

O-305-03

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

IN THE MATTER OF:

APPLICATION No. 2230395

TO REGISTER A SERIES OF TRADE MARKS

IN CLASSES 9, 16, 36, 38 AND 41

IN THE NAME OF DIGEO BROADBAND INC.

DECISION

series applications

1. Under section 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 it is possible to file a single application for registration of a series of trade marks i.e. “*a number of trade marks which resemble each other as to their material particulars and differ only as to matters of a non-distinctive character not substantially affecting the identity of the trade mark*”.As noted by Professor Annand in her decision in Logica Plc’s Application (SRIS 0/068/03, 5th March 2003) the practice of allowing two or more marks to be included in a single application for registration is anomalous, both in the context of Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21st December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks and in the context of Council Regulation 40/94 of 20th December 1993 on the Community trade mark. The United Kingdom and Ireland appear to be the only Members of the European Union in which the anomaly exists.

2. The application for registration is made in accordance with the provisions of rule 21(1) of the Trade Marks Rules 2000:

The proprietor of a series of trade marks may apply to the registrar on Form TM3 for their registration as a series in a single registration and there shall be included in such application a representation of each mark claimed to be in the series; and the registrar shall, if satisfied that the marks constitute a series, accept the application.

The acceptance contemplated by rule 21(1) is acceptance for the purposes of collective examination, advertisement, opposition and registration under sections 37 to 40 of the Act.

3. A relatively high degree of homogeneity is required in order to ensure that the marks included in the application can be treated as uniformly eligible or uniformly ineligible for protection by registration. The wording of section 41(2) establishes that there must and can only be iteration of the material particulars of a trade mark with variations of a non-distinctive character not substantially affecting the identity of the trade mark thus reiterated. Each of the marks in question should be considered as a whole, from the perspective of the average consumer of the goods or services concerned, when assessing whether they form a series of the kind contemplated by the Act.

4. Section 41(2) permits less variation between marks than section 46(2) of the Act (article 10(2)(a) of the Directive; article 15(2)(a) of the CTMR). Variations can be treated as inconsequential under the latter provisions if they “*do not alter the distinctive character of the mark*” for which protection is claimed, but must also have no substantial effect on “*the identity of the trade mark*” in order to be acceptable under section 41(2).

This reinforces the point that marks can be distinctively similar without necessarily satisfying the statutory requirements for registration as a series.

series objections

5. Under section 37(3) of the Act the Registrar must, if she considers that the requirements for registration of marks as a series are not met, inform the applicant and give him an opportunity to make representations or amend the application within such period as she may specify. If the applicant fails to satisfy the Registrar that those requirements are met, or to amend the application so as to meet them, or fails to respond before the end of the specified period, the application must be refused under section 37(4) of the Act.

6. An applicant who is prepared to accept the Registrar's conclusion that his application for registration is not acceptable under section 41(2) may wish to put forward proposals for division and/or amendment of the application with a view to achieving registration on a revised basis.

7. An applicant who wishes to challenge the Registrar's conclusion that his application is not acceptable under section 41(2) is in a more difficult position. He needs to reserve the right to make use of the provisions relating to division and amendment in case his challenge to the Registrar's determination is rejected on appeal. For that to be possible, the determination under section 41(2) must precede any refusal of acceptance under section 37(4). If the Registrar simply refuses an application under section 37(4) on the basis of a contested objection under section 41(2) the refusal would (for as long as it

remained in place) be a bar to division or amendment: there would be no pending application to revise.

8. It is clear that an application should not be refused under section 37(4) unless a duly notified objection is, within the period of time specified by the Registrar under section 37(3), either: (i) not contested; or (ii) contested, but not resolved. The length of the specified period should be sufficient to allow time for an effective response to the relevant objection. Extensions can be granted under rule 68 as the circumstances of the case may require.

