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High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division Decisions >> McKenna, Re Judicial Review [2017] NIQB 96 (27 October 2017) URL: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/QB/2017/96.html Cite as: [2017] NIQB 96 |
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Ref: MAG10414
Neutral Citation No: [2017] NIQB 96
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down
(subject to editorial corrections)*
Delivered: 27/10/2017
2015/005573/01
2015/48142/01
Introduction | 1-7 |
Part A | |
The arrest and detention of the 12 men (August 1971) and of the two further men (October (1971) | 8-11 |
The use of the in-depth interrogation | 12-13 |
Ministerial Briefing | 14 |
The Five Techniques | 15 |
The circumstances of the applicants | |
Mr McGuigan | 16-20 |
Mr McKenna | 21-23 |
The immediate aftermath of internment | 24 |
The Compton Inquiry | 25-39 |
The Parker Inquiry | 40-48 |
Civil claims | 49 |
The inter-state case before the European Commission | |
for Human Rights | 50-51 |
The role of the Commission | 52 |
Steps taken by the Commission | 53-60 |
Some aspects of the parties' submissions | 61-68 |
Medical evidence | 69 |
The Commission's findings in respect of the evidence | 70-74 |
Outcome | 75-77 |
The inter-state case before the European Court of Human Rights | 78 |
How the case came to be before the court | 79-81 |
Steps before the court | 82 |
Outcome | 83-88 |
The scope of the inter-state case in the areas of inspection/punishment | |
of offenders | 89 |
Criminal liability for what occurred 1971-78 | 90-92 |
Events after the judgment of the ECHR | 93-98 |
Uncovery of materials from the National Archives | 99-100 |
The RTÉ programme | 101-119 |
Events at the Policing Board | 120-122 |
Action to look into the position | 123-137 |
PART B | |
Documents supplied to the court | 138-141 |
Ministerial knowledge/authorisation | 142-154 |
The issue of possible prosecution | 155-158 |
Assurances given to the RUC | 159-165 |
The depth of the investigation | 166-167 |
Materials relating to the issue of the independence of the PSNI | 168-170 |
Requests to the Irish Attorney General and Secretary of State for | |
Northern Ireland | 171-176 |
PART C | |
Summary of Court's assessment | 177-178 |
PART D | |
Legal issues before the Court | 179-183 |
PART E | |
The legal landscape | 184-190 |
The problem of the efflux of time | 191-224 |
The Brecknell doctrine | 225-232 |
Independence as a feature of Article 2 | 233-236 |
PART F | |
The Court's Assessment of the Issues | |
Articles 2 and 3 – the Convention issue | 237-239 |
What would Strasbourg do on the facts of these cases? | 240-246 |
Convention values test | 247-258 |
Is the Brecknell Test met? | 259-263 |
Is McKerr still good in law? | 264-274 |
Independence | 275-284 |
The common law issue | 285-292 |
Has there been a breach of customary international law? | 293-298 |
Rationality | 299-311 |
Legitimate expectation | 312-314 |
Strasbourg misled? | 315-316 |
PART G | |
Conclusions | 317-318 |
MAGUIRE J
Introduction
PART A
The arrest and detention of the 12 men (August 1971) and of two further men (October 1971)
The use of in-depth interrogation
Ministerial briefing
"97. From the start, it has been conceded by the respondent Government that the use of the five techniques was authorised at "high level". Although never committed to writing or authorised in any official document, the techniques had been orally taught to the RUC by the English Intelligence Centre at a seminar in April 1971."
The Five Techniques
"96. … These methods, sometimes termed "disorientation" or "sensory deprivation" techniques, were not used in any cases other than the 14 so indicated above. The techniques consisted of the following:
(a) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain for periods of some hours in a 'stress position', described by those who underwent it as being 'spreadeagled against the wall, with their fingers put high above the head against the wall, the legs spread apart and the feet back, causing them to stand on their toes with the weight of the body mainly on the fingers';
(b) hooding: putting a black or navy coloured bag over the detainees' heads and, at least initially, keeping it there all the time except during interrogation;
(c) subjection to noise: pending their interrogations, holding the detainees in a room where there was a continuous loud and hissing noise;
(d) deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations, depriving the detainees of sleep;
(e) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detainees to a reduced diet during their stay at the centre and pending interrogations.
167. The five techniques were applied in combination, with premeditation and for hours at a stretch; they caused, if not actual bodily injury, at least intense physical and mental suffering to the persons subjected thereto and also led to acute psychiatric disturbances during interrogation."
The circumstances of the applicants
Mr McGuigan
Ms McKenna
The immediate aftermath of internment
The Compton Inquiry
"Investigate allegations by those arrested on 9 August under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (NI) 1922 of physical brutality while in the custody of the security forces prior to either their subsequent release, the preferring of a criminal charge or their being lodged in a place specified in a Detention Order."
"105. … we consider that brutality is an inhuman or savage form of cruelty and that cruelty implies a disposition to inflict suffering, coupled with indifference to, or pleasure in, the victim's pain …"
"On individual cases, it is not a matter in which any individual is regarded as having gone beyond what were his instructions. … I am entirely satisfied that the methods used have not gone beyond the rules laid down in 1965, as amended in 1967."
"The methods of interrogation have been used for many years. They were used specifically at the time of Aden and they were used in Malaysia and in Borneo. Is the hon. Gentleman honestly saying that in his belief the Minister at the time did not know the methods which were being used by their Departments? I find this very hard to accept."
"The rules concerning interrogation do not say that all detainees held by the Army should be interrogated in this way. They say that this is the limit to which interrogation should go. What I want to know is whether the Army went to that limit without Ministerial approval or whether the Army went to that limit with the approval of, or indeed the express instruction of, Minister. I want the Minister of State to tell me whether it was his decision or whether it was taken in default of his knowledge."
"I can tell the Hon. Gentleman – exactly the same Ministerial concurrence as was given to the same methods of interrogation used in Aden, Malaysia and Borneo."
