THE PATENT OFFICE Room 2A, 1 Harmsworth House, 13-15 Bouverie Street, 2 London, EC4Y 8DP. 3 Thursday, 3rd February 2000 4 Before: 5 MR GEOFFREY HOBBS QC (The Appointed Person) 6 7 In the Matter of THE TRADE MARKS ACT 1994 8 and 9 In the Matter of Trade Mark Application Nos: 2117243A and 10 2117243B by DAVID CHARLES PAGE to register the trade mark DAVID PAGE in Class 25. 11 and 12 13 Opposition thereto under Nos: 47998 and 48071 by PALMON (OVERSEAS) LIMITED 14 15 An appeal to the Appointed Person from the decision of Miss Ann 16 Corbett of 4th June 1999 17 18 (Transcript of the Shorthand Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd., Midway House, 27-29 Cursitor Street, London EC4A 1LT. 19 Telephone No: 0171-405 5010. Fax No: 0171-405 5026.) 20 MR T HINCHLIFFE (instructed by Messrs Barlin Associates) appeared 21 as Counsel on behalf of the Appellant/Opponent. 22 THE APPLICANT did not appear and was not represented. 23 MR M KNIGHT appeared on behalf of the Registrar of Trade Marks.

D E C I S I O N
Approved by the Appointed Person

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MR

HOBBS: In January 1996 a company called Ambiance Shirts

Limited began trading as an importer and wholesaler of shirts

from premises at Rainham in Essex, having purchased certain

assets from the receivers of a company called Ambiance

Clothing Limited.

David Charles Page was formerly the Managing Director of Ambiance Clothing Limited. He became the General Manager of Ambiance Shirts Limited in January 1996 and continued in that position until the 31st October 1996, or thereabouts. At that point his employment was terminated inter alia for competing with the company in breach of his duty to serve it faithfully and well in his capacity as a senior employee.

On 17th December 1996 Ambiance Shirts Limited applied to register a series of four marks for use as trade marks in relation to articles of clothing in class 25. The common feature of the four marks in the series was the name David Page.

The evidence before me indicates that the name David Page was being used by the company as a trade mark for shirts from April 1996 onwards. It seems unlikely that the company could have been using the name of its General Manager as a trade mark without his knowledge and consent.

The company's application for registration was accepted and in due course matured into trade mark registration number 2118919 in September 1997, having been advertised for opposition purposes in June 1997. The registration was not opposed by Mr Page or anyone else for that matter.

However, Mr Page had applied independently for registration of a series of two marks consisting of his name David Page represented, firstly, in ordinary letter press and, secondly, in stylised handwritten form. That application had been made on 2nd December 1996. The application was for registration of the name David Page for use as a trade mark in relation to clothing, footwear and head gear in class 25.

In July 1997 the application was sub-divided into two applications at Mr Page's request under Rule 19 of the Trade Marks Rules. The application for registration of the name David Page in ordinary letter press proceeded under number 2117243A. It was advertised for opposition purposes on 10th October 1997. The application for registration of the name David Page in stylised handwritten form proceeded under number 2117243B. It was advertised for opposition purposes on 22nd October 1997.

The divisional applications both retained a filing date of 2nd December 1996. That being so, they had seniority over the application filed by Ambiance Shirts Limited on 17th December 1996. It was therefore not possible for the company's registered trade number 2118919 to be asserted against Mr Page's applications as a basis of objection under sections 5(1), 5(2) or 5(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 because it could not qualify for recognition as an earlier trade mark within the meaning of section 6 of the Act relative to those applications.

I understand from exhibit MW.1 to the statutory

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declaration of Michael Watson dated 15th July 1998 that Ambiance shirts Limited ceased trading on 30th June 1997. evidence before me indicates that a deed of assignment dated 1st May 1997 was executed by the company in favour of Palmon (Overseas) Limited and that this conveyed to the assignee the entirety of the assignors rights in the trade mark DAVID PAGE and the goodwill of the business to which the trade mark was appurtenant. I have not seen a copy of the deed of It appears to have been processed by the Trade assignment. Marks Registry in December 1997 with an effective date of 13th November 1997 so far as it concerned the assignment of registered trade mark 2118919 from Ambiance Shirts Limited to Palmon (Overseas) Limited. I should mention at this point that Palmon was at all material times the owner of all of the issued share capital of Ambiance Shirts Limited.

Palmon then proceeded to file oppositions under Rule 13 of the Trade Marks Rules to the registration of the marks that Mr Page had applied for on 2nd December 1996. The grounds of opposition to application 2117243A were pleaded in the following terms:

The opponents are the successors in business of Ambiance Shirts Limited. By assignment dated 1st May 1997 the opponent has acquired the rights in the trade mark DAVID PAGE arising from their use of said trade mark and also the benefit of trade mark registration no. 21181919 advertised in the Trade Marks Journal No. 6178 at page 6198.

