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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Jones v Mid-Glamorgan County Council [1995] UKEAT 1310_95_0805 (8 May 1995) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1995/1310_95_0805.html Cite as: [1995] UKEAT 1310_95_805, [1995] UKEAT 1310_95_0805 |
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At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BUTTERFIELD
MR D A C LAMBERT
MR A D SCOTT
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant SEAN JONES
(of Counsel)
E.L.A.A.S.
MR JUSTICE BUTTERFIELD: By a decision promulgated on 24th October 1995, the Industrial Tribunal sitting at Bristol dismissed the appellant's complaint that he had been unfairly dismissed, struck out his claim for a redundancy payment and ordered the appellant to pay £500 towards the costs of the respondent.
The appellant now appeals against that decision. This matter has been listed for a preliminary hearing in order to decide whether the case raises a question of law which is reasonably arguable. This tribunal only has jurisdiction to hear appeals from an Industrial Tribunal on a question of law. If the appeal does not raise a point of law that is reasonably arguable, no purpose is served by allowing it to go on to a full hearing at which both parties would be represented.
The appellant has today had the benefit of being represented by Mr Jones a member of the Employment Law Bar Association. Each member of this tribunal is persuaded by the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant by Mr Jones that there is here an arguable point of law which requires this matter to be determined by the full tribunal.
The first matter which requires resolution by the full tribunal, is this: whether assuming that terms for the termination of the appellant's employment were agreed by him, albeit reluctantly, in the context of this case did the tribunal consider whether the appellant had been subjected to such pressure that in reality his termination amounted to a dismissal? It is submitted that on a proper reading of the Industrial Tribunal's reasons, the tribunal did not genuinely consider the question of dismissal themselves, but merely acted upon a finding made in earlier County Court proceedings.
The second matter of law concerns the extent to which issue estoppel arises in this case. The tribunal plainly relied, at least to some extent, upon conclusions reached in the County Court litigation. It is submitted to us that it is as a matter of law not open for them so to do in relation to the discrete matter which they had to determine in the question of the appellant's own termination of employment.
On those two questions of law, we grant leave for this matter to proceed to the full hearing. Plainly it is appropriate for the Notice of Appeal to be amended if so advised, and we grant leave for that to be done.