"... The formal authorisation to remove certain detainees to the interrogation centre was necessarily given by the Northern Ireland Minister for Home Affairs, with the knowledge and concurrence of Her Majesty's Government. Ministers knew that the interrogation would be conducted within the guidelines laid down in 1965 and 1967 and that the methods would be the same as had been used on numerous occasions in the past. Their detailed application was necessarily a matter for the judgment of those immediately responsible."
".... This interrogation was authorised by the Northern Ireland Government with the knowledge and concurrence of Her Majesty's Government. ... The Compton Report confirmed that the methods currently authorised for interrogation contain no element of cruelty or brutality, but more generally it drew attention to the problem of implementing the rules in detail in circumstances in which it is vital to carry out intensive urgent interrogation."
The Parker Inquiry
"whether, and if so in what respects, the procedures currently authorised for interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism and for their custody while subject to interrogation require amendment".
"We also read our terms of reference as calling upon us to enquire quite generally into the interrogation and custody of persons suspected in such circumstances of terrorism in the future, and not specifically in connection with Northern Ireland. In particular, we are not called upon to consider afresh matters already dealt with in the Compton report. Further, while in our view the use of some if not all of the techniques in question would constitute criminal assaults and might also give rise to civil proceedings under English law, we refrain from expressing any view in respect of the position in Northern Ireland in deference to the courts there, before whom we understand proceedings which raise this issue are pending."
Civil claims
The inter-state case before the European Commission for Human Rights
The role of the Commission
Steps taken by the Commission
"148. … [The Irish Government] also maintain—though they do not ask the Court to make a specific finding—that the British Government failed on several occasions in their duty to furnish the necessary facilities for the effective conduct of the investigation. The Commission does not go as far as that; however, at various places in its report, the Commission points out, in substance, that the respondent Government did not always afford it the assistance desirable. ...."
Some aspects of the parties' submissions
"…that the allegations were not made personally against any member of the United Kingdom Government, but were based on the legal concept of an administrative practice: the alleged acts were not isolated in time or in place and had not been duly punished.
(i) Repetition of acts
The applicant Government submitted that the facts disclosed a repetition of acts …
(ii) Official tolerance
The applicant Government submitted that there had been official tolerance of these acts of ill-treatment …
The applicant Government stated that they were aware, however, that it was claimed on behalf of the respondent Government that, in the words of the Greek case "higher authorities" had been investigating these allegations and that accordingly official tolerance was not established. But in the applicant Government's submission the Commission had in its definition of official tolerance suggested a number of alternative ingredients.
(iii) The level of tolerance
Further the applicant Government considered that the allegations which had been made by individuals were of such a character and continued over such a length of time and in such circumstances that they could not possibly have occurred without the knowledge of superior officers of the individual men concerned.
Referring to the respondent Government's submission that in order to establish official toleration there must be condonation or toleration of the acts by somebody in a position to act for the Government or with the Government's approval, the applicant Government submitted that this suggestion was directly contrary to the views expressed in the Greek case. …"
"(iii) Official tolerance
…
The respondent Government denied that the alleged ill-treatment had been tolerated by superiors who had been cognisant of the acts of ill-treatment but had done nothing to punish or prevent them.
The respondent Government submitted that instructions had been issued and that every complaint had been or was being investigated.
(iv) Level of tolerance
…
It would, in the respondent Government's submission, neither be fair nor reasonable to regard condonation by subordinate officers of acts forbidden by higher authorities as an administrative practice for which the Government is responsible and there was no evidence of such toleration. …"
"… the applicant Government drew attention to the respondent Government's refusal to inform the Commission what authority had ordered the application of the five techniques and the ban imposed on witnesses heard in January 1975 precluding them from answering questions on the five techniques. …"
Medical evidence
"The applicant Government then dealt with the conflict of opinion as to the seriousness of psychiatric after-effects of what was done to the prisoners in these cases. They observed that Dr. Lh. had admitted that in the cases of T.6 and T.13 he had found psychiatric symptoms, but described them as being minor and wearing off with the passage of time. Professors Daly and Bastiaans, on the other hand, had expressed the firm view that quite serious long-term sequelae were a probability in these and other cases where the persons were subjected to the practices now impugned …"
The Commission's findings in respect of the evidence
"The witnesses themselves described feelings of anxiety and fear, as well as disorientation and isolation during the time they were subjected to the techniques and afterwards. …..
On the other hand, the psychiatrists disagreed considerably on the after-effects of the treatment and on the prognosis for recovery. Professors Daly and Bastiaans considered that both witnesses would continue for a long time to have considerable disability shown by bouts of depression, insomnia and a generally neurotic condition resembling that found in victims of Nazi persecution. Drs. 5 and 1 considered that the acute psychiatric symptoms developed by witnesses during the interrogation had been minor and that their persistence was the result of everyday life in Northern Ireland for an ex-detainee carrying out his work travelling to different localities. In no sense could the witnesses' experiences be compared with those of the victims of Nazi persecution.
On the basis of this evidence the Commission is unable to establish the exact degree of the psychiatric after-effects which the use of the five techniques might have had on these witnesses or generally on persons subjected to them. It is satisfied, however, that, depending on the personality of the person concerned, the circumstances in which he finds himself, and the conditions of everyday life in Northern Ireland at the relevant time, some after-effects resulting from the application of the techniques cannot be excluded."
Outcome
- the combined use of the five techniques in the cases before it constituted a practice of inhuman treatment and of torture contrary to Article 3, and
- violations of Article 3 occurred by inhuman (and in two cases degrading) treatment of several persons including T6.
"… the five techniques applied together were designed to put severe mental and physical stress, causing severe suffering, on a person in order to obtain information from him. …
Compared with inhuman treatment discussed earlier (pp. 376 seq.), the stress caused by the application of the five techniques is not only different in degree. The combined application of the methods which prevent the use of the senses, especially the eyes and the ears, directly affects the personality physically and mentally. The will to resist or to give in cannot, under such conditions, be formed with any degree of independence. Those most firmly resistant might give in at an early stage when subjected to this sophisticated method to break or even eliminate the will.
It is this character of the combined use of the five techniques which, in the opinion of the Commission, renders them in breach of Art. 3 in the form of not only inhuman and degrading treatment, but also torture within the meaning of that provision.