9. I think that the right course, in a case where an applicant may wish to take steps to resolve a contested objection, is for the Registrar to notify the applicant under section 37(3) of her determination that the requirements for acceptance as a series under section 41(2) and rule 21(1) are not met and specify a period of x weeks from the date of the determination (or the disposal, including withdrawal, of any appeal therefrom) within which final refusal of the application under section 37(4) may be avoided by appropriate corrective action. A further determination might be issued in similar terms if it subsequently becomes necessary or expedient to do so in relation to the corrective action that the applicant proposes to take. That is not to say that the operation of section 37(4) should be postponed to allow time for half-hearted or random attempts at corrective action.

the present application

10. In the present case, Digeo Broadband Inc (“*the Applicant*”) applied on 25th April 2000 for registration of a series of 308 marks in classes 9, 16, 36, 38 and 41. The marks identified in the application are set out in Annex A to this decision. The goods and services specified in the application for registration were as follows:

Class 09:

Computers, computer hardware and computer software; computer peripherals; integrated circuits; electronic publications; computer software and publications in electronic form supplied on-line from databases, from facilities provided on a global computer network or the Internet; interactive computer software, apparatus for searching electronic information from a global computer network or the Internet; telecommunications equipment and software for connecting users to communications networks and the global computer network.

Class 16:

Printed matter; printed publications; printed matter in relation to computer software and telecommunications equipment and software; operating and user instructions manuals and other written accompanying material for computers, computer hardware and computer software; manuals; instructional and teaching material (except apparatus).

Class 36:

Financial services; information services relating to finance and insurance; billing services provided from a global computer network or the Internet; home banking; Internet banking; telephone banking; information, advisory and consultancy services relating to home banking; Internet banking; telephone banking; billing services.

Class 38:

Telecommunications services; provision of on-line communications services; communication via a global computer network or the Internet; electronic mail, message

sending and receiving services; broadcasting services; broadcasting services through cable, satellite and telephone and data transport networks; television satellite transmission services; provision of web pages; transmission and distribution of data or audio visual images via a global computer network or the Internet; electronic commerce services included in this class; consulting and installation services included in this class; computer and telecommunications services, namely electronic network transmission services; global electronic communications network transmission services; content delivery services.

Class 41:

Education; providing of training; entertainment; sporting and cultural activities; content development; aggregation and syndication services.

11. The shortest mark in the proposed series is the word **DIGEO**. Each of the remaining 307 marks consists of the word **DIGEO** with additional elements designed to enable the mark as a whole to be used as a domain name, albeit that the mark thus created could not actually be used as a domain name without the benefit of an enabling registration conforming to the rules and regulations of the domain name registry denoted by the added elements. There are several instances of duplication among the 307 marks. However, these do not appear to have been noticed or commented upon and I shall therefore proceed on the hitherto assumed basis that the application identifies 308 different marks.

12. The question whether a mark in the form of a domain name has the power to distinguish the goods or services of interest to an applicant from those of other undertakings depends upon the perceptions and recollections it is likely to trigger in the mind of the average consumer of such goods or services. It does not depend on the answer to the separate question whether the person applying for registration of the mark

as a trade mark is entitled to the benefit of a corresponding registration in the relevant domain name registry.

13. A negative answer to the latter question might or might not lead to the conclusion that the application for trade mark registration is objectionable under sections 3(3)(b), 3(6) or 5 of the Act of 800-Flowers Trade Mark [2002] FSR 12, p. 191 (CA). However, these are not matters I need to consider. The issue before me is whether the 308 marks identified in the application for registration filed on behalf of the Applicant on 25th April 2000 constitute “*a series*” as defined in section 41(2) of the Act. In view of the way in which that issue has developed between the Applicant and the Registrar, I am required to assume (without deciding) that each of the 308 marks in the proposed series would be separately registrable in the name of the Applicant for use in relation to goods and services of the kind specified in the relevant application for registration.

refusal of the application

14. In a written decision issued on 28th May 2002, the Registrar’s hearing officer Mr. A.J. Pike concluded that the variations between the marks in question were too significant and extensive to be acceptable in a single series under section 41(2). His conclusion was largely based on the view that the average consumer of the goods and services concerned would, in many if not most instances, be unaware that the marks in which the word **DIGEO** was combined with additional elements were, by virtue of the additions, adapted for use as domain names. He did not consider whether or how the application might legitimately be revised for the purpose of neutralising the objection under section 41(2). He decided that the application should be refused under section 37(4).

