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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Bailey v. Ready Mixed Concete (London) Ltd [1999] UKEAT 162_99_0103 (1 March 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1999/162_99_0103.html Cite as: [1999] UKEAT 162_99_0103, [1999] UKEAT 162_99_103

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR J BOWERS QC (of Counsel) Appearing under the Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK: The first issue in this case, which came before an Employment Tribunal sitting at London (North) on 19 November 1998, was what was the reason for the Appellant's dismissal?

She was employed by the Respondent as a Purchase Ledger Clerk in their accounts department from 22 July 1996 until her dismissal effective on 31 March 1998. Having completed less than two years continuous service at the date of dismissal, the Appellant had to establish an inadmissible reason for dismissal in order to enjoy statutory unfair dismissal protection. She alleged that she was dismissed for a reason connected with pregnancy contrary to s.99 of Employment Rights Act 1996. Alternatively, she relied on the Respondent's duty to offer her a suitable available vacancy if the reason for dismissal was, as the Respondent alleged, redundancy and that dismissal occurred during her maternity leave. She further contended that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of her sex.

The Tribunal considered the evidence, made certain findings of fact and concluded that the real reason for dismissal was some other substantial reason. Although the Tribunal accepted that the Respondent genuinely believed that the Appellant had been dismissed by reason of redundancy, they found that she was not redundant in law but that her dismissal resulted from a necessary reorganisation. Put the other way, the Tribunal were satisfied that she was not dismissed for a reason connected with her pregnancy. Nor was she treated less favourably on the grounds of her sex, by reason of their finding that the reason for dismissal was some other substantial reason. Accordingly her claim failed. The full reasons were promulgated with a decision on 8 December 1998.

Against that decision the Appellant appeals. This is a preliminary hearing held to determine whether or not the appeal raises any arguable points of points of law to go forward to a full appeal hearing.

The original grounds of appeal were formulated by Miss Bailey herself and it is right to say that on perusal of the papers, none of us could see any arguable point of law emerging from that pleading. However, today the Appellant has had the advantage of representation by Mr John Bowers QC under the ELAAS pro bono scheme and he has helpfully produced proposed amended grounds of appeal which are now before us.

The first question posed by the amended grounds of appeal, is whether or not the Tribunal erred in law in finding that the reason for dismissal was not, as the Respondent contended, redundancy. If the Tribunal was wrong in concluding that that was not the reason for dismissal, then certain consequences flow, both in relation to the claim under the Employment Rights Act and indeed the claim under the Sex Discrimination Act. Having considered those grounds, we are satisfied that each of them is arguable and in those circumstances without more we shall direct that the case proceed to a full appeal hearing and we shall give leave to the Appellant to amend her Notice of Appeal to add the amended grounds prepared by Mr Bowers.

For the purpose of the full appeal hearing, the case should be listed for three hours, category B. There will be exchange of skeleton arguments between the parties not less than 14 days before the date fixed for the hearing, copies of those skeleton arguments to be lodged at the same time with this Tribunal.

Finally, it would be helpful if the Tribunal Chairman, Mrs Hill, is asked to provide her comments on paragraph 5 of the amended grounds of appeal, and in particular by reference to her notes of evidence to indicate if possible the chronological order of events between (a) the notification by the Appellant of her pregnancy to Mr Lockhart, her manager and (b) the date on which Ms Thompson returned to work with the Respondent, that date being, we see from paragraph 3 of the Tribunal's reasons, 31 March 1997. In paragraph 4 of the reasons, it is said that at about the same time, the Applicant advised Mr Lockhart that she was pregnant. It would be helpful to know which came first in the time on the evidence before the Tribunal.

There are no further directions.