Indeed, the systematic application of the techniques for the purpose of inducing a person to give information shows a clear resemblance to those methods of systematic torture which have been known over the ages. Although the five techniques - also called "disorientation" or "sensory deprivation" techniques – might not necessarily cause any severe after-effects the Commission sees in them a modern system of torture falling into the same category as those systems which have been applied in previous times as a means of obtaining information and confessions."
The inter-state case before the European Court of Human Rights
How the case came to be before the court
- refrain from reintroducing the five techniques, as a method of interrogation or otherwise; and
- proceed as appropriate, under the criminal law of the UK and the relevant disciplinary code, against those members of the security forces who committed acts in breach of Article 3 referred to in the Commission's findings and conclusions, and against those who condoned or tolerated them.
Steps before the court
Outcome
- by 16 votes to one that the use of the five techniques constituted a practice of inhuman and degrading treatment, which practice was in breach of Article 3;
- by 13 votes to four that the said use of the five techniques did not constitute a practice of torture within the meaning of Article 3;
- by 16 votes to one that no other practice of ill-treatment was established for the unidentified interrogation centres; and
- unanimously that it could not direct the UK to institute criminal or disciplinary proceedings against those members of the security forces who have committed the breaches of Article 3 found by the Court and against those who condoned or tolerated such breaches.
"1. The unidentified interrogation centre or centres
(a) The 'five techniques'
…
167. The five techniques were applied in combination, with premeditation and for hours at a stretch; they caused, if not actual bodily injury, at least intense physical and mental suffering to the persons subjected thereto and also led to acute psychiatric disturbances during interrogation. They accordingly fell into the category of inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3. The techniques were also degrading since they were such as to arouse in their victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance.
On these two points, the Court is of the same view as the Commission.
In order to determine whether the five techniques should also be qualified as torture, the Court must have regard to the distinction, embodied in Article 3, between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment.
In the Court's view, this distinction derives principally from a difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted.
The Court considers in fact that, whilst there exists on the one hand violence which is to be condemned both on moral grounds and also in most cases under the domestic law of the Contracting States but which does not fall within Article 3 of the Convention, it appears on the other hand that it was the intention that the Convention, with its distinction between 'torture' and 'inhuman or degrading treatment', should by the first of these terms attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering.
Moreover, this seems to be the thinking lying behind Article 1 in fine of Resolution 3452 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December, 1975, which declares: 'Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.'
Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was the extraction of confessions, the naming of others and/or information and although they were used systematically, they did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood.
168. The Court concludes that recourse to the five techniques amounted to a practice of inhuman and degrading treatment, which practice was in breach of Article 3."
"(b) Ill-treatment alleged to have accompanied the use of the five techniques
169. The applicant Government claim that the 14 persons subjected to the five techniques, or some of those persons including T6 and T13, also had to undergo other kinds of treatment contrary to Article 3.
The Commission has found such treatment only in the case of T6, although it regarded it as probable that the use of the five techniques was sometimes accompanied by physical violence (see para. 105 above).
170. As far as T6 is concerned, the Court shares the Commission's opinion that the security forces subjected T6 to assaults severe enough to constitute inhuman treatment. This opinion, which is not contested by the respondent Government, is borne out by the evidence before the Court.
171. In the 13 remaining cases examined in this context … the Court has no evidence to support a finding of breaches of Article 3 over and above that resulting from the application of the five techniques.
172. Accordingly, no other practice contrary to Article 3 is established for the unidentified interrogation centre or centres; the findings relating to the individual case of T6 cannot, of themselves, amount to proof of a practice."
"104. ….The Commission found no physical injury to have resulted from the application of the five techniques as such, but loss of weight by the two case-witnesses and acute psychiatric symptoms developed by them during interrogation were recorded in the medical and other evidence. The Commission was unable to establish the exact degree of any psychiatric after-effects produced on T6 and T13, but on the general level it was satisfied that some psychiatric after effects in certain of the 14 persons subjected to the techniques could not be excluded.
…
106. Although several other cases were referred to before the Commission by the applicant Government in connection with the unidentified interrogation centre or centres, no detailed allegations or findings are set out in the Commission's report except in the case of T22 which was one of the '41 cases'. …."
"152. The United Kingdom Government contest neither breaches of Article 3 as found by the Commission… nor … the Court's jurisdiction to examine such breaches."
165. The facts concerning the five techniques are summarised at paragraphs 96–104 and 106–107 above. In the Commission's estimation, those facts constituted a practice not only of inhuman and degrading treatment but also of torture. The applicant Government ask for confirmation of this opinion which is not contested before the Court by the respondent Government."
The scope of the inter-state case in the areas of inspection / punishment of offenders
"187. …. In the present case, the Court finds that the sanctions available to it do not include the power to direct one of those States to institute criminal or disciplinary proceedings in accordance with its domestic law."
The issue of criminal liability for what occurred in the period 1971-1978
"…. Further, while in our view the use of some if not all of the techniques in question would constitute criminal assaults and might also give rise to civil proceedings under English law, we refrain from expressing any view in respect of the position in Northern Ireland in deference to the courts there, before whom we understand proceedings which raise this issue are pending."
Events after the judgment of the ECtHR
"On this file there are various papers that show that Ministers and senior officials were indeed aware of the interrogation methods being used. These indications are unclear or ambiguous as to whether they had been aware in advance i.e. had expressly authorised their use but could plausibly be held to imply that that had been so. …"
"Ministerial awareness
Various papers show that Ministers and senior officials were indeed aware of the interrogation methods being used by the Army in Northern Ireland. In some cases the indications are unclear or ambiguous as to whether they had been aware in advance, i.e. had expressly authorised their use, but could plausibly be held to imply that they had been so. FCO papers show that officials admitted to themselves and alerted their superiors to the UK's legal vulnerability over Article 3 charges, eg a paper submitted to Lord Carrington, Mr Whitelaw and the Attorney General makes clear that "charges … dealing with the main allegations of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment … under Article 3 are likely to stand up." The papers go on to warn that "Ministers must therefore accept that it is a virtual certainty that, if proceedings continue to the stage of a finding by the Commission, that finding will be that … a systematic practice of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3, involving toleration at a high level, has been established." In other words at that time (27 November 1972) Ministers knew the situation and had a chance to comment. Other papers show that there was a warning to Ministers about the possibility or likelihood of a finding of "official toleration at a Government level"; and recognition of the UK's vulnerability under Article 3, where "only 5 out of 28 cases could be defended with any reasonable arguments". Later files contain a draft of the UK's Counter-memorial with a denial of official connivance or toleration. A draft letter to the Taoiseach has the Prime Minister explicitly denying Ministerial responsibility and resenting the Irish allegations because (though this was not in the final version) they are "malign and untruthful per se"."
