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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Hare v Air Canada [1996] UKEAT 539_96_1511 (15 November 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1996/539_96_1511.html Cite as: [1996] UKEAT 539_96_1511 |
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At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
MR P DAWSON OBE
MR K M HACK JP
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | MR R MASKELL Area Secretary AEEU 396-398 Dunstable Road Luton Beds LU4 8JT |
JUDGE D M LEVY QC: Mr Colin Hare was an employee of Air Canada from 18 May 1970 until 21 August 1995. He was dismissed from the company (according to the IT1 which he submitted) on that latter date and he complained by application to the Industrial Tribunal dated 9 October, apparently received by the Tribunal on 8 October 1995, that he had been unfairly dismissed.
The details of his complaint says that he was dismissed for allegedly defrauding the company, something which was in dispute. The Notice of Appearance by the Respondent, which is dated 28 November 1995 stated that he was dismissed for gross misconduct. There was a hearing before the Industrial Tribunal at London (North) on 2 April 1996 at the conclusion of which, it was the unanimous decision of the Tribunal that the dismissal was fair and the case was dismissed. Essentially, the conduct complained of by the company was that Mr Hare inaccurately and dishonestly completed time sheets.
The grounds of appeal on which Mr Maskell, who appears for the Appellant today, as he was below, are numerous, but essentially what is complained of is bias by the Industrial Tribunal. It is suggested that prior to the commencement of the hearing before them, the Tribunal, particularly the Chairman had determined the factual issues against the Appellant, who accordingly did not have a fair hearing. Further, the Chairman was rather hard on the representative of the Appellant, as he made (or attempted to make) submissions.
We have had the benefit of seeing the affidavits dated 12 June 1996, of the Appellant and of Mr Maskell, who has not supplemented the Notice of Appeal by any oral submissions before us today. We have also had the benefit of reading a letter of 19 April from the Regional Chairman of the London (North) Industrial Tribunal by way of reply to those affidavits. A copy of this letter was sent to Mr Maskell.
Obviously this Tribunal views with very great care complaints made about the conduct at a hearing of members of an Industrial Tribunal. It is axiomatic that every litigant must have and be seen to have a fair hearing. Here, it seems to us, that the Chairman and her colleagues viewed with a certain amount of concern, the complaint made by the Applicant (the Appellant here) because prima facie there was a matter of misconduct alleged and it is clear that the Chairman made her feelings known at an early stage at the hearing, namely if there were proper grounds for suspicion of dishonesty, properly investigated and determined, an employer might well be entitled to dismiss and an Industrial Tribunal would be unlikely to be able to upset their decision.
The Chairman of the Tribunal hearing Mr Hare's application has great experience in conducting such hearings. There is nothing in the papers to make any of us conclude that there was anything which any professional advocate, whether a Barrister or a Solicitor appearing for the Appellant, would have found out of the ordinary in the questions which were asked of the representative, indeed, or of the witness by the Tribunal; the complaint of unfairness is, in our judgment, unfounded. Advocates, applicants and witnesses are all entitled to be treated with courtesy, but they must sometimes be expected to face questions which they have difficulty in answering. Although here they may well have come from the Tribunal, this does not illustrate bias.
In our judgment there were ample facts available for the Tribunal to find that the application failed on the facts. We can see nothing wrong with the judgment which was made. We have considered very carefully (as we say) what is said by Mr Hare and by Mr Maskell in their affidavits, but there is nothing in those statements which lead us to think that the Tribunal reached the wrong decision, or that there is anything of which the representative of the Appellant, or the Appellant, can truly complain.
In those circumstances we think it would be appropriate to dismiss the appeal at this stage.