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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Perera v White & Anor [1996] UKEAT 377_93_2802 (28 February 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1996/377_93_2802.html Cite as: [1996] UKEAT 377_93_2802

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BAILII case number: [1996] UKEAT 377_93_2802

Appeal No. EAT/377/93

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 28 February 1996

Before

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)

MR A C BLYGHTON

MRS R A VICKERS

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MRS G PERERA          APPELLANT

(1) MR J WHITE

(2) CARE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES          RESPONDENTS

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellant MR D PERERA

(Husband)


 


MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): This is an old case. Steps must be taken urgently to bring it to a conclusion.

The case started as long ago as 6 September 1991 when Mrs Perera presented an Originating Application to the Industrial Tribunal. She named as parties to her case the following Respondents:

(1) Mr John White

(2) Care Management Advisory Service Ltd of Ross-on-Wye

(3) The London Borough of Tower Hamlets

(4) Social Services Department

(5) The London Homes for the Elderly.

All Respondents were alleged to have been involved in infringing Mrs Perera's rights, including her rights not to be unfairly dismissed.

An order was made by the Industrial Tribunal on 17 March 1992 striking out as parties the London Borough of Tower Hamlets and the London Homes for the Elderly. Mr Perera, who is conducting his wife's case on her behalf, sought to question that order. He wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal asking for reasons for the decision to strike out those two parties and also raising the question of a review. He received a letter dated 5 April from the Assistant Secretary of the Tribunals saying this:

"The Chairman states that it is not the practice to provide `full written reasons' for interlocutory orders for the purpose of appeal or otherwise and he declines to do so.

The Chairman further advises that there is no power vested in the Tribunal to review an interlocutory order."

There is no error in either of those statements under the Industrial Tribunal rules, which were then in force, the Industrial Tribunals (Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1985. A decision in relation to a Tribunal includes a declaration or an order, other than an "interlocutory order". An order striking out parties or adding parties is an interlocutory order.

The review powers of the Tribunal contained in Regulation 10 are confined to reviewing "decisions" and, as stated in Regulation 2, a "decision" does not include an interlocutory order. Similarly, the obligation of a Tribunal to give reasons, in a full form, is confined to decisions.

Mr Perera questioned what was said in that letter. He was sent a further letter explaining the position. The case went on against Mr White and Care Management Advisory Services Ltd. The hearing was held at London North on 17 and 18 February 1993.

The Tribunal unanimously decided that Mrs Perera's claims of sex and racial discrimination failed. Her complaint was dismissed. The full reasons for that decision was sent to the parties on 12 March 1993.

Mrs Perera served a Notice of Appeal against that decision on 23 April 1993, nearly three years ago. The parties to the appeal were named, not only as Mr White and Care Management Advisory Services Ltd, the Respondents to the case heard by the Industrial Tribunal. They also included the names of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets and the London Homes for the Elderly, who had been struck out as parties at an interlocutory hearing on 17 March 1992.

Many of the grounds of appeal, set out in the six page Notice of Appeal, refer to those parties and seek to implicate them in the appeal.

Mr Perera sought, in correspondence, to keep those parties in the appeal. A letter was written to Mr Perera by this Tribunal on 28 June 1993 informing him that the Respondents named in paragraphs 4(b) and (c) of the Notice of Appeal, had been struck out, because they were not parties to the Industrial Tribunal hearing on 17 and 18 February 1993 and therefore, could not be parties to the appeal.

It was pointed out to him that he should have appealed against the Industrial Tribunal's interlocutory order of 17 March 1992. Any such appeal would now be out of time. This matter should be raised as a preliminary point at the hearing.

After a long delay, partly caused by difficulties of obtaining papers from the Industrial Tribunal, this matter was set down as a preliminary hearing. All we propose to deal with today is the preliminary point about parties. It is not only convenient. It is necessary to do that in order to determine the scope of legal argument on the appeal.

Our decision is that Mr Perera is not entitled, on this appeal, to bring in two parties who were struck out nearly four years ago and were not parties to the hearing and the decision on that hearing in February 1993. They cannot be parties here. It follows that, as they cannot be parties here, he cannot take points in the Notice of Appeal which relate to his wife's claims against them.

We therefore decide, as a preliminary point, that Mrs Perera is not entitled to raise, as a ground of appeal, any point relating to a claim against the London Borough of Tower Hamlets or against the London Homes for the Elderly.

The points of law which may be taken on this appeal are limited to questions which arise from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. That only affects Mr White and Care Management Advisory Services Ltd. It would help Mr Perera if we now granted a short adjournment for a week or two to enable him to reconsider the points on the appeal and to re-think the way in which he wishes to argue this case.

The case will remain listed as a preliminary hearing because we are not satisfied, having read the grounds of appeal, that there are any arguable points of law raised in the appeal against those two Respondents. It is fair, however, to give Mr Perera a final chance to think about the matter, now that we have disposed of any attempt by him to advance claims on the appeal against the two bodies that are not parties to the proceedings.

We adjourn the appeal for a period which we will now discuss with Mr Perera.