The uncovery of materials from the National Archives and the RTÉ documentary of 2014
The RTÉ programme
(a) information as to who was responsible for the use of the five techniques. The programme linked this to the issue of attempts to seek a friendly settlement which had been pursued by the Irish Government and which had involved the question of whether there should be criminal or disciplinary proceedings against anyone; and
(b) materials it had which tended to undermine its assertions that the five techniques were not long-lasting or severe in their effects on the men. This had been an important issue in the litigation and had contributed to the Court's finding that, although the five techniques as applied in combination "were used systematically", they did not cause suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture. It was noted in the documentary that, before the Commission, the UK Government declined to call direct evidence on in-depth interrogation and its witnesses were instructed not to answer questions about it.
"… Costello [the Irish Attorney General] raised the proceedings brought by the Irish Government to the European Court of Human Rights, and in particular the possibility of either prosecuting or taking disciplinary action against those responsible in 1971/72 for acts found by the Commission to have been in breach of Article 3.
It is my view (confirmed by Brian Faulkner before his death) that the decision to use methods of torture in Northern Ireland in 1971/72 was taken by Ministers – in particular Lord Carrington, then Secretary of State for Defence.
If at any time methods of torture are used in Northern Ireland contrary to the view of the Government of the day I would agree that individual policemen or soldiers should be prosecuted or disciplined, but in the particular circumstances of 1971/72 a political decision was taken."
"1. I have seen the Home Secretary's minute to you of 31st March about the Attorney General's meeting with the Irish Attorney General, and I strongly agree that there should be no question of either prosecuting or taking disciplinary action against those responsible for "deep interrogation" in 1971.
2. I was however a little surprised by the statement that our predecessors, and in particular Lord Carrington, took a "decision to use methods of torture in Northern Ireland". The published records do suggest that this is rather a hard way of putting the decision to use deep interrogation.
3. Lord Balniel said in the House of Commons on 9th December 1971 interrogation in depth was authorised by the Northern Ireland Government with the knowledge and concurrence of HMG; but the rules then in force to govern the conduct of interrogation, which were summarised in the Compton Report, explicitly prohibited torture, brutality and humiliating or degrading treatment. Moreover, paragraph 12 of the Parker Reports says of the "five techniques" used in deep interrogation that "it cannot be assumed that any UK Minister has ever had the full nature of the particular techniques brought to his attention and consequently that he has ever specifically authorised their use". We have not contested the subsequent finding of the European Commission of Human Rights that the five techniques constitute torture but we have not explicitly accepted it and indeed the burden of our argument at Strasbourg was that they did not amount to torture. In short, we have rested publicly on the statement mentioned above.
4. I certainly do not want to labour the point since I entirely endorse the Home Secretary's conclusion, and in any case we have no responsibility to answer for what happened in 1971-72. But I thought the Home Secretary had compressed the record rather too starkly and in a way which goes beyond any public position.
5. I am copying this to the Home Secretary and the other member of IN."
"… I was concerned in that minute to stress that action against individual policemen or soldiers, as raised by Mr Costello, would not be justified, since a political decision had been taken in 1971/72.
Given that, I would accept that in discussing the situation in 1971/72 I compressed the record too starkly. It would have been better had I referred to a decision to use interrogation in depth in Northern Ireland in 1971/72 rather than referring to a decision to use methods of torture at that time.
But like Fred Mulley, I would not wish to labour this point unduly, particularly since these methods have been abandoned and have never been resumed."
"20. … I have now read Dr Leigh's Reports in these three cases.
21. I consider that Sean McKenna's case is one of the more serious ones. …. When Dr Leigh examined him on 10 April, 1974, he was tense and anxious and sobbed at times during the interview, and complained of many serious psychiatric symptoms, including contemplation of suicide."
"… I note that prior to his interrogation it was recorded by the doctor who examined him on admission to the Interrogation Centre on 11.8.71 that he suffered from mild heart trouble … It is clear, therefore, that at the time of admission to the Detention Centre he was already suffering from angina pectoris, and that this angina had increased in severity. In addition, he complained to me of a number of psychiatric symptoms, mainly of an anxious and fearful nature.
Angina pectoris is by many considered to be a psychosomatic disorder; it is a symptom of underlying heart disorder and is always associated with the risk of sudden death. It seems that Mr McKenna was suffering from angina before he was interrogated and I think it would be hard to show
a) that it was wise to proceed with interrogation, and
b) that the interrogation did not have the effect of worsening his angina.
With regard to his other psychiatric symptoms, I think that one will probably have to regard them as being the result of the so-called 'deep interrogation' procedures."
Events at the Policing Board 2014
"Question:
Following the assertion in official documents that Lord Carrington authorised the use of methods of torture in this jurisdiction, what action has the Chief Constable taken?
Response:
The PSNI will assess any allegation or emerging evidence of criminal behaviour, from whatever quarter, with a view to substantiating such an allegation and identifying sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution and bring people to court."
Action to look into the position
"It is of interest that a "dummy" sheet is attached which is in the midst of the other documents cross-referenced to the missing memorandum. I attach a copy of this sheet which records the following. "Document dated 31.3.77 retained under S.38 of the Freedom of Information Act, 2000. (Appendix 2) Having sought clarification in regard to that statement, I was informed that the document had most likely been returned to the original department which would have provenance over it. … The explanation as to its retention was for health and safety reasons. This would appear to be something of an all embracing and convenient rational.
The file is not available for public viewing, assuming it is released, until 2020. An application, however, can be submitted by the PSNI under the Freedom of Information Act."
