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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Meme v Lloyds Bank Plc [1996] UKEAT 600_95_2702 (27 February 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1996/600_95_2702.html Cite as: [1996] UKEAT 600_95_2702 |
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At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)
(AS IN CHAMBERS)
JUDGMENT
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant NO APPEARANCE BY OR
ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
For the Respondents MR SAM NEAMAN
(of Counsel)
Maxime Letocq
Messrs Cameron Markby Hewitt
Solicitors
Sceptre Court
Tower Hill
London EC3N 4BB
MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal against the Registrar's order refusing an extension of time for appealing.
The Registrar's order was made on 23 June 1995. An application was made by the Appellant, Mr Meme, by letter dated 12 May 1995 for an extension of time to enter an appeal.
After considering that letter, the application, the objections raised by the Respondents in their letter and Mr Meme's further letter of 15 June, the application was refused.
On 7 August, Mr Meme wrote saying that he wanted to appeal against the Registrar's decision to the Judge. This is that appeal.
On 8 January 1996 notice of the hearing was sent to the Appellant at the only address in the records of the Tribunal. The notice was returned by the Royal Mail "addressee unknown". The Appeal Tribunal's records do not contain any telephone number for Mr Meme. So we have been unable to contact him to enquire whether he intends to pursue his appeal.
The position today is that Mr Meme has not turned up and he is not represented. The Respondents, Lloyds Bank Plc, are represented by Mr Neaman.
He applies for the appeal to be dismissed with costs for want of prosecution.
I have read the papers in the case and, before hearing the application by the Respondents, had already formed the view that the Registrar had made the correct decision. There are no grounds on which this appeal can succeed. I can briefly state the reasons for that decision.
The hearing before the Industrial Tribunal was held at Brighton over eight days between the end of January and early September 1994. The Tribunal sent a reserved decision with extended reasons to the parties on 19 October 1994. In the extended reasons they explained why they had reached the unanimous decision that Lloyds Bank had not unlawfully discriminated against Mr Meme contrary to the Race Relations Act 1976. They also explained the majority decision that his dismissal was unfair and the unanimous decision that no award of compensation should be made to him.
There was no appeal against that decision within the time set by the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 for appealing decisions of an industrial tribunal. Under Rule 3(2) the period within which an appeal to the Appeal Tribunal may be instituted is 42 days from the date on which extended written reasons for the decision of the Industrial Tribunal were sent to the Appellant.
An application was made for an extension of time by letter dated 22 May 1995. By that time the time for appealing was already 30 weeks or more after the expiration of the time for appealing.
The Appeal Tribunal has to ask what is the explanation for failure to comply with the time-limits. The explanation must be full and honest. The Tribunal must then ask whether the explanation excuse the non-compliance with the time-limits? In this case Mr Meme put before the Tribunal many facts about his personal position which attract sympathy, but do not excuse failure to comply with the time-limits. He has had a difficult time. During the hearing in the Industrial Tribunal his father died. His elderly mother became ill. His marriage has broken down. He has had to move out of the house. He has suffered financial and health problems. A doctor's certificate has been produced on his health problem.
Although all these things explain the problems that Mr Meme has had while pursuing his claim against the Bank and while considering whether to appeal or not, I am unable to accept that they excuse not doing the relatively simple requirement of the Rules, to lodge a notice of appeal in a prescribed form within the generous six-week period from notification of the extended reasons for the decision which he has appealed against.
In those circumstances, coupled with the fact that no notice of appeal in the proper form has ever been received and no one has turned up today to pursue the appeal, I accept the submission from Lloyds Bank that the proper course is to dismiss the appeal. A skeleton argument was helpfully submitted which sets out the correct legal principles and summarizes the reasons why the Registrar was right to refuse an extension of time. I accept those submissions. It is not necessary to repeat them.
An application has been made for the Appellant to pay the costs of this appeal. The Tribunal has power to order costs where it appears to it that the proceedings were unnecessary, improper or vexatious or there has been unreasonable delay or other unreasonable conduct in bringing or conducting the proceedings. In my judgment, it was unreasonable conduct to bring an appeal against the Registrar's order and then to fail to attend in order to argue the appeal and fail to send a representative to argue it. Expense and costs have been incurred by the Bank in responding to an appeal which should either not have been brought or, if it was brought, should have been argued by the Appellant in person or by a representative. In those circumstances I make an order that the appeal costs of Lloyds Bank be paid by the Appellant.
The costs are to be assessed by the Taxing Officer.