contentions on appeal

15. The Applicant gave notice of appeal to an Appointed Person. At the hearing of the appeal it was contended, in substance, that the hearing officer should have allowed the application to proceed on the basis that:

- (1) the identity of a trade mark is not substantially affected either by:
 - (a) the addition or subtraction of elements designed to enable it to function as a domain name; or
 - (b) the replacement of any such elements with other such elements;
- (2) the differences between the marks in issue involve nothing more than addition/subtraction or replacement of such elements; and
- (3) the requirements of section 41(2) were therefore satisfied in the present case.

I shall address these contentions in the order in which I have stated them.

contention (1)

16. In relation to contention (1), I was referred to the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Community Trade Marks Office in Case R 638/2000-4 BUY.COM (10th September 2001). I was also referred to published statements of the practice relating to registration of domain names as trade marks in the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the Community Trade Marks Office and the UK Trade Marks Registry.

17. In BUY.COM an application for registration of the designation **BUY.COM** was refused for lack of inherent or acquired distinctiveness. The element **.COM** was found to be well-known to internet users as a generic reference to website operators broadly defined as commercial organisations (paragraph 22). In combination with the word **BUY** it created a designation which *“taken as a whole is directly and immediately descriptive of an Internet site at which customers can buy any goods and services”* (paragraph 25).

18. Being merely a non-distinctive domain name, the designation was ineligible for registration as a trade mark:

21. The subject mark is, as the appellant claims, a domain name. A domain name is the address of a site on the Internet and as such, is used to access the web site so identified. Applications for registration of marks consisting of domain names are subject to the same requirements as all other applications for Community trade mark registration taking into account that to be a domain name does not mean to be a trade mark since not all domain names are capable of performing the function of a trade mark in the sense of Article 4 CTMR.

...

34. The use of the mark at issue as the domain name of the appellants' website is not use as a trade mark, as the appellant and the declarant assert, since a domain name operating as such is not a trade mark because their respective functions are different. The appellant's domain name is a mark identifying the appellant's site on the Internet, that is, its Internet address, which the Internet user can have access by either typing or double-clicking on the domain name. Therefore, the mere use of the subject mark as the appellant's domain name is not use of the mark as a trade mark identifying and distinguishing the appellant's retailing services in general and even less than the specific services claimed since these latter are not shown to be provided under any trade mark by the appellant's business at all.

The decision clearly gives full weight to the defining effect of the difference between **BUY** and **BUY.COM**.

19. The principal concern of the statements of practice which have been drawn to my attention is to rationalise, for the purposes of examination as to distinctiveness, the defining effect of ending a mark with an element well-known for its domain name significance, such as **.COM** **.ORG** **.EDU** **.GOV** or **.NET**. The possibility that the presence of such elements might individualise an otherwise unregistrable mark to a degree which rendered it eligible for registration is generally rejected. However, the statement of practice in the UK Trade Marks Registry notes that:

There may be exceptions. The Registrar has accepted the mark **CAN AND WILL.COM** whilst refusing the mark **CAN AND WILL** on the basis that the latter is merely a slogan which describes an approach to conducting business (at the time of writing, an appeal is pending), whereas the addition of **.COM** was considered to give the sign as a whole a trade mark character. Even though it is now common to see **.COM** added to names or descriptions of goods/services, it was considered unnatural to add **.COM** to a slogan. Doing so created a distinctive totality.

The mark **CAN AND WILL** was subsequently held to be registrable by Mr. Simon Thorley Q.C. sitting as the Appointed Person on 14th December 2000 (SRIS 0/052/01). I do not think that detracts from the correctness of the proposition that a distinctive totality may be found to have been created with the assistance of elements which would enable a mark to function as a domain name.

20. According to the prevailing view, domain names are neither automatically eligible nor automatically ineligible for registration as trade marks: the key question is whether the designation put forward for registration has the ability to function not simply as a domain name, but also as a trade mark for goods or services of the kind specified by the applicant. I do not doubt the correctness of that approach. It clearly does not ignore the defining effect of elements well known for their domain name significance.