"Having taken this matter as far as I can within a limited time period, I can conclude that we are now in possession of documents of interest, or can have access to a considerable amount of information contained within two very relevant files.
Should it be decided to further research this subject, it must be clearly understood that such a task would involve a considerable amount of research.
The information in my possession, by its nature opens up a number of other lines of enquiry. This would involve the possible reading of no less than one hundred and fifty individual files and may never answer the question posed."
• a press notice following a statement made by Merlyn Rees at Stormont Castle on 2 September 1976 relating to important steps taken by the UK Government to secure the protection contemplated by the Convention, including "fresh instructions to the security forces about the proper treatment of arrested persons, fresh disciplinary regulations for the RUC, and so on";
• Fred Mulley's letter of 12 April 1977, described above;
• Merlyn Rees' letter dated 18 April 1997, described above;
• a letter from the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister stating the Prime Minister had seen the letter of 18 April 1977;
• five press articles which, according to the Investigating Officer, mainly reported the views of Brian Faulkner and John Taylor and that both seemed to be in denial about the type or gravity of the interrogation methods used at the time; and
• documents relating to legal points and arguments relating to the proceedings taken by the Irish Government.
Of this file the Investigating Officer said that the first four documents described placed the Rees memo in context and that:
"It is perfectly clear that Merlyn Rees felt he unwittingly used the word "torture" in an ill-advised and unfortunate manner. This one memorandum has been seized upon by some groups and individuals to attempt to justify claims that the Government sanctioned the use of "torture"."
"… it is abundantly clear that a great deal of effort and thought had gone into the preparation and implementation of those directives. They were clearly acceptable at the time and used at a juncture in history when terrorism was rife in British Colonies and later in Northern Ireland."
PART B
Ministerial knowledge/authorisation
"2. Following a visit to Northern Ireland by the Intelligence Co-ordinator, whose report emphasised the importance of interrogation and the desirability of assisting the RUC Special Branch in every way possible, a request for assistance in the setting up of an RUC Interrogation Centre was discussed on 24 March 1971 at a meeting in the Ministry of Defence with representation of the Security Service. As the Security Service was not prepared to undertake the commitment, it was agreed that assistance should be provided by the Joint Services Intelligence Wing (JSIW) which is recognised as the only official school for interrogation training. The Home Office was informed at official level of the agreement, and DGI mentioned the matter in general terms to the Minister of State at the end of March.
3. In discussion on the pros and cons of internment in early August, S of S was advised that one of the advantages would be the intelligence dividends expected to be obtained through interrogation. Following the decision to proceed to internment, VCGS forwarded to S of S on 9 August a note from BGS (INT) which:-
(a) summarised the safeguards provided in JIC(65)15;
(b) explained that the supporting methods designed to heighten the subject's desire to communicate with his fellow human beings included isolation, fatigue, white sound, and deprivation of sense of place and time;
(c) made clear that the interrogation would be conducted by the RUC and that JSIW had provided, and would continue to provide, advice and support from the technical intelligence aspect.
4. On 10 August S of S [Lord Carrington] discussed the matter with the Home Secretary [Reginald Maudling]. Neither Secretary of State indicated any dissatisfaction with the situation explained in BGS (INT)'s minute. S of S consider I believe, that he and the Home Secretary (in the Prime Minister's absence) thereby acquiesced in the provision by the Army of advisory services for the interrogations that were expected to be authorised by the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs and to produce a valuable intelligence dividend. The selection of individuals to be interrogated was, however, entirely a matter for the RUC and the Northern Ireland Government.
5. On 11 August Mr. Faulkner, acting as Minister for Home Affairs, and on the advice of the RUC, signed orders … authorising the removal of each of the 12 persons … Mr Faulkner had received recommendations that these individuals should be interrogated, and he had been extensively briefed by the Director of Intelligence in Northern Ireland on the techniques of interrogation. By authorising the removal of these persons in the circumstances, Mr Faulkner must be deemed to have agreed that they should be interrogated.
6. I believe therefore that not only would it be fair that any public answer should be in terms that interrogation had been authorised by the Northern Ireland Government with the knowledge and acquiescence of HMG; but that the legal fact of the signing of the removal order by Mr Faulkner virtually precludes any other answer. Likewise, if asked who authorised interrogation of these particular individuals, the facts permit no other answer than "the Northern Ireland Government".
7. This minute is being copied to the Home Office and the Secretary of the JIC. If they agree the facts and deductions in the foregoing paragraphs, it will be for consideration when and how the Home Office should obtain Mr Faulkner's agreement that this will be the public line taken."
(a) It confirms the briefing given on 9 August 1971.
(b) It shows that the Secretary of State for Defence was the object of the briefing.
(c) It demonstrates that the Secretary of State was told of the intelligence dividends which would be expected to be obtained through interrogation.
(d) It confirms that he was told not only about the safeguards found in JIC(65)15 but also about "the supporting methods" designed to heighten the subject's desire to communicate with his fellow human beings including isolation, fatigue, white sound and deprivation of sense of place and time.
(e) It indicates that the interrogation would be conducted by the RUC and that JSIW had provided, and would continue to provide, advice and support from the technical intelligence aspect.
(f) It shows that the Secretary of State discussed the matter on the following day with the Home Secretary.
(g) It makes clear that neither demonstrated any dissatisfaction with the situation.
(h) It indicates that the Northern Ireland Minister for Home Affairs had been extensively briefed on the techniques of interrogation and had authorised the removal of each of the persons who was to undergo the process.
"Ballykelly
10. The Home Office was fully represented on inter-departmental discussions surrounding internment, and these included the establishment of the Interrogation Centre at Ballykelly. There can have been NO doubt in anybody's mind as to the purpose for which this camp was being modified.
Implementation
11. I need NOT document the recent history of interrogation because it is fresh in all our minds. It is enough to record that:
a. I made a full explanatory report to VCGS, setting out our interrogation techniques in detail.
b. VCGS forwarded this to S of S (VCGS/828 of 9 Aug 71).
c. Later PS/S of S told me that S of S discussed this with the Home Secretary personally – I think on the same day.
d. Interrogation began on 11 Aug 71 at 1900 hrs, but NOT until D of I had had one hour of personally explaining techniques to Mr Faulkner".
