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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Awad v University Of Westminster [1997] UKEAT 995_97_1012 (10 December 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/995_97_1012.html Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 995_97_1012 |
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At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MR K M HACK JP
MR A D TUFFIN CBE
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE
For the Appellant | MR O SEGAL (ELAAS) |
JUDGE PETER CLARK: In September 1996 the appellant applied for the full-time post of lecturer in translation studies and Arabic at the University of Westminster. By letter dated 31st October, received by the appellant on the following day, he was informed that his application was unsuccessful. That was followed by a request by the appellant for a feedback session which was held on 6th November. Further correspondence was then exchanged, culminating in a letter from the respondent University's Personnel Manager dated 6th February 1997 refusing the appellant's request for further information on the grounds that full information had already been supplied. Details of other applicants for the job were refused on grounds of confidentiality.
On 27th February 1997 he presented a complaint of unlawful racial discrimination and victimisation against the University to the London (North) Industrial Tribunal.
The complaint came before a Chairman, Miss E J Potter, sitting alone on 30th June 1997, on the preliminary question as to whether the complaint had been brought in time.
She held that it had not on the basis that there was here a single act of discrimination in early November 1996; that fell outside the primary three months limitation period, and it would not be just and equitable to extend time. She rejected the appellant's contention that there was here a continuing act of discrimination extending over a period of time up until the final letter from the respondent dated 6th February. The complaint was dismissed.
In this appeal the principal point taken by Mr Segal is that there were here two separate acts of discrimination within the meaning of s. 68(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976. The first was in early November 1996. It was not a continuing act under s. 68(7)(b), as Mr Segal accepts the tribunal was entitled to find.
The second act relied upon, which it is said occurred within the primary limitation period, is drawn from paragraph 11(4) of the Originating Application, which reads:
"(4) The University decided not to go on with the appointment in order to give chance to two of the candidates to continue as part-time members of staff."
The way the case is put is that the University's decision not to re-advertise the original post after the preferred candidate dropped out, or to reconsider the appellant again for the post, but to distribute the existing duties of the post to two of the appellant's fellow applicants who were also part-time members of staff, was a second act of discrimination.
We are unsure whether the point was put with such clarity by the appellant below, but assuming that it was, we think that it must fail.
In our judgment there was no second act of alleged discrimination here. What happened was the consequence of the University's initial decision to reject Dr Awad's application for the original post in favour of the preferred applicant, in that following that candidate dropping out the duties of that post were then redistributed amongst existing staff.
In these circumstances we are unable to discern any arguable point of law to go to a full appeal hearing. The Industrial Tribunal decision must stand. The appeal is dismissed.