21. The Applicant is less generous in its approach to the present application. Contention (1) effectively proposes that the defining effect of such elements should be ignored for the purposes of the assessment required by section 41(2). I think it would be wrong to proceed on that basis. Section 41(2) refers holistically “*the identity of the trade mark*” covered by the application. The graphic representations in which the material particulars of the trade mark are supposed to have been reiterated with insubstantial variations must each be considered in their entirety. Excision and dismemberment have no part to play in the relevant assessment.

22. I do not accept that the identity of a trade mark must be taken to have been insubstantially affected by the addition/subtraction of elements which would be seen as necessary or appropriate to enable it to function as a domain name. In my view, the addition/subtraction of the defining effect of such elements is liable to change the overall

identity of the altered mark in a manner and to a degree that will often, perhaps invariably, fall to be regarded as substantial for the closely circumscribed purposes of section 41(2). I also consider that the replacement of such elements with other such elements changes the defining effect from one form to another and thereby changes the overall identity of the altered mark in a manner and to a degree which might or might not be substantial for those purposes. I therefore reject the mechanical approach to assessment envisaged by contention (1).

contention (2)

23. Contention (2) is technically correct. The shortest mark in the proposed series is the word **DIGEO** and each of the remaining 307 marks consists of the word **DIGEO** with additional elements designed to enable the mark as a whole to be used as a domain name. The Applicant submits that the 307 marks should be taken to possess the domain name significance they were designed to possess. The hearing officer considered that they should only be taken to possess domain name significance if and insofar as that is the significance they would be taken to possess by the average consumer of the goods and services concerned. The Applicant maintains that the hearing officer's approach was flawed and that he should not have attempted to decide how the marks in question were likely to be perceived and remembered once it had been confirmed that they were constructed in accordance with established domain name protocols.

24. I agree that ignorance of meaning is not the same thing as absence of meaning, but that simply invites the question how meaning or its absence should be determined. In the context of claims for trade mark protection, the guiding principle is that the decision taker must have regard to *“the presumed expectations of an average consumer who is*

reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect” as anticipated by the Judgment of the ECJ in Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide GmbH [1998] ECR I-4657, paragraphs 27 to 37. It is clearly not right to impute unusual knowledge or experience to the average consumer. Also, as famously affirmed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later work Philosophical Investigations (1953) at paragraph 43: “*For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we use the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language*”. In my view, the hearing officer was fully entitled to question the extent to which the 307 marks were likely to be recognised as domain names when encountered in the market place by people with such knowledge and experience of domain name protocols as the average consumer could realistically be taken to possess.

25. He pursued that aspect of the matter at a hearing appointed to consider the objection which had been raised by the Registry under section 41(2). The hearing took place on 1st June 2001. The official record confirms that the objection was maintained, but notes that the Applicant’s representatives: “*will submit detailed arguments against this decision with a view to requesting a written decision so that the matter may be appealed before the Appointed Person. 3 months allowed*”. However, no further submissions were made. The hearing officer was therefore left with no alternative but to refuse acceptance of the application under section 41(2) and rule 21(1).

26. On 1st March 2002 the Registry notified the Applicant that its application had been rejected under section 37(4) of the Act on the basis of the objection that had been raised and maintained under section 41(2). Up until then it appears to have been assumed that the Applicant would have an opportunity to test the correctness of the objection under

section 41(2) without losing the right to take appropriate remedial action if the objection turned out to be well-founded. It can fairly be said that the letter of refusal issued on 1st March 2002 went further than necessary for the orderly determination of the outstanding objection (see paragraphs 5 to 9 above). I return to this aspect of the matter below.

27. The Applicant's representatives responded to the official letter of 1st March 2002 with a request under rule 62(2) for a statement of the reasons for the decision. This was issued on 28th May 2002. It proceeded on the basis of the hearing officer's own assessment of the perceptions and recollections that the marks in issue would be likely to trigger in the mind of the average consumer of the goods and services concerned.