The issue of possible prosecutions arising from the events
"In my opinion there is no evidence that any person within the jurisdiction of the English courts has committed a criminal offence of the nature alleged".
Assurances given to the RUC
"… expressed grave concerns about the enquiry examining detailed allegations lest they proceeded in practice to look at the whole of the interrogation process. He rehearsed at length the history of the enterprise so far as the RUC were concerned; how the military had initiated the idea; how in the early part of the year they had run a presentation for his officers; how the whole thing had been forgotten until immediately before internment; and how at the last moment it had been decided to go ahead only after assurances had been obtained from the highest places. The assurances, as Mr Johnson interpreted them, give every support to the operation short of actions that involved physical brutality and it was because the Inquiry's terms of reference had been limited to looking at allegations of brutality that the RUC had found the idea of an investigation acceptable at all having regard to the protection they had sought and obtained …"
"5. There is a further position of the RUC's Special Branch referred to in paragraph 4c. of Mr Hockaday's note. In so far as there may well be public criticism when the report is published about the procedures used, the RUC will, I think, clearly expect UK Ministers to deal with the criticisms particularly since it was the UK authorities who persuaded the RUC to adopt the procedures in question."
The depth of the investigation into those who were responsible
"All the Commission cases were investigated at the time [but]
[t]he major difficulty, however, is that there is a large area of doubt about the adequacy of the investigations which were carried out."
Reference was also made to a 'cover up' on the part of the RUC at least in the years 1971 and 1972 leading to the "complete absence of prosecutions in the illustrative cases" and to the paucity of prosecutions in the remaining cases.
In respect of the issue of what line the authorities should take on investigations and prosecutions, the author went on:
"In relation to the five techniques, there is no point in talking about evidence or investigations. It would not be a week's work to discover who was responsible if we set our minds to it. As I understand it, the decision not to prosecute was, and is, a policy decision (and no doubt an admirable one)."
Materials relating to the issue of independence of the PSNI
"3.7 … As well as having fewer resources at its disposal than its predecessor, the Legacy Investigations Branch cannot itself satisfy the requirements of Article 2 ECHR because of its lack of independence from the police service. We recommend that the legislation establishing the Historical Investigations Unit be treated as an urgent priority …"
Requests to the Irish Attorney General and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
PART C
Summary of Court's assessment
(i) Deep interrogation techniques were taught by the MOD to members of the RUC beginning around March 1971.(ii) Interrogations were as a result supposed to be conducted in accordance with JIC (65) 15.
(iii) Ministers at Westminster and in Northern Ireland were aware of the techniques as they were told what the methods to be employed were to be. The techniques were to be those which had been used on numerous occasions in the past. The above position was not disguised when controversy surrounding the use of the techniques broke out within days of deep interrogation being used but, for the most part, the use of general formulations to describe the official position was adopted. Authorisation, it was said, occurred at a "high level" or it was said that steps were taken by the Northern Ireland Government with the concurrence of the United Kingdom Government. The role of individuals was not highlighted. The court considers there is evidence which supports the view that informed authorisation in advance was given by one, if not two, Cabinet Ministers, as well as by the Northern Ireland Minister for Home Affairs.
(iv) The Compton inquiry did consider issues of alleged ill-treatment /brutality in the context of the use of deep interrogation but it did not explore the process of authorisation in any depth. Nor did it explore issues related to the identification or punishment of those responsible for what occurred.
(v) The Parker inquiry likewise did not concentrate on the issue of identifying those responsible for setting up and authorising the operation of deep interrogation. Rather it was chiefly concerned with policy development. However, both majority and minority reports acknowledged that some, if not all, of the techniques in use involved unlawfulness and the possible commission of criminal offences.
(vi) It appears likely that at some point in the process of authorising the use of interrogation in depth or in the immediate aftermath of controversy involving its use, the RUC received assurance that its members, provided they acted in line with the JIC Guidelines, would not face legal sanction. The detail of this is unclear.
(v) Unsurprisingly, the Government of the day announced when Parker was debated in Parliament that the techniques would not be used in future as an aid to interrogation.
(vi) The Ireland-United Kingdom inter-State case was brought in the aftermath of these events. Insofar as the case involved the issue of deep interrogation it centred on the question of the substantive breach of the requirements of Article 3 ECHR, including the issue of whether the respondent State was engaging in an administrative practice. The overall issues were subjected to careful consideration and evidence taking, albeit on a limited scale. Ultimately, the UK Government conceded the administrative practice point but the issue of the impact of deep interrogation on the mental health of the individual who was the subject of it was contested.
(vii) While both the Commission and the Court found that the UK had substantively breached Article 3 in the context of deep interrogation, the emphasis was different as between the two with the Commission viewing what had occurred as amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment and torture whereas the court declined to make any finding of torture. Notably, the court's conclusion was reached in circumstances in which the UK had not, before the court, contested the Commission's finding in respect of torture.
(ix) Neither the Commission nor the court focussed to a substantial degree on the question of the effectiveness of any official investigation on the part of the UK authorities in the context of bringing those responsible for what occurred to justice. This aspect of Article 3 jurisprudence had not at that time been developed.
(x) Only a very limited finding was made by the Commission about the psychiatric effects arising from deep interrogation, though it acknowledged that on this issue there was disagreement between the psychiatrists on either side. The Commission said it was unable to establish the exact degree of psychiatric after-effects which the use of the techniques had. However it accepted that some after-effects resulting from the application of the techniques could not be excluded. This position was adopted later by the court.
(xi) Explicitly the ECtHR held that it could not direct the UK to institute criminal or disciplinary proceedings against those members of the security forces who had committed acts in breach of Article 3 or against those who condoned or tolerated such breaches.
(xii) There is little sign that any serious investigation in fact took place in the immediate aftermath of the use of the measures directed at the issue of identifying persons responsible for possible prosecution. Nor is there evidence which suggests that such an investigation in a meaningful way was conducted subsequently.
(xiii) Following the end of the inter-State proceedings in 1978 the issue of what had happened to the hooded men lay dormant. While issues arose within the UK Government as to the disclosure of official public records in the early 2000s the discussion of this issue was conducted privately. Ultimately from in or around 2003 some documents were deposited in the UK National Archives, though their presence for long went unnoticed.
