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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Stopford v Herbert & Sons Ltd [1996] UKEAT 856_96_1812 (18 December 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1996/856_96_1812.html Cite as: [1996] UKEAT 856_96_1812

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR S MOON (Lay Representative)


 


JUDGE LEVY QC: Mrs Rosemary Ann Stopford commenced employment with Herbert & Sons Ltd in October 1988. The time came when the Company claimed that it made her redundant. The Company claimed that when it made known that she was being made redundant it gave her the opportunity to seek other employment, which she refused to countenance. She left the Company's employment, according to her, on 26th January 1996, and commenced proceedings, which she has dated 11th April 1996, by an application to the Industrial Tribunal received by the Industrial Tribunal on 13th April 1996. The Company put in its Notice of Appearance a little later, it was received by the Industrial Tribunal on 7th May 1996. The Company say that

"1) Mrs Stopford commenced with company as Secretary (Personnel & Finance) on 10 October 1988."

and then they deal with changes in the Company. Then they say:

"4) "Against this background, a review of overhead costs within the Personnel Department followed publication of the 1996 budget in January 1996, with the result that the position [of Secretary to the department] was declared redundant.

5) On 17 January 1996, at a meeting with management, Mrs Stopford was informed of the redundancy and options open to her were discussed - alternative employment. Mrs Stopford declined the offer to have a witness present at the meeting.

6) On 18 January at a further meeting with management, Mrs Stopford asked questions relating to her redundancy but declined the offer of discussion on alternative employment. She asked for detail of her redundancy payment."

That would explain why, perhaps, Mrs Stopford put in her Originating Application the date of her dismissal as 26th January 1996, because later in the Notice of Appearance it says:

"7)On 22 January the company confirmed in writing the details of the payment due.

8) Although the company asked Mr Stopford to work out her notice, she asked to leave and thus terminated on 26 January.

9) The company contend that Mrs Stopford was dismissed fairly on the grounds that:

a) A reduction in the secretarial requirement within the personnel function resulted in the position of Secretary being redundant.

b) The redundancy policy dated July 1992 was followed.

c) Consultation took place to the level allowed by Mrs Stopford.

9) The company acted reasonably."

There was a hearing of Mrs Stopford's complaint before an Industrial Tribunal sitting at Bury St Edmunds on 13th June 1996, when Mrs Stopford was represented by her husband. The unanimous decision of the tribunal was that her claim for breach of contract was dismissed, because it was withdrawn, but that she was not unfairly dismissed. From that decision, Mrs Stopford appeals by Notice of Appeal dated 2nd August 1996.

The appeal comes before us this morning on the ex parte procedure. Mrs Stopford has the advantage of being represented by Mr Moon, a lay representative, who was not at the hearing below, but has addressed us cogently on her behalf.

The case which he wishes to put forward on appeal is this. He says that the redundancy was determined in October 1995, and there should have been consultation with Mrs Stopford at that stage. He says that there having been no proper consultation as to different secretaries being made redundant, the consultation process was flawed, and the whole decision of the Industrial Tribunal is awry. He submits that alternative employment was not properly considered. He further submits that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal was perverse.

In the skeleton argument he refers to a number of cases, and he has told us about them in the course of his submissions to us. Whether there has been adequate consultation and what is appropriate consultation in a case are matters of fact for an Industrial Tribunal hearing an application to determine. What the Industrial Tribunal have found here, having looked at the facts, was that the job of Mrs Stopford was properly made redundant, and the employee need not have looked at the pool of other employees to see whether the area should be widened. Legislation requires the Company to consider whether alternative employment might be available to Mrs Stopford if she was to be made redundant and if there was such employment available to offer it to her. That they attempted to do, but, as the tribunal found, she refused to accept such offers as were made. In those circumstances it was open to an Industrial Tribunal to find that there was not an unfair dismissal, and on the facts they so found.

It seems to us that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal was one which they were entitled to come to on the facts in front of them, and, despite Mr Moon's skilful advocacy, we really cannot see there is a point to go forward on this appeal. All three of us have looked anxiously into the facts of this case to see if there is a point of law which has a chance of success if the appeal goes forward; all three of us have reached the conclusion that no such point can be found. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal at this stage.