaper advertising market is transparent in that both Newsquest and Johnston would have known the advertisers in their respective publications there is no evidence to suggest that, in general, they would have known the prices and, as a result, it would be difficult to monitor pricing behaviour. Second, it is likely a co-ordinated market outcome would only be sustainable in Lewes. In Uckfield, Northcliffe would have to be involved, particularly as Newsquest is a minor player, and there is no evidence of this. Third, the ability of bigger newspapers publishers, such as Northcliffe or even Trinity Mirror, or the more prestigious advertisers who seem to have some buyer power, to upset the arrangements appears to be a constraint on tacit collusion.
35 The existence of Newsquest's Lewes and South Coast Leader, although no longer targeted at Lewes but just the South Coast, also appears to shed doubt on tacit collusion in Lewes between Newsquest and Johnston. Moreover, the continued expansion of Newsquest's free newspaper portfolio, and in particular the Uckfield Leader into the Uckfield and Heathfield Leader (after Brannigan's exit) would suggest that there is no co-ordinated market outcome more generally. Finally, no evidence was provided to support tacit collusion.
36 The dynamic nature of the market(s) would suggest that Newsquest and Johnston were in fact competing against each other not only in Uckfield but also in Lewes and more generally in East Sussex and that a co-ordinated market outcome was not possible. In the absence of evidence to the contrary the conclusion is that collective dominance was unlikely."
(a) the relevance of the practice of "clustering", that is the tendency for publishers to focus their operations on particular geographic areas when launching new titles or acquiring titles from other publishers;
(b) a policy of "live and let live" whereby publishers tacitly share the market on a geographic basis so that there is only muted competition where they are present in the same areas;
(c) the difficulty of entry into the market faced by small scale entrepreneurs including the risk of a "robust response" by incumbents;
(d) the fact that a reporter had told Mr Brannigan that Johnston intended to exclude him from the market although the exclusionary conduct was conduct by Newsquest and that "there is at least tacit (if not agreed) adherence to a policy of 'live and let live' as between Newsquest and Johnston as regards geographical areas in which their titles compete."
(a) there is transparency in advertising prices because it is an important part of the sales teams' work to know the rates charged by other newspapers to individual customers and those customers are generally willing to provide that information; and
(b) the OFT was wrong to assume that retaliation from the other local publishers would be likely since there was no evidence of this in circumstances where evidence would have been expected.
The Tribunal's Analysis
(d) Alleged abuses
(i) the threat by Newsquest of litigation concerning Mr Brannigan's use of the word "Life" in the title of his new newspaper;
(ii) the late cancellation of Uckfield Life's printing slot by Newsquest (Sussex);
(iii) the launch by Newsquest of its own free newspaper, the Uckfield Leader;
(iv) selective price discounting offered to Mr Brannigan's advertising customers in return for exclusivity; and
(v) other conduct which can generally be described as "spoiling tactics" such as discouraging distribution points from stocking the Uckfield Life, denigrating Mr Brannigan's papers and copying his editorial material.
(i) Use of the word "Life" in the title of Mr Brannigan's newspaper
"The next major attack from Newsquest (Sussex) was against our newspaper titles – Lewes Life and Uckfield Life. They print a Gatwick Life in West Sussex and a Horley Life in Surrey. Despite the fact that I checked the name use with Companies House etc, had never heard of the other two titles out of our area and that no other newspapers in East Sussex had the word 'life' in their title, they absurdly put their top solicitors onto us saying that they owned the right to the word 'life' and that we were trying to pass off our paper as a Newsquest title. Mr Gerritt [a legally qualified friend of Mr Brannigan] informed them that the word life is generic and can be used by anyone. He also pointed out that on every front page of our newspaper we proudly declared that we were a local, independent newspaper. Despite regular contact to and fro between them (and increasing costs for a new, small company such as ourselves), the case has never officially been dropped against me. Mr Gerritt tried several times to get this clarified when we hadn't had any reply, asking them to confirm no further action was being taken, but no confirmation one way or the other was forthcoming."
(ii) Cancellation of the print slot
"This change involved many extra concerns and costs, such as transporting the papers from Colchester to the south coast, different technical specifications to the ones we'd set up for with Newsquest (Sussex) and an earlier print slot necessitating reviewing our whole procedures. As well as having to buy extra computers … we also had less time to collate the late breaking stories of importance due to the earlier print slot, losing us ground on our competitors."