(xiv) It was not until 2014, as a result of documents found in the National Archives, that controversy in respect of the hooded men was re-awakened. The immediate trigger for this was a RTÉ broadcast in 2014 which suggested that torture had been authorised at the time by a UK Government Minister and that at the time of the inter-State case the UK Government had withheld from the Strasbourg institutions evidence which tended to undermine the UK case that the after-effects of the use of the five techniques were not long lasting or severe.
(xv) The RTÉ broadcast led to questions being asked about the posture of the PSNI in relation to the above allegations. In July 2014 the forum of the Northern Ireland Policing Board was used to question senior police officers, including the Chief Constable, about what steps the police proposed to take, in particular in relation to the allegation that torture had been authorised by a UK Government Minister.
(xvi) These questions elicited the response that the police would assess any such allegation and, if there was sufficient evidence, the question of prosecution could be considered.
(xvii) Thereafter a preliminary investigation was carried out at the National Archives on behalf of the police but while it considered a range of documents it was concluded by the investigator that there would be no useful purpose served by taking the investigation further. This resulted in two Assistant Chief Constables stating that the evidence to support an allegation that the UK Government had authorised torture had not been found.
(xviii) This led to the present proceedings.
(xix) The issue of whether or not the ECtHR was misled is a matter which is currently being considered at Strasbourg.
PART D
The legal issues before the Court
PART E
The legal landscape
"Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity" (see paragraph 485).
The court went on (at paragraph 486) to say that:
"The investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. This means that the authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention and must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or to use as the basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines the ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of those responsible will risk falling foul of this standard".
In a later paragraph (495) the court stated that:
"An adequate response by the authorities in investigating allegations of serious human rights violations may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing the appearance of impunity, collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts".
The court (at paragraph 497) also, on the facts of the case, spoke of the importance and gravity of the issues requiring "particularly intense public scrutiny of the investigation".
"In cases of wilful ill-treatment the breach of Article 3 cannot be remedied only by an award of compensation to the victim. This is so because, if the authorities could confine their reaction to incidents of wilful ill-treatment by State agents to the mere payment of compensation, while not doing enough to prosecute and punish those responsible, it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity, and the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, despite its fundamental importance, would be ineffective in practice" (see paragraph 105).
The problem of the efflux of time
"In my view the answer lies in appreciating that the obligation to hold an investigation is an obligation triggered by the occurrence of a violent death. The obligation to hold an investigation does not exist in the absence of such a death. The obligation is consequential upon the death. If the death is not within the reach of section 6, because it occurred before the Act came into force, it would be surprising if section 6 applied to an obligation consequential upon the death. Rather, one would expect to find that, for section 6 to apply, the death which is the subject of investigation must itself be a death to which section 6 applies. The event giving rise to the Article 2 obligation to investigate must have occurred post-Act".
(a) That only procedural acts and/or omissions occurring after the critical date fell within the court's temporal jurisdiction.(b) That there must exist a genuine connection between the death and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State for the procedural obligation to come into effect.
(c) That a significant proportion of the procedural steps will have been or ought to have been carried out after the critical date.
(d) However, in certain circumstances, the connection could be based on the need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective manner.
"I can start by stating with some confidence what the Grand Chamber did not decide. It did not decide that there is a continuing obligation to hold a procedural investigation that persists from the time of the death until the obligation has been satisfied".
He then went on, at paragraph 48:
"The 'procedural acts and/or omissions'…relate to specific incidents of a particular process or procedure. "Omissions" cannot be read as applying to historic failings before the critical date that have not been remedied".
At paragraph 49 he commented that:
"The concept of a connection between a death and the entry into force of the Convention for the State in question is not an easy one if, as seems to be the case, this connection is more than purely temporal".
And at paragraph 50 he said:
"The obligation to comply with the procedural requirements of Article 2 is to apply where 'a significant proportion of the procedural steps ' that Article 2 requires (assuming it applies) in fact take place after the Convention has come into force. This appears to be free-standing obligation".
"I believe that the most significant feature of the decision…is that it makes it quite clear that the Article 2 procedural obligation is not an obligation that continues indefinitely…[j]ust because there has been a historic failure to comply with the procedural obligation imposed by Article 2 it does not follow that there is an obligation to satisfy that obligation now. In so far as Article 2 imposes any obligation, this is a new free standing obligation that arises by reason of current events. The relevant event in these appeals is the fact that the coroner is to hold an inquest into [the applicants'] deaths. Silih…establishes that this event gives rise to a free standing obligation to ensure that the inquest satisfies the procedural requirements of Article 2".
"The second principle is that the ambit of application of the Act should mirror that of the Convention…[t]he object of the Act was to bring rights home. This will only be achieved if claimants are able to bring in this jurisdiction claims that they would otherwise be permitted to bring before the Strasbourg court".
At paragraph 62, Lord Phillips asked "Is the presumed intention of Parliament when enacting the HRA that there should be no domestic requirement to comply with this international obligation?". To this, his answer was: "the mirror principle should prevail. It would not be satisfactory for the coroner to conduct an inquest that did not satisfy the requirements of Article 2, leaving open the possibility of the claimants making a claim against the United Kingdom before the Strasbourg court. On a natural meaning of the provisions of the HRA they apply to any obligation that currently arises under Article 2".
"The first is whether Article 2…gives rise to a procedural obligation on the State to carry out an effective public investigation into the circumstances of a death where agents of the State are, or may be, in some way implicated, even though because the death occurred before 2 October 2000 the substantive obligation does not apply to it in domestic law. The second is whether, if there is no such obligation in domestic law but the State nevertheless decides to carry out an investigation into a pre-commencement death of that kind, the investigation which it carries out must meet the procedural requirements of Article 2…".