- 2. The opponent's predecessors have used the mark applied for in the United Kingdom in relation to inter alia shirts.
- 3. Mr David Charles Page, the applicant for registration of mark no. 2117243A was the de facto Managing Director of Ambiance Shirts Limited and their predecessors and the trade mark DAVID PAGE was taken into use by said predecessors with the consent of Mr David Page and at his direction. The said trade mark is an asset which has now been acquired by the opponents.
- 4. Registration of the mark applied for would be contrary to the provisions of Section 5 of the Act in that it is so similar to the opponents trade mark and it is proposed to be used and registered for goods identical and/or similar to the goods for which the trade mark is registered and has protection. Use of the mark applied for would lead to a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public and/or to a likelihood of association with the opponents.
- 5. Registration or use of the mark applied for would obstruct or prejudice the legitimate conduct of the opponents business. Registration of the mark applied for should be refused as being contrary to the provisions of the Act, in accordance with the exercise of the Registrar's judgment and/or

discretion.

The opponent has notified the applicant of its 6. objection to the use and registration of the trade mark in suit but the applicant has failed to withdraw the application in suit."

The grounds of opposition to application 2117243B were pleaded in substantially similar, but not quite identical terms:

- 11 1 The opponents are the successors in business of Ambiance Shirts Limited. The trade mark DAVID PAGE was adopted and used by Ambiance Shirts Limited in relation to certain garments prior to the date of application no. 2117243B such that at such date the said trade mark indicated the goods of Ambiance Shirts Limited and no other. By assignment dated 1st May 1997 the opponent has acquired the rights in the trade mark DAVID.PAGE arising from such use of said trade mark and also the benefit of trade mark application no. 21181919 advertised in the Trade Marks Journal No. 6178 at page 6198 and the registration resulting thereform.
- The opponent's predecessors have used the mark DAVID 2. PAGE in the United Kingdom in relation to inter alia shirts.
- Mr David Charles Page, the applicant for 3. registration of mark no. 2117243B was the de facto Managing Director of Ambiance Shirts Limited and

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their predecessors and the trade mark DAVID PAGE was taken into use by said predecessors with the consent of Mr David Page and at his direction. The said trade mark is an asset which has now been acquired by the opponents.

- A. Registration of the mark applied for would be contrary to the provisions of section 5 of the Act in that it is so similar to the opponents' trade mark and it is proposed to be used and registered for goods identical and/or similar to the goods for which the trade mark is registered and has protection. Use of the mark applied for would lead to a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public and/or to a likelihood of association with the opponents. The applicant has acted in bad faith in making an application to register the trade mark DAVID PAGE in his own name.
- 5. Registration or use of the mark applied for would obstruct or prejudice the legitimate conduct of the opponents' business. Registration of the mark applied for should be refused as being contrary to the provisions of the Act, in accordance with the exercise of the Registrar's judgment and/or discretion.
- 6. The opponent has notified the applicant of its objection to the use and registration of the trade mark in suit but the applicant has failed to

withdraw the application in suit."

It will be noted that the discrepancies (identified by the underlining above) between the two sets of grounds of opposition related to an allegation of bad faith (presumably made with reference to the provisions of section 3(6) of the Trade Marks Act 1994). That allegation was made explicitly in the second set of grounds of opposition, but not in the first set of grounds of opposition. Beyond that, the opponent's pleadings were really rather obscure as to the precise basis of objection that was being raised on relative grounds under section 5 of the Trade Marks Act 1994. They also included a request for the favourable exercise of a discretion which the Registrar no longer possesses; see EUROLAMB TM [1997] R.P.C. 279.

Generally uninformative counter statements were filed on behalf of Mr Page within the period prescribed by Rule 13(2) of the 1994 rules.

In a letter of 3rd July 1998 Palmon's agents asked the Registrar to consolidate the oppositions on the basis that the issues raised by the grounds of opposition were identical. That request was duly granted. Palmon filed evidence in support of the consolidated oppositions in July 1998. That evidence consisted of the statutory declaration of Mr Michael Watson with four exhibits dated 15th July 1998.

In paragraph 10 of his statutory declaration Mr Watson summed up his evidence in the following terms:

"In the premises I submit that Mr Page in making

application for registration of the trade mark DAVID PAGE under number 2117243A and 2117243B has acted in bad faith and that such applications should be denied."

Page filed no evidence in answer and on 5th January

Mr Page filed no evidence in answer and on 5th January
1999 his agent sent a letter to the Trade Marks Registry with
a copy to Palmon's agents stating:

"We are unable to obtain the applicant's instructions on this matter and we must presume that the applicant does not intend to continue the proceedings."

