BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?

No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!



BAILII [Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]

United Kingdom Journals
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Journals >> Jury Warnings: The Exercise of Judicial Discretion
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/1995/issue4/cooper4.html
Cite as: Jury Warnings: The Exercise of Judicial Discretion

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

Jury Warnings: The Exercise of Judicial Discretion

Simon Cooper

Lecturer in Law, Newcastle Law School

Copyright © 1995 Simon Cooper.
First Published in Web Journal of Current Legal Issues in association with Blackstone Press Ltd.

Summary

The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 abrogated the need for a trial judge to warn the jury of the dangers of acting on the uncorroborated evidence of an alleged accomplice or victim of a sexual offence. This casenote evaluates R v Makanjuola [1995] 145 NLJ 959, the first Court of Appeal case to address these provisions, and considers the future of jury warnings where the evidence has been provided by a witness whose testimony is in some way suspect.

Web JCLI | [1995] 4 Web JCLI | Download this file.

Contents

The Background
Suspect Witnesses
The Decision in R v Makanjuola
The Facts
The Decision
The Guidelines
Mandatory Warnings?
Bibliography

The Background

The common law recognised that, in certain cases, a trial judge was obliged to warn the jury about the dangers of acting on the uncorroborated evidence of particular classes of witness. Not only was the warning mandatory, it required the judge to adhere to a set formula which included use of the phrase 'dangerous to convict' and obliged him to identify for the jury's benefit what evidence, if any, was capable of affording corroboration. The classes of witness, regarded as being inherently unreliable, were judicially identified as evidence given:

(i) on oath by a child of tender years;

(ii) on behalf of the prosecution by an accomplice of the accused;

(iii) by the complainants of sexual misconduct (Davies v DPP [1954] AC 378).

Statutory intervention has now abrogated the need for this mandatory warning in all the above cases. Section 34(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 abolished the requirement for a warning in respect of sworn evidence given by children of tender years and the most recent reform being effected by s32 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.

Section 32 so far as is relevant provides:

"(1) Any requirement whereby at a trial on indictment it is obligatory for the court to give the jury a warning about convicting the accused on the uncorroborated evidence of a person merely because that person is-
(a) an alleged accomplice of the accused, or
(b) where the offence charged is a sexual offence, the person in respect of whom it is alleged to have been committed,
is hereby abrogated..."

Running alongside the judicially established categories which attracted a mandatory warning, was a further class of case usually referred to as the 'suspect witness'.

Contents | Bibliography

Suspect Witnesses

Many witnesses might, of course, prove to be unreliable for an infinite number and variety of reasons. For example, there is nothing to suppose that the evidence of an accomplice who testifies on his own behalf and implicates his co-accused, is any more reliable than an accomplice who testifies on behalf of the prosecution. Yet the common law required a warning to the jury only in the latter situation. Similarly, a witness might hold a grudge against the accused or have some other personal interest in the outcome of the case, thereby rendering his evidence 'suspect'. The approach of the courts to this type of situation was developed in a number of cases in both the Court of Appeal and House of Lords. In R v Spencer [1987] AC 128, the evidence against the accused was provided by a patient at a secure hospital who was suffering from a mental disorder. The House of Lords held that where the evidence for the prosecution was provided by a witness who was not within one of the recognised categories which attracted a mandatory warning but who, by reason of his particular mental condition and criminal history, fulfilled analogous criteria, the judge should warn the jury of the dangers of convicting in the absence of corroborating evidence. The concession made in Spencer was that in such cases, it may not be necessary to use the word 'dangerous' in giving the jury a warning, so long as the words employed by the judge make the jury fully aware of the dangers of convicting on the witness's evidence alone. Lord Ackner stated that the overriding duty of a trial judge is to put the defence case fairly and adequately to the jury. The earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Beck [1982] 1 WLR 461, was expressly approved. In Beck, three of the prosecution witnesses, whilst not accomplices in the strict sense of that word, clearly had motivation to shift blame from themselves to the accused. The trial judge advised the jury to pay 'particular care and attention' to the evidence of these witnesses but did not give the established corroboration warning which would have been mandatory had they been accomplices. Ackner LJ delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal said:

"While we in no way wish to detract from the obligation on a judge to advise a jury to proceed with caution when there is material to suggest that a witness's evidence may be tainted by improper motive, and the strength of that advice must vary according to the facts of the case, we cannot accept there is any obligation to give the accomplice warning."

The view taken in Beck, endorsed in Spencer, seems to have been that while the format of the warning in 'suspect witness' cases was discretionary, a warning of some sort was obligatory.

One question which remains is whether or not a Beck type warning survives the enactment of the 1994 Act. There is some room for arguing that the Act, by implication, sweeps away the Beck warning (Mirfield, 1995). Equally, it can be argued that Beck remains unaffected by the 1994 Act (Birch, 1995). Unfortunately, whilst addressing the impact of s32 on the need for warnings in cases involving sexual misconduct and providing some general guidance, the first appeal case concerning the 1994 Act does not directly address the Beck question.

