United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

Earl Loreburn—In this case the arbitrator has found that the injury arose out of and in the course of the applicant's employment, but he said that he found that it was not by accident. Now in order to succeed an applicant must show that there was an accidental occurrence or condition, something unlooked for, some unlooked for mishap, or untoward event which was not expected or designed; but he must also show that the injury was connected with it and consequent upon it, and, as there are many causes of most events, it must be a connection which is not as a matter of common-sense too remote. That is for the arbitrator as a conclusion of fact from the evidence, and the Court has power to set it aside if there is no evidence which reasonably warrants the conclusion at which the arbitrator has arrived. I cannot myself say that that is so here, and indeed the learned Solicitor-General for Scotland has not asked the House to say so.

But the Court may also interfere if the Sheriff took an erroneous view of the law which has affected his judgment. Now the learned Sheriff has given his reasons for his award, and my own impression is that there was a misunderstanding about M'Luckie's case, 1913 S.C. 975, 50 S.L.R. 770, but I have not been able to see that the award of the learned Sheriff was really affected by that misconception of M'Luckie's case, if it was a misconception, and therefore in my opinion the appeal fails.

It is unnecessary to repeat what has been so often said in this House that the decision of an arbitrator is the decision of the person appointed by the Legislature to be the judge of fact, and that whether one agrees with him or does not agree with him, in either case, unless there is some error of law, the Courts have no power to interfere.

Lord Shaw—I entirely concur with what has just been observed by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack.

Cases of this sort begin with the first link of the chain, namely, whether there was an accident. But in order to bring them within the Act you have to inquire whether that accident was causally connected with the other portion of the claim of causation which concludes with injury or death.

In the present case that causal connection is completely broken because the learned Sheriff in his careful findings, as I think them to be, does not leave any doubt on our minds that he thought there was no accident whatever which could be causally connected with the result which was so unfortunate to this workman.

There is nothing further in the case. As I have remarked in former cases, for us to interfere in this House, or for any court of law to interfere with a judgment of that character, would be an act of usurpation in regard to the power to determine fact which is specially remitted by the Legislature to the arbitrator and to the arbitrator alone. It is an additional comfort, however, for me to reflect that looking upon this case in its entirety I see no reason which suggests itself to my mind for the conclusion that the learned Sheriff did not come to a correct finding.

Lord Parker—I agree.

Lord Sumner—I concur.

Lord Parmoor—I agree.