28. At the hearing before me the Applicant's representatives criticised the hearing officer for making that assessment "*without the benefit of evidence*" and on the basis of "*judicial notice without enquiry*". These criticisms are misconceived. The Applicant could and should have adduced evidence in support of its position in answer to the objection under section 41(2) if it wanted to ensure that the hearing officer was informed of particular facts and matters which, in its view, indicated that his approach was incorrect. It did not do so, even after the hearing officer had indicated that he would be willing to take account of further representations on behalf of the Applicant following the hearing on 1st June 2001. In that state of affairs the hearing officer had to make the best assessment he could by drawing upon his general knowledge and experience. Although it can be a "*task of some nicety*" to decide how far a court or tribunal may act upon its own knowledge (see Phipson on Evidence 15th Edition, 2000 paras. 2-08 to 2-10) there is nothing in his decision to suggest that he exceeded the latitude which must necessarily be

allowed for the purpose of enabling him to apply the ‘average consumer’ test to the marks he was required to examine.

29. The question then arises whether the application of the ‘average consumer’ test to the marks in issue should have resulted in a finding to the effect stated in contention (2). In seeking to answer that question, it is sufficient to consider the 308 marks in the proposed series in categories as follows:

- (1) the mark which consists simply of the word **DIGEO**
- (2) the 159 marks in which the word **DIGEO** is combined with different 2-letter suffixes in the configuration **DIGEO.****
- (3) the 4 marks in which the word **DIGEO** is combined with 3-letter suffixes in the configurations **DIGEO.COM DIGEO.NET DIGEO.ORG** and **DIGEO.EDU**.
- (4) the 26 marks in which the combination **DIGEO.CO** is further combined with different 2-letter suffixes in the configuration **DIGEO.CO.****
- (5) the 55 marks in which the word **DIGEO** and the suffix **US** are combined with different 2-letter interpolations in the configuration **DIGEO.**. US**
- (6) the mark in which the word **DIGEO** is combined with 4 additional letters in the configuration **DIGEO.TM.ZA**
- (7) the 62 marks in which the combination **DIGEO.COM** is combined with different 2-letter suffixes in the configuration **DIGEO.COM.****

I shall now consider each of these categories in turn.

30. Category 1: I think it is clear that the word **DIGEO** would be perceived and remembered as an invented word with ‘digital electronic’ overtones when used in relation

to goods and services of the kind specified in the application for registration. In isolation, it is not (and would not be regarded as) a domain name.

31. Category 2: It appears to me that the 159 marks in this category would generally not be perceived and remembered as domain names by the average consumer of the goods and services concerned, primarily because he or she would not be sufficiently conversant with domain name protocols to think of them in that way. The suffixes would, if they were not regarded as abbreviations, be regarded as arbitrary features of the marks in which they appeared. Examples of this are: **DIGEO.CL** **DIGEO.AD** **DIGEO.AO** **DIGEO.CX** **DIGEO.GQ** **DIGEO.GF**. To the extent that the suffixes were regarded as abbreviations, they would be taken to possess geographical significance or regarded as abbreviations of more general expressions. Examples of this are: **DIGEO.FR** (France) **DIGEO.NZ** (New Zealand) **DIGEO.CO** (company) **DIGEO.CD** (compact disc) **DIGEO.IT** (information technology) **DIGEO.TV** (television).

32. Category 3: I believe that the 4 marks in this category were likely to be perceived and remembered by the relevant average consumer as domain names with differing significance as follows: **DIGEO.COM** (commercial entity) **DIGEO.NET** (on internet) **DIGEO.ORG** (organisation or institution) **DIGEO.EDU** (educational institution).

33. Category 4: The mark **DIGEO.CO.UK** would be perceived and remembered by the relevant average consumer as a domain name for a commercial entity that had business connections or associations with the United Kingdom. Each of the remaining 25 marks seems likely to have been perceived and remembered as a domain name for a commercial entity with connections or associations of some kind or other to which the suffixes cryptically referred. I am not satisfied that the relevant average consumer would

have attributed geographical significance to the suffixes of many (if any) of these marks.

