[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Amica V Rhone Poulenc Chemicals Ltd [2003] UKEAT 1292_96_1903 (19 March 2003) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2003/1292_96_1903.html Cite as: [2003] UKEAT 1292_96_1903

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	Written submissions (The Appellant neither present nor represented)
For the Respondent	Mr Lee Jefcott Solicitor Messrs Hammonds Suddards & Edge Solicitors Trinity Court 16 John Dalton Street Manchester M60 8HS


 


HIS HONOUR JUDGE J McMULLEN QC

1. This is an appeal by the Applicant from a Decision of an Employment Tribunal promulgated on 15 June 1995, Chairman Mr D A Leahy, sitting alone at Manchester. The Applicant had brought claims under the Wages Act 1986, the Equal Pay Act 1970 and Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. The Applicant brought these claims pursuant to an Originating Application dated 15 November 1994. The Applicant had also been involved in proceedings in other Employment Tribunals.
2. The Respondent denied that the claim was made in time. The time required to present a claim is six months from the cessation of employment - see section 2(4) of the Equal Pay Act 1970. The Chairman concluded that the application was made beyond that time and decided against the Applicant's right to bring the claim, her employment having terminated in December 1993.
3. The Applicant also claimed under Article 119, (now 141) of the Treaty of Rome, which provides that:

"Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application and the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for work of equal value"

There is no procedural limitation upon that right by reference to the time when a claim must be brought.

4. The Chairman heard what he took to be an attractive argument that there is no limitation period, but having looked at the authorities, decided that there was, see Rankin -v- British Coal Corporation [1993] IRLR 69. The Applicant appealed against the dismissal, therefore, of all her claims to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and her case came before Mr Justice Morison and members, at a preliminary hearing on 4 July 1997. The President dismissed all of the grounds of appeal except the one relating to Article 119, which the EAT held to have a reasonably arguable point of law.
5. It was the same point of law as was raised in the cases which were heard together and are now known as Preston and Others -v- Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others [2001] IRLR 237 HL. That case concerns some sixty thousand part-time workers who claimed they had been unlawfully discriminated against in relation to admission to pensions schemes. One issue was the limitation of claims pursuant to section 2(4). The House of Lords decided that, following the reference back from the European Court of Justice, the provision did not infringe the Treaty of Rome, Article 119, and there was broad equivalence in the jurisdiction based upon breach of contract.
6. Thus it is not a breach of Community Law to require that the Applicant in the instant case brought her claim within six months of leaving her employment by the Respondent in December 1993, and the stay on the Applicant's case is therefore lifted. Pursuant to section 28(4) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996, and as the Judge nominated by the President to hear Preston related appeals, I dismiss the Applicant's appeal from the Employment Tribunal. I have read carefully all of the documents the Applicant has put in front of me, since she has indicated that she is unable to attend today.
7. I have also heard from the Respondent by way of a letter dated 27.2.02 helpfully produced by Mr Jefcott, who has attended today. A dispute of long-standing has also been resolved today, following my Order that the Respondent produces the Applicant's claim for equal pay, made in 1977. It was submitted by the Respondent that it was not relevant to today's proceedings and I agree. Thus, the appeal is dismissed.