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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Persson v Matra Marconi Space UK Ltd [1994] UKEAT 403_94_0609 (6 September 1994) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1994/403_94_0609.html Cite as: [1994] UKEAT 403_94_609, [1994] UKEAT 403_94_0609 |
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EAT/404/94
At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE TUCKER
MR J A SCOULLER
MR S M SPRINGER MBE
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant IN PERSON
MR JUSTICE TUCKER: This is a Preliminary Hearing ex-parte of an employee's appeal against decisions by Industrial Tribunals held at London North on the first occasion, 14 and 15 July 1993, and the second occasion, 14 February 1994.
On the first hearing the Tribunal unanimously decided that the Appellant was unfairly dismissed by reason of redundancy. They found that the unfairness arose because of the failure to consult but they awarded nil compensation on the grounds that consultation would have made no difference.
The second hearing was held to consider an application by the Appellant for a review of the original decision. The Tribunal was constituted of the same Chairman and members as before. On this occasion the unanimous decision was that the application for a review was granted and that the decision made on the previous hearing was confirmed.
The grounds on which the Appellant made his application for a review are set out in paragraph 2 of the decision given on that occasion. They were first that the Tribunal made certain findings of fact without giving the reasons for the finding. As to that, that is a matter for appeal, not for review. The second was that the Tribunal did not explain to the Applicant the provisions of Section 68 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 regarding his right in respect of reinstatement or re-engagement. As to that the Tribunal said that they would consider it if the matter arose. The third ground was that the issue as to whether consultation would have made no difference to the decision to dismiss was never pleaded or argued, and in particular that the issue as to whether consultation would have made a difference in that he was never asked to transfer to Portsmouth was not considered. As to that the Tribunal agreed to hold a review and they did so. They spent the best part of the day in conducting the review hearing. They heard further evidence from the Appellant and from others. Having done so they still found that they could not, in reliance on the well-known case of Polkey v A E Dayton Services Ltd [1987] IRLR 503 award the Appellant any compensation. They say:
"It is clear that consultation would have made no difference. There were no jobs that could be identified in respect of the Applicant. Mr Waterhouse made a considered decision that the Applicant was the one to be made redundant".
They said:
"That it is not for the Tribunal to impose its decision upon that of a reasoned on the spot management decision".
And as to that they were, of course, entirely correct. It seems to us that the Industrial Tribunal have conducted two careful hearings now of the Appellant's complaints. Those hearings followed no fewer than three interlocutory hearings, and so it cannot be said, in our view, that this matter has not been thoroughly investigated.
If, as is apparent, the Appellant was dissatisfied with the findings made by a Tribunal on the original hearing, the question is whether he took the appropriate course by seeking a review. The Employment Appeal Tribunal has recently made plain, in the case of Lindsay v Ironsides Ray & Vials [1994] ICR 384 and in particular page 393 of the judgment delivered by Mr Justice Mummery, that the power to grant a review on the grounds of the interests of justice require such a review, is in very wide terms. It is however a power which should be cautiously exercised.
We have no doubt that the Tribunal were correct in declining to review on the ground that certain findings of fact had been made without giving reasons, but it was right for them to review the matter on the ground that they decided to do, where due to an oversight or some procedural occurrence, one or other party can with substance say that he has not had a fair opportunity to present his argument on a point of substance. I cite the words of Mr Justice Browne-Wilkinson, as he then was, in the case of Trimble v Supertravel Ltd [1982] ICR 440 at age 442.
The Tribunal, in our view, took the right decision as to whether to conduct a review and as to what parts of the application it was appropriate to review. Nevertheless, the Appellant remains unsatisfied. His fundamental appeal, as he has made plain, is against the original decision. We have all read the voluminous, we make no complaint of that, but they are voluminous grounds of appeal and arguments which he has set out. Whether it is accurate to describe them as skeleton arguments is questionable, but arguments they certainly are and we have read them, and we have allowed the Appellant to amplify them in the course of the hearing before us. He complains, in essence, about the findings of fact made by the originally constituted Tribunal. He says that the reasons for the decision were not established and the existence of a redundancy situation was not established. He complains that no findings were made which would support that decision. He complains that the Tribunal disregarded his evidence and that of his witness, Mr Faithful and that they gave no reasons for failing to take account of that evidence.
Having read in full the decision of the Tribunal on that occasion, we do not find that those complaints are substantiated. It seems to us that the Tribunal gave careful consideration to the matters which were before them, and that they gave sufficient reasons for the decision which they reached. It has been said on more than one occasion and we repeat, it is not necessary for an Industrial Tribunal to go meticulously into every point that is raised before it, and to deal with the precision which might be expected of an equity draftsman in responding to those points. It is sufficient if the Tribunal give reasons for their decision, to allow an agreed party to see how they arrived at it. In our opinion that was done in this case.
There is no other point of law that seems to us it would be appropriate for this Tribunal to consider. I have asked, more than once, the Appellant, to identify the point of law on which he depends, but he has been unable to identify it. So far as any complaint about the procedure of the Tribunal is concerned, an Industrial Tribunal has power to lay down and adopt its own procedure in order properly to identify and decide the issues which are before it. I say that in relation to a complaint made by the Appellant about the attitude of the Tribunal on review to the application of Section 68 of the 1978 Act.
The Tribunal was entitled to take what course it considered expedient in the interests of justice and it did so. We do not find any complaint on that or on any other ground made out. As has been said we have given the Appellant full opportunity to address us. He has done so in addition to the documents which he has placed before us. We do not see any ground of appeal which could properly be argued. Every ground he has been able to present has been argued before us, but he has not succeeded in showing us that the Tribunal on either occasion erred in law or that it acted in any sense perversely.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