The obscurity of the suffixes can be seen in the following examples: **DIGEO.CO.CK**

DIGEO.CO.EE DIGEO.CO.CG DIGEO.CO.IM DIGEO.CO.MA

DIGEO.CO.MP.

34. Category 5: The 55 marks in this category seem likely to have been perceived and remembered by the relevant average consumer as designations, not necessarily domain names, used in relation to entities or activities connected or associated with the United States. In some cases, the 2-letter interpolation might be recognised as an abbreviation for the name of a State, for example **DIGEO.NY.US** (New York) **DIGEO.CA.US** (California). I believe that in most cases the significance of the interpolation would be lost on the relevant average consumer. The obscurity of the interpolations can be seen in the following examples: **DIGEO.CZ.US DIGEO.GU.US DIGEO.HLUS DIGEO.KS.US DIGEO.ME.US DIGEO.PR.US.**

35. Category 6: The mark in this category seems likely to have been perceived and remembered by the relevant average consumer as the word **DIGEO** followed by two arbitrary 2-letter combinations: **DIGEO.TM.ZA**. I am not satisfied that it would always or necessarily be perceived and remembered as a domain name.

36. Category 7: I believe that each of the 62 marks in this category was likely to be perceived and remembered as a domain name for a commercial entity with connections or associations of some kind or other to which the suffixes cryptically referred. I am not satisfied that the relevant average consumer would have attributed geographical significance to the suffixes of many (if any) of the marks. The obscurity of the suffixes

can be seen in the following examples: **DIGEO.COM.MX** **DIGEO.COM.TR**
DIGEO.COM.AR **DIGEO.COM.FJ** **DIGEO.COM.GI** **DIGEO.COM.KH**
DIGEO.COM.LA.

37. My conclusion is that the range and diversity of perceptions and recollections made relevant by the ‘average consumer’ test prevented the hearing officer from finding that the differences between the marks in issue involved nothing more than the addition/subtraction or replacement of elements designed to enable the trade mark **DIGEO** to function as a domain name.

contention (3)

38. In order to compare each mark with every other in the proposed series of 308 marks, it would be necessary to make 47,278 different comparisons. The hearing officer did not embark on that task. I do not intend to do so either. For the reasons given above, I find it impossible to say that the marks identified in the application consist only of iterations of the trade mark **DIGEO** with variations of a non-distinctive character not substantially affecting the identity of the trade mark thus reiterated. I therefore reject contention (3).

conclusion

39. I uphold the Registrar’s refusal to accept the application for registration of the 308 marks as a series under section 41(2) and rule 21(1). However, I consider that the Applicant should have been notified of such refusal under section 37(3) and given the opportunity to avoid final refusal of the application under section 37(4) by taking

corrective action within a specified period following notification of the decision to refuse acceptance under section 41(2) and rule 21(1) (or the disposal, including withdrawal, of any appeal therefrom). In my view, the final refusal of the application under section 37(4) was unnecessary and inappropriate given that the Applicant might legitimately wish to pursue the possibility of taking corrective action if (as has now happened) the objection under section 41(2) was upheld on appeal.

40. So that the Applicant may have the opportunity which I think it should have been given to take appropriate action in response to that objection, I shall:

- (1) set aside the decision refusing acceptance of Application Number 2230395 under section 37(4) of the 1994 Act;
- (2) substitute for that decision a decision: (a) refusing acceptance of the Application under section 41(2) of the Act and rule 21(1) of the Trade Marks Rules 2000; and (b) allowing the Applicant a period of 8 weeks from the date of this decision within which to respond under section 37(3) of the Act with a request to the Registrar for amendment and/or division apt to render the Application unobjectionable under section 41(2); and
- (3) remit the Application to the Registrar for further processing under and in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules.

In keeping with the usual practice on appeals to this tribunal in respect of ex parte decisions of the Registrar, there will be no order as to costs.

Geoffrey Hobbs Q.C.

13th October 2003

Mr. John Olsen and Ms. Tasneem Haq of Messrs. Field Fisher Waterhouse appeared on behalf of the Applicant.

Mr. Allan James, Principal Hearing Officer, appeared on behalf of the Registrar.