(iii) The launch of the Uckfield Leader by Newsquest
"… He told our Uckfield sales person … that Newsquest (Sussex) were targeting the local property market to prevent us extending our revenue reach in East Sussex, based on the fact that estate agents tend to follow one another and tend to advertise en masse. This wasn't a late space deal to run an advert Newsquest already had for the Halifax within their production department as often happens within advertising, it was to run newly designed, weekly full-page colour adverts at no cost." (See the Revised Complaint paragraph 18).
"40 Brannigan asserts that 'To launch the Uckfield Leader, targeting a small, rural town with a mere 10,386 households would appear to go against company [Newsquest] ethos and would indicate a change in usual practice, unless launched as a market spoiler' … . In Aberdeen Journals Decision (2) [paragraph 108] it is clear that the intention was to use the Herald and Post as a fighting title which was resurrected when the Independent entered the market but would be wound down after it exited. However, at the time of the complaint, Newsquest might well have been able to argue that the launch of the Uckfield Leader was a natural expansion of Newsquest's 'Leader' series of free newspapers and that its launch, although precipitated by the entry of the Uckfield Life, was simply a competitive response.
41 A response to competition even by a dominant company is not in itself anticompetitive. The opinion of the Advocate General in Compagnie Maritime Belge, where 'fighting ships' and price cuts were employed, was that '… competition law should not thus offer less efficient undertakings a safe haven against vigorous competition even from dominant undertakings'. He went on to say that 'Different considerations may, however, apply where an undertaking which enjoys a market position of dominance approaching a monopoly, particularly where price cuts can be implemented with relative autonomy from costs, implements a policy of selective price cutting with demonstrable aim of eliminating all competition'. In Compagnie Maritime Belge the liner conference had a market share of over 90%. Aberdeen Journals had a virtual monopoly (Paragraph 19). In Brannigan's case such a situation did not exist. In Uckfield, Newsquest had a readership of just 7% Also, the other main players in the market(s) with potentially more advertising revenue to lose did not behave in a similar way to Newsquest by introducing new titles or predating. Moreover, Newsquest would be unlikely to eliminate them from the market since they would probably have been of comparable efficiency and size. In view of this situation it is unlikely that, at the time, the Uckfield Leader could be considered simply as a fighting title to eliminate only Brannigan and protect Newsquest's limited market share in Uckfield, even if Newsquest was dominant in some market covering paid-for and free newspapers (which the OFT does not believe it is), since its entry would affect the other players in the market.
42 If the product market was simply free newspapers it would seem a pointless exercise for Newsquest to launch a market spoiler in Uckfield where it had no interests to protect. It is not a credible strategy for a publisher to prevent an entrant from entering a market which it has no long term intention of contesting. Thus the only plausible strategy would have been that entry by Newsquest was a genuine response to competition.
43 With hindsight, this does appear to have been the case. The Uckfield Leader is still around in 2006, almost three years after the events, and has expanded to become the Uckfield and Heathfield Leader. This would suggest that it was not launched purely as a market spoiler to thwart a new entrant."
(iv) Other alleged abuses
(a) defamatory remarks made by both Newsquest and Johnston;
(b) targeting by Newsquest's Uckfield Leader of collection points used by Mr Brannigan to distribute the Uckfield Life; and
(c) copying Mr Brannigan's editorial material.
(3) Infringement of the Chapter I prohibition
VII CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out in this judgment, the Tribunal dismisses the appeal.
Vivien Rose Graham Mather Vindelyn Smith-Hillman
Charles Dhanowa 26 July 2007
Registrar
Note 1 http://www.catribunal.org.uk/documents/App1073Bran090606.pdf. [Back] Note 2 http://www.catribunal.org.uk/documents/Note1073Bran090107.pdf. [Back] Note 3 See CC Reports in Johnston Press plc / Trinity Mirror plc Cm 5495 (May 2002); Gannett UK Ltd / SMG plc Cm 5782 (March 2003); and Newsquest (London) Ltd / Independent News and Media plc Cm 5951 (October 2003). [Back] Note 4 See e.g. Newsquest (London) Ltd / Independent News and Media plc Cm 5951 (October 2003) paragraph 2.119. [Back] Note 5 Gannett UK Ltd / SMG plc Cm 5782 (March 2003) paragraph 3.7. [Back] Note 6 Recent European case law points in a different direction: see Commission’s decision of 16 July 2003 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 EC (Case COMP/38.233 - Wanadoo Interactive) [2005] 5 CMLR 120, recital 307 and Case T-340/03 France Télécom SA v Commission, judgment of 30 January 2007, paragraph 217. The CFI’s judgment is on appeal to the European Court of Justice in Case C-202/07 P France Télécom SA v Commission (judgment pending). [Back]