That statement was ambiguous, in my view, as to what Mr Page's intentions actually were with regard to his own applications and with regard to the conduct of the pending oppositions.

I do not think it was open to the Registrar, simply on the basis of that letter, to deem the applications to have been withdrawn. The consolidated oppositions remained liable to be considered on their merits. The provisions of Rule 13 do not empower the Registrar to reject an application for registration without considering the evidence filed under Rule 13(3) in circumstances where the applicant for registration has defended the opposition by filing a counter statement within the period prescribed by Rule 13(2)

Hot on the heels of the letter of the 5th January from Mr Page's agents there came a letter from Palmon's agents written to the Registry in the following terms:

"We have today received from R G C Jenkins & Co a copy of their letter to you dated 5th January 1999 in the above matters. As the applicant is no longer contesting the oppositions, we hereby request an immediate decision based on the papers of record."

It is suggested that the writer of the letter was requesting a formal administrative dismissal of the applications based on withdrawal by the applicant. However, the letter seems to me to presuppose the existence of continuing proceedings in which there is a need for a decision to be taken. That would not be the situation in a case where the application in suit had been withdrawn: withdrawal would then be the act volutary of the applicant under section 39 of the 1994 Act and there would be no need for a formal decision of the Registrar to approve or secure the fact of withdrawal.

The letters of 5th January and 6th January created a situation in which there was at least some degree of misunderstanding between the applicant for registration, Mr Page, and the opponent, Palmon. The confusion might well have been dispelled if the Registry had communicated with the parties in the terms envisaged by Rule 13(9) of the 1994 Rules:

"Upon completion of the evidence the registrar shall request the parties to state by notice to him in writing whether they wish to be heard; if any party requests to be heard the registrar shall send to the parties notice of a date for the hearing."

That did not happen. The Registry informed the parties in a letter of 22nd April that a decision was being prepared and would be issued in due course. This was all rather unfortunate because it seems to have left in place a situation in which the applicant, the opponent and the Registry were communicating with one another on different wave lengths.

Ms Ann Corbett, acting as Hearing Officer for the Registrar proceeded to issue a decision on 4th June rejecting the oppositions on their merits. I think that she did so on the basis of the request in Palmon's letter of 6th January 1999 believing, that by means of that letter, Palmon had waived what would otherwise have been its right to an oral hearing.

In her decision issued on 4th June 1999, the Hearing Officer attempted to decipher the grounds of opposition filed on behalf of Palmon with a view to identifying the statutory basis of the objections relied on. She concluded that the only objection of substance notified by the statements of grounds was an objection under section 5(2)(b) of the 1994 Act based upon registered trade mark 2118919. She dismissed that objection as unsustainable because, as I have noted above, that registration was not available for citation as an earlier trade mark against the applications in suit.

The Hearing Officer appreciated that Mr Watson's statutory declaration was directed to an allegation that the applications in suit had been made in bad faith and were, for that reason, objectionable under section 3(6) of 1994 Act. She

said however:

"That was not a ground pleaded when the Notice of Opposition was filed and there has been no subsequent request by the opponents or their representatives to amend the statement of grounds of opposition. I take no account therefore of this evidence insofar as the opposition is concerned."

In expressing that view she can fairly be said to have been half wrong and half right. She was half wrong because the second statement of grounds filed in opposition to application 2117243B did refer to bad faith in terms which indicated that a section 3(6) objection was being taken. She was half right because the first statement of grounds filed in opposition to application 2117243A did not focus upon the question of bad faith in the same terms.

However, as counsel on behalf of Palmon has pointed out in his submissions before me this afternoon, bad faith is an objection which, if it applies at all, must in this case apply to the undivided application in its entirety and must therefore, if it be a good objection, be sustainable in relation to the sub-divided applications claiming the filing date of the original application.

The net result is that I find a situation in which confusion and misunderstanding appears to have been piled upon confusion and misunderstanding with the result that the main objection raised by Palmon, that is to say the objection under section 3(6) of the Act, was not considered on its merits.

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The question I ask myself now is: what do I do about that state of affairs? I do not think it is appropriate to determine the bad faith objection de novo on appeal. What I propose to do, having considered the matter, is to set aside the Hearing Officer's decision and remit the oppositions to the Registrar for further consideration upon the basis of the objections currently pleaded, leaving it to the Registrar's Hearing Officer to determine whether and, if so, to what extent the pleadings can and should be amended in due course to enable the opponent to put forward the main objection upon which it has sought to rely. That is my decision.

Do you want to address me on costs?

MR HINCHLIFFE: Sir, I seek no order as to costs.

MR HOBBS: That is perceptive of you. I shall say nothing on the question of costs then. Thank you both very much.

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