Contents | Bibliography

The Decision in R v Makanjuola

The Facts

The appellant was convicted of indecent assaulting the complainant by squeezing her breasts when they were alone together in a storeroom at their place of employment. Counsel for the defence had suggested to the complainant during cross-examination that the allegation had been invented because she was angry with the appellant following a disagreement at work a few days earlier. The appellant did not give evidence on his own behalf. It was argued by counsel for the appellant that the trial judge had erred by failing to give any direction to the jury on corroboration.

The Decision

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal noting that there was no evidential basis for regarding the complainant as 'inherently unreliable'. Nor was there any basis for giving any sort of special warning, the case being described as "perfectly straightforward". The Court then took the opportunity to provide it's opinion on the effect of s.32 and how trial judges might approach future cases where it is suggested some form of discretionary warning to the jury might be necessary.

The Guidelines

Having stated that s32(1) abrogates the requirement to warn in respect of the evidence of an accomplice or complainant of a sexual offence, Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ stated:

"(2) It is a matter for the judge's discretion what, if any warning, he considers appropriate in respect of such a witness as indeed in respect of any other witness in whatever type of case. Whether he chooses to give a warning and in what terms will depend on the circumstances of the case, the issues raised and the content and quality of the witness's evidence.

(3) In some cases, it may be appropriate for the judge to warn the jury to exercise caution before acting upon the unsupported evidence of a witness. This will not be so simply because the witness is a complainant of a sexual offence nor will it necessarily be so because a witness is alleged to be an accomplice. There will need to be an evidential basis for suggesting that the evidence of the witness may be unreliable. An evidential basis does not include mere suggestions by cross-examining counsel....

(5) Where the judge does decide to give some warning in respect of a witness, it will be appropriate to do so as part of the judge's review of the evidence and his comments as to how the jury should evaluate it rather than as a set-piece legal direction.

(6) Where some warning is required, it will be for the judge to decide the strength and terms of the warning. It does not have to be invested with the whole florid regime of the old corroboration rule

The Court concluded by stating "attempts to re-impose the straitjacket of the old corroboration rules are strongly to be deprecated".

Contents | Bibliography

Mandatory Warnings?

The guidelines formulated in Makanjuola suggest, in the strongest possible terms, that the need for any form of warning is a matter for the discretion of the trial judge in all circumstances, although another interpretation is possible. Guideline 3 states that "[i]n some cases, it may be appropriate for the judge to warn the jury to exercise caution". Later, guideline 6 states, "[w]here some warning is required, it will be for the judge to decide the strength and terms of the warning". It might be argued then, that the Court has acknowledged that, in certain cases, a warning is not merely discretionary but obligatory. However, adopting such an interpretation does seem to do violence to the overall tenor of the guidelines. A full reading of the guidelines seems to demand that the trial judge adopt a two stage approach when the issue of the need for a warning is raised. First, it is for the judge to decide whether or not the evidence of any particular witness merits a warning at all. Secondly, if the judge decides a warning is necessary, it is for him to determine the strength and terms of that warning.

The principal ground upon which Makanjuola is open to criticism lies in the fact that there is no clear statement as to the types of case which might, or perhaps must, attract a jury warning, the Court being content to state that the need for a warning is, apparently, a matter for the trial judge's discretion. The unwillingness of the Court of Appeal to provide such information, whilst perhaps understandable, is hardly satisfactory. Substantive directions to jurors should be consistent from case to case. They ought not to depend upon the exercise of a discretion, at least where the material facts are identical.

Further, it is at least arguable that a warning to the jury in a case which involves 'suspect evidence' remains mandatory. Support for this argument can be drawn from the way the common law developed before the passing of the 1994 Act. In Spencer, the House of Lords accepted the argument that the evidence of "suspect witnesses" required a warning be given to the jury, although in so doing refused to extend the categories judicially recognised in Davies v DPP. It was clear, however, that some form of quasi-corroboration warning had to be given. It was not a matter for discretion. The 1994 Act only removed, rightly in my view, the obligation to warn merely because the witness fell within one of the recognised common law categories. The Act is silent about suspect evidence and suspect witnesses generally and does nothing to cast doubt upon the dicta in Spencer. It would be curious then, notwithstanding the changes made by the 1994 Act, if the giving of a warning in relation to suspect evidence was now merely discretionary. It would be neither necessary nor desirable to be prescriptive about the format of any such warning. As the Court of Appeal in Makanjuola said:

"Attempts to re-impose the straitjacket of the old corroboration rules are strongly to be deprecated."

It must, however, be in the interests of justice to ensure that the jury are made aware of the potential weaknesses of suspect evidence, irrespective of the type of case in which the issue arises. The overriding duty, according to Spencer, is that the trial judge puts the defence case fairly to the jury and this can hardly be achieved unless due reference is made to any weaknesses in the prosecution case. It ought, therefore, to remain incumbent upon a trial judge to at least direct a jury to view suspect evidence with caution and perhaps, where appropriate, inform them of what other evidence, if any, is available to support the suspect evidence.

Contents

Bibliography

Mirfield, P (1995) 'Corroboration After the 1994 Act' [1995] Criminal Law Review 448

Birch, D (1995) 'Corroboration: Good-bye To All That' [1995] Criminal Law Review 524

BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/other/journals/WebJCLI/1995/issue4/cooper4.html