Annex A

DIGEO.COM.M X	DIGEO.BY	DIGEO.COM.E G	DIGEO.IS	DIGEO.COM.M V
DIGEO	DIGEO.BE	DIGEO.SV	DIGEO.IN	DIGEO.ML
DIGEO.COM	DIGEO.BZ	DIGEO.GQ	DIGEO.CO.ID	DIGEO.COM.M T
DIGEO.NET	DIGEO.BJ	DIGEO.ER	DIGEO.CO.IR	DIGEO.MH
DIGEO.ORG	DIGEO.BM	DIGEO.CO.EE	DIGEO.IQ	DIGEO.MQ
DIGEO.CA	DIGEO.BT	DIGEO.FK	DIGEO.IE	DIGEO.MR
DIGEO.CL	DIGEO.BA	DIGEO.FO	DIGEO.IM	DIGEO.CO.MU
DIGEO.COM.V E	DIGEO.BW	DIGEO.COM.F J	DIGEO.CO.IM	DIGEO.COM.M X
DIGEO.CZ	DIGEO.VG	DIGEO.FI	DIGEO.CO.IL	DIGEO.FM
DIGEO.CO.HU	DIGEO.BG	DIGEO.GF	DIGEO.IT	DIGEO.MD
DIGEO.FR	DIGEO.BF	DIGEO.GH	DIGEO.CI	DIGEO.MC
DIGEO.DE	DIGEO.BI	DIGEO.PF	DIGEO.COM.J M	DIGEO.MS
DIGEO.TO	DIGEO.COM.K H	DIGEO.TF	DIGEO.CO.JP	DIGEO.CO.MA
DIGEO.COM.T R	DIGEO.CM	DIGEO.GM	DIGEO.CO.JE	DIGEO.CO.MZ
DIGEO.CO.UK	DIGEO.CV	DIGEO.COM.G E	DIGEO.COM.J O	DIGEO.MM
DIGEO.NZ	DIGEO.KY	DIGEO.COM.G H	DIGEO.KZ	DIGEO.COM.N A
DIGEO.AL	DIGEO.CF	DIGEO.GI	DIGEO.CO.KE	DIGEO.COM.N P
DIGEO.DZ	DIGEO.COM.C N	DIGEO.COM.G I	DIGEO.KI	DIGEO.NL
DIGEO.AS	DIGEO.CX	DIGEO.COM.G R	DIGEO.KW	DIGEO.AN
DIGEO.AD	DIGEO.CO	DIGEO.COM.G R	DIGEO.KG	DIGEO.NC
DIGEO.AO	DIGEO.CD	DIGEO.GL	DIGEO.COM.L A	DIGEO.COM.N I
DIGEO.COM.A I	DIGEO.CG	DIGEO.GD	DIGEO.LV	
	DIGEO.CO.CK	DIGEO.COM.G		