"In the light of this somewhat unsatisfactory state of affairs, there would be much to be said for our deciding the issue of whether McKerr remains good law on this point. However, given that it is unnecessary to resolve that issue in order to determine this appeal, we ought not to decide it unless we have reached a clear and unanimous position on it. We have not. On the one hand, the respondents' case is supported by an unanimous decision of a five-judge court in McKerr, whose ratio is clear and simple to apply, but it could lead to undesirable conflicts between domestic and Strasbourg jurisprudence. On the other hand, the appellants' case derives significant support from two, and arguably three, of the judgments in the subsequent seven-judge court in McCaughey, and, while it involved applying Strasbourg jurisprudence which has been criticised for lack of clarity, it would ensure that domestic and Strasbourg jurisprudence march together…Accordingly, I would leave open the question of whether, if the Strasbourg court would have held that the appellants were entitled to seek an investigation into the Killings under Article 2, a UK court would have been bound to order an inquiry pursuant to the 1998 Act".
"[99] We return to Mr Fordham's essential submission, using the language of his skeleton argument, namely that, whilst McKerr has constructed a roadblock, Re McCaughey has removed it. It is a bold submission. In our judgment it is wrong because it seeks to derive more from Re McCaughey than it has placed on offer. We do not consider that the Supreme Court was addressing the question whether a post-Human Rights Act decision whether or not to commence an investigation or inquest into a pre-Human Rights Act historic death is constrained by the procedural obligation under Article 2. Re McCaughey was a clear case of an inquest formally commenced before 1 October 2000 but with the major part of it being processed after that date.
[100] What they (appellants) have been seeking in recent years is a new public inquiry, embracing an inquiry into the inadequacy of previous investigations. In our view, the domestic law in relation to reliance on Article 2 in these circumstances is still expounded in Re McKerr, by which we remain bound. We do not accept that a majority of the Supreme Court overruled Re McKerr on this point or intended to do so… Any attempt to move in that direction would now be a matter for the Supreme Court rather than us".
The Brecknell doctrine
"…the Court takes the view that where there is a plausible, or credible, allegation, piece of information or item of relevance to the identification, and eventual prosecution or punishment of the perpetrator of an unlawful killing, the authorities are under an obligation to take further investigative measures".
"The lapse of time will, inevitably, be an obstacle as regards, for example, the location of witnesses and the ability of witnesses to recall events reliably…[t]he court would further underline that, in light of the primary purpose of any renewed investigative efforts, the authorities are entitled to take into account the prospect of success of any prosecution".
"Should new material emerge in the post-entry into force period and should it be sufficiently weighty and compelling to warrant a new round of proceedings, the court will have to satisfy itself that the respondent State has discharged its procedural obligation under Article 2 in a manner compatible with the principles enunciated in its case-law. However, if the triggering event lies outside the Court's jurisdiction ratione temporis, the discovery of new material after the critical date may give rise to a fresh obligation to investigate only if either the 'general connection' test or the 'Convention values' test…has been met".
Independent investigation as a feature of Article 2
"The investigation should be independent of the executive. Independence of the investigation implies not only the absence of a hierarchical or institutional connection, but also independence in practical terms".
"The extent to which the requirements of effectiveness, independence, promptitude and expedition, accessibility to the family and sufficient public scrutiny apply will again depend on the particular circumstances of the case, and may well be influenced by the passage of time as stated above. Where the assertion of new evidence tends to indicate police or security force collusion in an unlawful death, the criterion of independence will, generally, remain unchanged".
'Public perception of the possibility of unconscious bias is the key'".
PART F
The court's assessment of the issues
Articles 2 and 3 – the Convention issue
What would Strasbourg do on the facts of these cases?
The 'Convention values' test
Is the Brecknell test met?
Is McKerr still good law?
Independence
(a) The fact remains that the RUC were extensively involved in the events here at issue and the PSNI still has a substantial number of officers who in the past have served in the RUC.
(b) There are officers of the RUC who might even be serving now in the PSNI who could be the subject of investigation. Certainly, such officers may well in the past have served in the PSNI with officers who may be charged with the investigation.
(c) Public confidence would best be served by transparent investigation. Moreover there are agencies in the State which can without great difficulty be utilised to carry out any investigation required. Indeed it would be expected that investigations into police officers who had served in the RUC and who now served in the PSNI would have their cases considered by the Police Ombudsman.
(d) Given the nature of the relationship at the time between the Northern Ireland and United Kingdom authorities and the relationship between the RUC and the PSNI, if the PSNI was to be the investigative agency in respect of those who authorised the deep interrogation process this, especially in Northern Ireland, would be detrimental to the goal of securing the requisite public confidence needed to sustain such an investigation.
(e) The position of the PSNI in dealing with legacy cases generally has been the subject of substantial question marks in recent years, in many cases long post-dating the approach of the Strasbourg court in Brecknell. The present case is one which involves a notorious chapter in the history of the troubles in Northern Ireland and the level of scrutiny required and the identity of the scrutiniser against this background requires heightened care. To invest the power to investigate in the hands of the PSNI in these circumstances is concerning.
(f) As McQuillan indicates, there has been considerable public concern about the quality of investigations into troubles related deaths, including investigations carried out by the Historic Enquiries Team, which is associated with the PSNI. This can be expected to continue and be to the fore in an investigation of this nature.
(g) The preliminary investigation carried out in 2014 in these cases, the court regrets to say, does not inspire confidence, as will be discussed later.
(h) The approach of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers in the context of the McKerr group of cases should not be viewed, for the reasons referred to in McQuillan at paragraph [126], as of more than of general interest and should not be viewed as precluding a finding of this nature.
The common law issue
Has there been a breach of customary international law?
Rationality
Legitimate Expectation
The issue of whether the European Commission and Court of Human Rights were misled
PART G
Conclusions
Note 1 21 EHRR 97. The ECtHR stated that “The obligation to protect the right to life under [Article 2] read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State” (see paragraph 161). [Back] Note 3 The correct approach in this sort of situation was reviewed by Weatherup J (as he then was) in McCartney and McDermott’s Application [2009] NIQB 62 at paragraphs [30]-[31]. This cites authorities of the Irish and Northern Ireland Courts of Appeal over a prolonged period. These indicate that when faced with a decision of the English Court of Appeal the Northern Ireland court is not strictly bound by them but afford great respect to them and will habitually follow them, even where the court considers the matter doubtful. [Back]