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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Ruszkai v Prudential Assurance Company Ltd [1997] UKEAT 1125_96_0904 (9 April 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/1125_96_0904.html Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 1125_96_0904, [1997] UKEAT 1125_96_904

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT


 


JUDGE LEVY: Mr Ruszkai was employed by Prudential Assurance Co Ltd as a Financial Consultant ("the Respondent"). A time came when the company found his performance unsatisfactory and dismissed him. He was dismissed on 2 January 1996, according to his application to the Industrial Tribunal dated 20 March 1996, having been employed from 5 November 1984. There was a statement accompanying his IT1 alleging that he had been unfairly dismissed and really any accusations made against him resulted from errors by his manager rather than by him.

The Respondent put in a long and detailed Notice of Appearance which suggested that his conduct fell far short of what a company of its magnitude and with its responsibility to LAUTRO could possibly accept. The evidence before the Industrial Tribunal was that there had been a proper hearing and appeal procedures and the Tribunal considered that the dismissal was accordingly fair. The Tribunal went out of its way, perhaps to be kind to Mr Ruszkai, to say that there was no allegation of dishonesty made against him.

From that decision, by a Notice of Appeal dated 16 September 1996, Mr Ruszkai wishes to appeal. Mr Ruszkai has not attended this morning but he sent a letter dated 23 October written by a Mr Sid Cordle which reads:

"I enclose a schedule of events which has been sent to the respondents' solicitors for any amendment so I can either accept amendments or we can indicate to the appeal tribunal where there is a difference of opinion. I also enclose skeleton arguments and have highlighted sections of the cases upon which I rely. I enclose a photocopy of the minutes of the decision of Mr Bettington recorded as it was made and a copy of the application to the tribunal and the respondents notice of appearance.

Can I formally request that the appeals tribunal, on the basis of the evidence submitted, should reconsider the need for a preliminary hearing. It is not easy for me to get to London and in any case I will only go through the points made in the enclosed information."

This matter has come up for a Preliminary hearing and when the matter was called up this morning, neither Mr Cordle nor Mr Ruszkai have answered. A representative of ELAAS has been here to assist but unfortunately has been unable to give any assistance as there is no client here for him to advise.

The Notice of Appeal raises issues, for instance, that there was insufficient findings of fact made on the key issues in front of it; that there was an error of law based on the decision of British Leyland & Co v Swift, and there was misapplication of the facts.

At the end of the day, what the Industrial Tribunal had to decide at the hearing, was whether or not the decision of the Respondent was fair or unfair. All of us have separately read the Extended Reasons given by the Tribunal. We note that a hearing took four days and that the Members had a discussion on the fifth which was sent to the parties on 13 August 1996. In our judgment, the decision of the Industrial Tribunal is one which they were entitled to reach on the facts as they found them.

There is an obligation on a company such as the Respondent to ensure that those whom it employs as consultants and who see members of the public on its behalf behave entirely properly. The investigations which the company carried out about Mr Ruszkai's conduct which are set out in the Extended Reasons, are such as to satisfy us that the conclusion which the Industrial Tribunal reached was one which they were fully entitled to reach on the facts. In the circumstances we do not think there is a point of law to go forward on the appeal and we will dismiss it at this stage.