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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Horley & Crespigny (t/a Brede Court) v Cruttenden [1994] UKEAT 18_94_1306 (13 June 1994) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1994/18_94_1306.html Cite as: [1994] UKEAT 18_94_1306

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BAILII case number: [1994] UKEAT 18_94_1306

Appeal No. EAT/18/94

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 13 June 1994

HIS HONOUR JUDGE J HULL QC

MR J C RAMSAY

MR S M SPRINGER MBE

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MR M HORLEY & MRS F DE CRESPIGNY T/A BREDE COURT          APPELLANTS

MISS W L CRUTTENDEN          RESPONDENT

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellants MRS DE CRESPIGNY

IN PERSON


 


JUDGE HULL QC: In this case Mrs de Crespigny appeals to us from a decision of the Industrial Tribunal sitting at Ashford, Kent. Mr de Saxe was the Chairman and he sat with the two Industrial Members. It was a complaint by Miss Cruttenden. She had been employed in Mrs de Crespigny's residential home as a cook/housekeeper/assistant manager and her employment began in September 1985 and ended on 4 May 1993. She said that she had been laid-off for various periods. She had apparently been unwell. There were all sorts of considerations. She was regarded by Mrs de Crespigny as perhaps unsuitable in various ways. We will not go into the painful details. At any rate that was the situation, her employment ended and she applied to the Industrial Tribunal not on the basis that she had been unfairly dismissed or anything like that, but saying that she had been made redundant as appeared to be the case.

When Mrs de Crespigny put in her answer (pages 10 and 11 of our bundle) after explaining that Miss Cruttenden had often been away ill, she said that the number of residents had been reduced and it was necessary to combine her job with another job; which certainly made it look as if it was simply a redundancy situation and not a case of dismissal for conduct or anything of that sort, or incapacity.

The Industrial Tribunal sat on 22 September 1993 and according to what Mrs de Crespigny has told us today, the Chairman asked Mrs de Crespigny whether she agreed that redundancy money should be paid and Mrs de Crespigny said "Yes." She did agree that a redundancy payment should be paid. After that, she says, the Chairman really said no more to her but simply concerned himself with the details of pay and with the members arrived at a redundancy payment which appeared to be the appropriate sum and ordered redundancy pay; quantified by saying it was for 7 years employment for which Miss Cruttenden was eligible. So that was the decision. The appeal to us is on the following grounds as put by Mrs de Crespigny:

"I failed to produce the reasons why I wanted to challenge payment of redundancy in full as I was dilatory in producing facts."

which on the face of it of course is not a ground of appeal. It might be an excuse for not having done oneself justice.

Mrs de Crespigny says that she wanted to be heard further and she has put before us a typed sheet dated 14 April 1994 which was put in apparently at the Tribunal and we have read that. I have read it aloud because there is only one copy put in.

We have this case in our list to see whether there is any point of law on which the appeal could succeed. We only have jurisdiction in points of law. We cannot decide questions of fact at all and it appears to us, having heard Mrs de Crespigny, that there is no point of law in this case. There is no doubt that the applicant was redundant. That is obvious from the documents and indeed from the admission made by Mrs Crespigny.

In those circumstances it fell to the Tribunal to decide what redundancy payment was appropriate according to (as one of my colleagues has put it) a "fixed formula" - so much for each week of employment depending on the age of the applicant and also subject to an overall limit. It was purely an arithmetical exercise. If there was anything wrong with the arithmetic of course Mrs de Crespigny might have a complaint. She complains that she has not got funds to pay the redundancy money ordered. That I am afraid is not in law any defence at all.

There appears to us to be nothing here that could possibly be called a point of law and no ground therefore on which we could possibly allow an appeal. Since we cannot discover, even with Mrs de Crespigny's assistance (for which we are very grateful) any point of law, we have to say the appeal fails and must be dismissed now rather than proceeding to a full hearing. We so order.