DIGEO.AQ	DIGEO.CR	D	DIGEO.COM.L V	DIGEO.NE
DIGEO.AG	DIGEO.HR	DIGEO.GP	DIGEO.COM.L B	DIGEO.COM.N G
DIGEO.COM.A R	DIGEO.CU	DIGEO.COM.G U	DIGEO.LS	DIGEO.NU
DIGEO.AM	DIGEO.COM.C Y	DIGEO.COM.G T	DIGEO.COM.L Y	DIGEO.COM.N F
DIGEO.AW	DIGEO.CZ	DIGEO.CO.GG	DIGEO.LI	DIGEO.CO.MP
DIGEO.AC	DIGEO.DK	DIGEO.GN	DIGEO.LT	DIGEO.NO
DIGEO.AT	DIGEO.DJ	DIGEO.GW	DIGEO.LU	DIGEO.COM.O M
DIGEO.COM.B B	DIGEO.COM.D M	DIGEO.GY	DIGEO.COM.M O	DIGEO.PK
DIGEO.COM.B H	DIGEO.COM.D O	DIGEO.COM.G Y	DIGEO.MK	DIGEO.COM.P A
DIGEO.COM.B N	DIGEO.TP	DIGEO.HT	DIGEO.MG	DIGEO.PG
DIGEO.COM.B R	DIGEO.COM.E C	DIGEO.HM	DIGEO.MW	DIGEO.COM.P Y
DIGEO.COM.B S		DIGEO.HN	DIGEO.COM.M Y	DIGEO.COM.P E
		DIGEO.COM.H K		
		DIGEO.CO.HU		DIGEO.PH
DIGEO.COM.PN	DIGEO.TJ	DIGEO.SO	DIGEO.MT.US	
DIGEO.PL	DIGEO.CO.TZ	DIGEO.PM	DIGEO.NE.US	
DIGEO.COM.PL	DIGEO.CO.TH	DIGEO.SD	DIGEO.NV.US	
DIGEO.PT	DIGEO.TG	DIGEO.SJ	DIGEO.NH.US	
DIGEO.COM.PR	DIGEO.CO.TT	DIGEO.TK	DIGEO.NJ.US	
DIGEO.QA	DIGEO.TN	DIGEO.UM	DIGEO.NM.US	
DIGEO.CO.KR	DIGEO.TM	DIGEO.WF	DIGEO.NY.US	
DIGEO.RE	DIGEO.TC	DIGEO.EH	DIGEO.NC.US	

DIGEO.RO	DIGEO.TV	DIGEO.EDU	DIGEO.ND.US
DIGEO.RU	DIGEO.CO.UG	DIGEO.AL.US	DIGEO.OH.US
DIGEO.COM.RU	DIGEO.COM.UA	DIGEO.AK.US	DIGEO.OK.US
DIGEO.RW	DIGEO.COM.AE	DIGEO.AZ.US	DIGEO.OR.US
DIGEO.SM	DIGEO.CO.VI	DIGEO.AR.US	DIGEO.PA.US
DIGEO.ST	DIGEO.COM.UY	DIGEO.CA.US	DIGEO.PR.US
DIGEO.COM.SA	DIGEO.CO.UZ	DIGEO.CZ.US	DIGEO.RI.US
DIGEO.SN	DIGEO.VU	DIGEO.CO.US	DIGEO.SC.US
DIGEO.COM.SC	DIGEO.COM.VE	DIGEO.CT.US	DIGEO.SD.US
DIGEO.COM.SL	DIGEO.VN	DIGEO.DE.US	DIGEO.TN.US
DIGEO.COM.SQ	DIGEO.WS	DIGEO.DC.US	DIGEO.TX.US
DIGEO.SK	DIGEO.COM.YE	DIGEO.FL.US	DIGEO.UT.US
DIGEO.SI	DIGEO.CO.YU	DIGEO.GA.US	DIGEO.VT.US
DIGEO.SB	DIGEO.ZR	DIGEO.GU.US	DIGEO.VA.US
DIGEO.CO.ZA	DIGEO.ZM	DIGEO.HI.US	DIGEO.VI.US
DIGEO.TM.ZA	DIGEO.ZW	DIGEO.ID.US	DIGEO.WA.US
DIGEO.GS	DIGEO.AF	DIGEO.IL.US	DIGEO.WV.US
DIGEO.ES	DIGEO.PW	DIGEO.IN.US	DIGEO.WI.US
DIGEO.LK	DIGEO.BD	DIGEO.IA.US	DIGEO.WY.US
DIGEO.SH	DIGEO.BV	DIGEO.KS.US	
DIGEO.KN	DIGEO.TD	DIGEO.KY.US	
DIGEO.LC	DIGEO.KM	DIGEO.LA.US	
DIGEO.VC	DIGEO.ET	DIGEO.ME.US	
DIGEO.SR	DIGEO.GA	DIGEO.MD.US	

DIGEO.SZ	DIGEO.KP	DIGEO.MA.US
DIGEO.SE	DIGEO.YT	DIGEO.MI.US
DIGEO.CH	DIGEO.FX	DIGEO.MN.US
DIGEO.COM.SY	DIGEO.MN	DIGEO.MS.US
DIGEO.COM.TW	DIGEO.NR	DIGEO.MO.US