[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Sutton Bridge Ltd v Bennison [1997] UKEAT 1252_97_1012 (10 December 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/1252_97_1012.html Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 1252_97_1012

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellants	MR A P BATES (Representative)


 


JUDGE HARGROVE QC: The question in this case is whether Mr Twell knew the respondent's pregnancy. The Industrial Tribunal found as a fact that he did before he dismissed the respondent, and that was the reason for the dismissal. The tribunal found that Mr Twell was an unsatisfactory witness and rejected his account for the reasons which he gave for the dismissal, they did so in these terms:

"21. The fact is that the applicant was dismissed in a hurried and pre-emptory fashion soon after becoming pregnant. The respondents point to her performance and Mr Twell, after first giving evidence that he did not consider her period of service, then relied upon it as a reason for his haste in dismissing her. The reasons initially provided were vague and imprecise. The Tribunal are unanimous having considered all the evidence that Mr Twell was informed or had heard of the applicant's pregnancy.

22. Having come to this conclusion the Tribunal must consider whether this was the principal reason for the applicant's dismissal and, having considered the circumstances of her dismissal as described above, and after taking into account that the company appeared to have a good record in connection with their treatment of pregnant employees, are unanimous in concluding that pregnancy was indeed the principal reason for the applicant's dismissal."

The grounds of appeal which are tendered here, are that the tribunal erred by not applying the principles and guidance offered by Neill LJ in King v The Great Britain China Centre [1991] IRLR 513, in that it failed to consider all the primary facts and has omitted primary facts in its extended reasons. Consequently, the inferences it drew were based on limited facts which resulted in a decision which was perverse and inconsistent with the evidence presented.

Secondly, that the tribunal had erred in that they erroneously decided that the evidence pointed to the Managing Director of the respondent company having knowledge of the respondent's pregnancy condition. The evidence presented to the tribunal, including affidavits, was so conclusive as to show that the Managing Director was unaware of her condition and therefore had no bearing whatsoever on the decision to dismiss the respondent.

This is a typical case of matters of fact being dressed up as matters of law. The only matters we can deal with here are matters of law. In fact the tribunal has followed the view of Neill LJ in King v The Great Britain China Centre. In our view the position of this appeal is untenable once it is accepted that the tribunal is the sole judge of fact, they have drawn the inference which they are perfectly entitled to do, and there is therefore no reasonably arguable matter of law before this tribunal and the appeal is dismissed.